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This thesis examines the use and nature of chartism in the foreign exchange market, bringing 
together an analysis of chartist methods and the views/empirical work of economics. A survey 
of general chartist methods demonstrates the origins of the modern techniques, the 
construction of the various indicators, the use of pattern recognition and the variety of 
calculated indices. Despite these methods being widely used in the market, there seems to be 
very little bridging between practical chartism and the many fundamental-based academic 
studies of exchange rate determination/forecasting. Key points of the academic literature 
which have features pertinent to non-fundamental chart analysis are therefore discussed, and 
what little explicit analysis of chartism has been done is highlighted. It is clear that analysis of 
the subject is a growing area of the literature. 
It transpires, however, that there is minimal actual evidence available about the use of 
chartism in practice. To provide information on this, a questionnaire survey was conducted to 
examine the extent to, and manner by which, chartism is used in the (London) foreign 
exchange market and how it is perceived by the market participants themselves. This gives 
clear information on the extent of chartist advice in the market and the wide variety of 
techniques used, along with insights into the differing views held by market participants on the 
subject. While something of a broad consensus emerges regarding the possible methods and 
the weights given to charts at differing time horizons, there is sufficient heterogeneity in 
general to suggest that differences of views will be transmitted in actual chartists advice. 
To test this directly, a database of chartists' forecasts was constructed by a telephone survey 
of a panel of chartists, to compile their one and four week ahead predictions for the three 
major bilateral rates. This gives a unique data set, from which it is possible to analyse the 
forecasts of individuals as well as the median forecast. The data is subjected to a battery of 
tests and comparisons, a recurring result of which is indeed the apparent difference in 
accuracy between individual chartists. For example comparisons with a range of other 
forecasting techniques (economic and statistical), show some chartists under-perform these 
consistently while the best are even able to outperform a random walk. 
Tests of the implied expectations mechanism reveal that the hypothesis of rationality of 
chartism cannot be entirely rejected over the short horizon, but that there is stronger evidence 
of irrationality over the four week period, a result which becomes more pronounced as the 
information set is expanded, which provides evidence against the chartist tenet that 'the price 
discounts everything'. Testing for different methods of expectation formation reveals that in 
general the hypothesis of static expectations cannot be rejected against the variety of 
afternatives considered. Overall, the crucial result in this area was that of an inelasticity of 
expectations: chartists' advice does not appear to exert a destabilising on the foreign 
exchange market by overreacting systematically to changes in the current rate. 
In sum, this thesis forms a bridge between chartism and economics, by examining the 
methods and results of the former and analysing them with the tools of the latter. 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
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1.1: Introduction 
Chartist, or technical, analysis involves using charts of financial asset prices, 
together with certain descriptive statistics to try to infer the likely course of 
future prices and so construct forecasts and trading strategies. The approach, 
first explicitly developed in terms of the stock market, is now applied to all 
asset markets 
- 
such as commodities and foreign exchange, spot and future 
markets. It is with reference to the market for spot foreign exchange that the 
analysis in this thesis is specifically aimed, although the principals of chartism 
are common to many financial markets. 
The chartist approach contrasts starkly with the methods of economists. While 
economists see themselves as trying to infer the behaviour of asset prices 
from solid fundamental reasoning, chartists analyse the market in terms of its 
past price movements alone. An essential difference between chart analysis 
and fundamental economic analysis is hence that chartists study only the price 
movement of a market, whereas fundamentalists attempt to look to the 
reasons behind that movement. Chartists see the market price as embodying 
all aspects of the market 
- 
economic or non-economic, rational or irrational, 
balancing all the forces of supply and demand. Hence the market pdce is 
seen by chartists as immediately discounting all pertinent information and 
therefore encompassing all the fundamentalists' views. 
It is clear at the outset that the ideas purported by chartists are not dissimilar in 
some respects to those of rational expectations, (Muth, 1961). And this can 
lead to a paradox, highlighted by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
- 
if market 
prices fully and instantly reflect all available information, then agents have no 
incentive to gather costly information, in which case it is not clear how the 
information gets discounted into market prices. 0) Another paradox inherent 
in the chartist assumption of all pertinent information being immediately 
(1) This is dicussed further in section 2.2.1.2 in relation to Dow Theory. 
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discounted in the price is that of why chartist do not therefore believe that their 
own forecasts are discounted: in which case it would be impossible to 
construct profitable trading strategies. It is questions such as these which 
probably lead economists to believe that chartism is built on untenable ground. 
There have, however, long been suggestions of the widespread use of 
chartism 
- 
even cursory contact with market practitioners and the large body of 
chartist literature would reveal a depth of interest. More formal studies, such 
as the study of the foreign exchange market conducted by the Group of Thirty 
(1985) have also pointed to widespread interest. The popular perception of 
chartism among economists, however, contrasts oddly with its existence in the 
market. The popular perception of chartism among economists is probably of 
it being somewhat irrational, a view succinctly expressed by The Economist, 
'Technical analysis is the alchemy of the modern investment world 
... 
like any 
other cult [chartism] is not overly worded by logic'. (The Economist, 30.1.88 
- 
5.2.88, p 65). It is probably fair to say that this also sums up the prevailing 
attitude of academic economists, at least until recently. As Marris (1989) 




with undisguised scorn; indeed again until quite recently, they had not even 
bothered to look at what chartists were doing'. 
There does, however, recently appear to have been a growing interest among 
economists in the role of chartists in financial markets. In large part this 
appears to stem from the numerous empirical features of markets which 
cannot be explained by standard fundamental 'efficient market'type theories. 
It is probably true to say that such approaches in any case seem somewhat 
counter to the beliefs of financial practitioners. To quote the Financial Times, 
(5.4.88, p16), 'In the hurly-burly of City dealing rooms, where anomalous price 
movements are exploited daily, the [efficient markets] theory has always been 
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dismissed as the product of remote academic theorising'. This continuing 
undiluted scepticism and mounting empirical evidence on the inadequacy of 
purely fundamental exchange rate models (eg Meese and Rogoff, 1983a, b) 
has in large part been the motivation behind the explicit acknowledgement of 
non-fundamentals influences on financial markets. The inclusion of chartist 
players in models (for example, those of Frankel and Froot, 1986b, d, 1987b) 
has been able to account for movements in the path of the dollar which 
fundamental models have to leave unexplained. The very continuation of the 
existence of non-fundamental 'noise-traders' in the market, in contrast to the 
traditional view which would claim such players would be wiped out by'smart' 
speculators has been demonstrated by De Long et al (1987,1988,1989), and 
the potential profitability of trading using simple chartist rules has been 
demonstrated for the recent period by Schulmeister (1988). These, along with 
other examples considered later, evidence a move in the literature towards the 
inclusion of non-fundamentals which seems capable of producing results more 
in accord with real-world phenomena. 
Reasons why interest in chartism is important therefore become clear. First, 
chartism is an actual facet of the market, and hence it seems unreasonable to 
dismiss it without consideration, particularly given evidence (both presented in 
this thesis and available elsewhere) of its widespread consideration by market 
practitioners. Second, it does seem that the appropriate role for economists is 
to endeavour to explain the actual features of markets, rather than regarding 
departure of market behaviour from what theory would predict as some kind of 
aberration. Third, given that chartism is a widespread market tool, its potential 
effects upon markets should be considered. Particularly crucial seems to be 
the question of whether these players may exert a destabilising influence on 
the market. These issues are explored further in the main body of the thesis, 
an overview of the contents of which is given next. 
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1-2: Overview of thesis 
The starting point of this thesis (Chapter 2) is to survey the techniques used by 
chartists in practice: the origins of the methods, to explain the construction of 
the indicators which chartists consult, and to examine how they can be 
interpreted and used as forecasting tools. It is shown how these indicators 
can be either subjective 
- 
in the form of identifying visually recurdng patterns in 
price series; or objective 
- 
such as the analysis of various calculated indices of 
price movements. The plethora of methods and potentially different ways of 
combining them, however, means that the results of either or both may well be 
highly user-dependent. 
The treatment of chartism and related issues in the literature is considered in 
Chapter 3. Some points regarding this were made in the overview of the 
previous section: it is apparent that there is a growing interest in, and 
acknowledgement of, chartism and general 'non-fundamental' aspects of 
markets, following previous neglect. Promising results do seem to come from 
models which incorporate such features 
- 
certain aspects of price behaviour 
unexplained by traditional approaches are able to be demonstrated. 
Despite this growing interest in chartism, there is virtually no work which 
specifically examines the extent to, and manner by which, chartism is used in 
the foreign exchange model. Clearly a pre-requisite for the examination of this 
question is a thorough knowledge of chartist techniques, as provided in 
Chapter 2. Given this, Chapter 4 goes on to explain the design and 
implementation of a questionnaire on chartism targeted at every chief foreign 
exchange dealer in the London market. 
The questionnaire was designed to elicit answers to three basic questions. 
First, to determine which chartist technique are most used in practice; second, 
to ascertain the role of the chartist practitioners themselves; and third, to 
explore how market participants view the role of chartism. This survey gave 
hard empirical information on which type of chartist techniques are widely 
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used, and of views of chartism held by market participants. The detailed 
results are discussed in Chapter 4, but two points worth highlighting here are 
that chartism appears to be most used at shorter forecasting horizons 
(intraday to one week) and that most of those questioned regarded chartism 
and fundamental analysis as complementary, rather than competing, tools of 
analysis. The result concurs with the impression gained from a survey of 
chartist techniques in Chapter 2- implying that chartist advice can be highly 
subjective 
- 
the advice presumably being even more diluted if combined with 
fundamental opinion as well. 
The actual predictions of chartists are subject to empirical analysis in Chapter 
5. A telephone survey was conducted over a nine-month period, asking a 
panel of chartists for their forecasts of the level of the three major bilateral 
exchange rates one and four weeks ahead. This gave a unique data set, in 
that it consisted entirely of chartist views. An additional advantage of the data 
is that it enables the testing of the properties of the individual as well as the 
median forecasts 
- 
whereas most surveys only allow researchers access to 
composite data. The data was subject to a variety of tests to examine its 
nature and to compare its predictions with other forecasting approaches. 
A recurring result throughout this analysis is the apparent difference in 
accuracy between individual chartists, evidenced in both their qualitative 
(direction of movement) accuracy and in the size of absolute errors. 
Comparison with a range of other forecasting techniques gives a range of 
results, with some chartists underperforming an array of standard economic 
and statistical approaches, while the best even outperformed a random walk 
over the sample period. Given this information, Chapter 6 goes on to test the 
degree of rationality present in the forecasts. 
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Three nested degrees of rationality were defined and tested: first that of using 
the past price movement of the currency in question alone; second, also 
including information on past price movements of the two other currencies; 
and third, also using key fundamental information available at the time. The 
results overall showed that hypothesis of rationality was sooner rejected at the 
four week horizon than at the one week horizon. This can be adduced as 
further evidence of chartism having most use as a short-term forecasting tool, 
since information on past errors seems to be lost. 
In Chapter 7, the examination of expectations continues with analysis of the 
implied expectations mechanisms in the chartists' forecasts. Crucially 
examined is the question of whether chartism may exert a destabilising 
influence on the market. The result to emerge is that chartist advice does not 
appear to be intrinsically destabilising in the sense that chartists' expectations 
do not appear to overreact systematically to changes in the current exchange 
rate. 
The key results and conclusions are highlighted in the overall conclusion of the 
thesis in Chapter 8. 
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2A SURVEY OF CHARTIST TECHNIQUES 
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2-1: Introduction 
Chartist analysis involves using charts of financial asset prices, together with 
certain descriptive statistics, to try to infer the likely course of future prices and 
so construct forecasts and trading strategies. This chapter surveys chartist 
methodology with particular reference to the market for spot foreign exchange, 
which is the particular concern of this thesis. The next section discusses Dow 
Theory and Elliott Wave Theory, from which much modern technical analysis 
can be traced. Section 2.3 describes the construction of charts and allied 
indicators, while Section 2.4 considers pattern recognition 
- 
the identification of 
visually recurring patterns in time series price data. Mechanical trading 
systems, widely used in conjunction with these, are then explained, while 
Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2: Dow theory and Elliott wave theory 
Much of modern technical analysis can be traced back to Dow Theory, which 
was developed specifically in relation to the stock market. Its principles laid 
the foundations for many of the charting techniques still used today and as 
such, Dow Theory is an appropriate introduction to the general subject of 
chartism. Closely allied to Dow Theory is Elliott Wave Theory which goes 
slightly further by attempting to provide an overall market perspective in 
attempting to anticipate, rather than follow, market moves. 
2.2.1: Dow theory 
2.2.1.1: The origins of Dow theory 
Dow Theory is probably the oldest, most basic and a particularly well known 
method of chartist analysis. It is in fact the result of the combined work of 
Charles H Dow and William Peter Hamilton. Dow was one of the founders of 
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Dow, Jones & Co, the publishers of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), of which 
he was the first editor, while Hamilton was a close associate of Dow's, and 
edited the newspaper for twenty years until 1929. The identifiable principles of 
what is now known as Dow Theory date from a series of Wall Street Journal 
editorials. The only expression Dow himself made of the theory was in a 
number of those editorial articles written between 1900 and 1902. These 
stock market observations were first dubbed 'Dow Theory' by SA Nelson in 
The ABC of Stock Speculation, (1902). It was Hamilton who further developed 
the work of Dow in a further series of WSJ editorials entitled 'The Price 
Movement', and published an outline of the theory's principles in his book The 
Stock Market Barometer: a Studv of its Forecast Value based on Charles H 
Dow's Theory of the Price Movement' in 1922. 
The first formalised account of Dow Theory was due to Rhea (1 932a, b), who 
took as his source the total of 252 WSJ editoral of Dow and Hamilton and 
related writings. 
2.2.1.2: The Dow theory approach 
Descriptions of Dow theory generally start by asserting several basic tenets 
- 
discussed below. From these the concerns of the approach can be 
understood and the trading/forecasting strategy appreciated. These are: 
(a) 'The averages discount ey Dow originally worked with two 
indices, one covering industrials and the other railroads, which was 
subsequently widened to transport 
-these indices were 'the averages'. Since 
daily closing prices were assumed to reflect the judgement and sentiment of 
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market participants, (2) it was held that, 'this process discounts everything 
known and predictable that can affect the demand supply relationships of 
stocks' (Pring 1985). This clearly bears with it an implicit assumption of 
something akin to rational expectations 
-Muth (1961). Thepointofthe 
assumption is that 'fundamentals' can be ignored for the purposes of 
forecasting so that, for example, information on past and expected future 
money supply, etc should already be discounted into asset prices, enabling the 
chartist to ignore them for the purposes of analysis. 
This does not necessarily mean that prices are unpredictable. Most modern 
fundamentalist approaches to asset price determination also assume rational 
expectations 
- 
for example, the discounted present value model asserts that 
the current share prices reflects the entire expected future path of dividends 
(see eg Brealey and Myers 1981). In the long run, share prices and dividends 
will move in line with each other, so share prices will only follow a random walk 
if dividends do so. 
This first tenet of Dow theory also suggests a paradox, highlighted in a slightly 
different context by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980): if market prices fully and 
instantly reflect all available information, then market participants have no 
incentive to gather costly information, in which case it is not clear how 
information gets discounted into market prices. The resolution of the paradox 
lies in relaxing the assumption that prices reflect all available 
(2) Or as expressed in Rhea, 1932, 'The fluctuations of the daily closing prices of 
the Dow-Jones rail and industrial averages afford a composite index of 
all the hopes, disappointments, and knowledge of everyone who knows 
anything of financial matters, and for that reason the effects of coming 
events (excluding acts of God) are always properly discounted in their 
movement. The averages quickly appraise such calamities as fires and 
earthquakes'. Rhea (1 932b) p1 9. 
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information. It is the possibility of making abnormal profits by very short-term 
arbitrage which gives agents the incentive to gather and process new 
information. If data are gathered discretely, it is assumed that the arbitrage 
process has taken place within the period. Another paradox inherent in the 
assumption of all pertinent information being immediately discounted in the 
price concerns whether the chartist forecasts themselves would be discounted. 
(b) 'The market has three trends' According to Dow Theory, there are 
simultaneously three movements or trends governing behaviour of the 
averages: the primary or major trend, the secondary trend and the minor 
trend. (3) Dow theorists would give the following rationale of market 
movements. The primary trend, lasting two or three years, is in turn divided 
into three distinct phases. For example, a primary bull movement would begin 
as the bear market bottoms out, the averages have discounted the worst 
news, and informed buying by the most knowledgeable investors begins 
- 
the 
'accumulation' phase. The second phase would set in as prices begin to 
advance noticeably and business news improves, the point at which chartist 
analysts would aim to begin to participate. In the third and final stage, when 
the market becomes dominated by bullish overspeculation, 'knowledgeable' 
investors would aim to begin to take their profit as the market peaks out 
- 
the 
so-called distibution' phase. 
(3) To quote an original WSJ editoral by Hamilton, 'Simultaneously in any broad 
stock market there are 
- 
acting, reacting and interacting 
- 
three definite 
movements. That on the surface is the daily fluctuation; the second is 
a brief movement typified by the reaction in a bull market or the sharp 
recovery in a bear market which has been oversold; the third and main 
movement is that which decides the trend over a period of many 
months, or the main true movement of the market. ' The Wall Street 
Journal, August 8,1919. 
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Secondary or intermediate reactions are seen as being superimposed on the 
primary trend and may be defined as an important decline in a bull market 
or advance in a bear market, usually lasting from three weeks to as many 
months during which interval the movement generally retraces from 33 to 66 
per cent of the primary price change since the termination of the last 
preceeding secondary reaction'(Rhea 1932b). 
If the primary trend were viewed as analogous to the tide of the market, and 
the secondary reactions as the waves of the tide, then minor movements 
would be the ripples on the waves. Dow theorists regard minor movements, 
which could last from a few hours to two or three weeks, as having little more 
than nuisance value. 
(c) 'The averages must confirm each other This tenet refers back to 
Dow's two original indices 
- 
one for industrials and one for transport. The 
point is that, according to Dow theorists, action should only be taken when the 
charts for both markets are giving the same signal 
- 
perhaps within a short lag 
of each another. The motivation for this tenet is presumably simply to try to 
distinguish distinct movements from temporary observations; but some 
expositors have read more into it than this, calling upon specific fundamental 
justifications for the price movements. Recalling that the two averages are for 
industrials and transport, Pring (1985) writes: 'it is not possible to have a 
healthy economy where goods are being manufactured but not sold (ie 
shipped to market)'. 
(d) 'Volume must confirm the trend' Dow theodsts would use the volume 
of trading as a secondary input into interpreting chart signals. The basic idea 
is that trading volume should expand in the direction of the major trend 
- 
ie 
should be heaviest in the major up or down trends. For example, in a down 
trend, the volume should be heaviest as prices drop and should begin to fade 
on minor rallies in the downtrend. The opposite situation may well be taken as 
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a signal of an impending reversal in the major trend. In the present context of 
Dow theory, however, volume is very much regarded as a secondary indicator. 
rim (e) 'A trend must be assumed to continue until definite reversal signals a, e 
Perceived' This might be paraphrased as'Dow 9s first law of motion 9. The 
major part of Dow's Theory is in fact concerned with recognising reversal 
signals in the major trends, some simple illustrations of which are given in 
Chart2.1. Chart 2.1a illustrates a major bull trend on which secondary 
reactions (of perhaps three months or so) are superimposed. During a major 
bull trend, Dow Theory characterises the secondary trends as taking 'three 
steps up and two or three back'. 
In Chart 2.1 ba break in a major bull trend would be suggested as the 
secondary peak of Cis below the preceeding peak at A. This is 'confirmed' 
as the secondary downward reaction goes through the level of the preceeding 
secondary trough at B, which would generate a sell signal at D. 
The situation is less clear in Chart 2.1c, when although the secondary 
correction from B falls below the level of the preceeding secondary trough at 
A, it is not clear whether C should be recognised as a sell point since its peak 
B was higher than those before it. Some Dow theorists may interpret the 
movement through point C as a possible sell signal. Further evidence of a 
trend reversal, however, would be taken in this case from the relatively low 
secondary peak at E, confirming a definite sell signal at F. 
In practice, further evidence might be adduced in analysing Charts b and c in 
conjunction with trading volume figures. For example, if volume had thinned 
during the rise from A to B and expanded from B to C (Chart c), a Dow theorist 
might well recommend selling at C rather than waiting for F. 
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This summary of the theory has served to highlight the salient issues of Dow 
Theory as it has become known. The original expositions of the theory in fact 
run to great length 
- 
Rhea (1 932b, p1 1) prefaced his description with the 
suggestion that, "Dow theory, like algebra, is not readily understood after a 
mere casual reading of a text book in the subject". 
2.2.2: Elliott wave theo 
The Elliott wave principle is complementary to the Dow Theory described in 
the previous section, but many chartists claim it goes further by providing an 
overall perspective to market movements and allowing an analyst to anticipate 
reversals in trends (Frost and Prechter, 1978). The basic principle was 
presented by RN Elliott, who described it as a'much needed complement to 
Dow Theory. It was first published in 1939, in a series of twelve articles in the 
Financial World magazine and was originally applied to stock market 
averages. The basis of Elliott wave theory is that financial markets are 
claimed to follow a repetitive cycle of a five wave advance followed by a three 
wave decline. Before describing the important elements of the Elliott wave 
principle, it is worth looking at its numerical basis 
- 
the Fibonacci sequence. 
2.2.2.1: Fibonacci numbers 
Fibonacci numbers are taken as the numerical basis of Elliott wave theory. 
The Fibonacci sequence is constructed such that the sum of any two 
consecutive numbers equals the next number ie: 
xj 
--.: xj-1 + xj-2 ,j>2 
x2 ý-' 1 
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Thus the sequence begins 
1,1,2,3,5,8,13,21,34,55,89,144 etc 
The sequence displays a number of properties, one of which is an almost 
constant relationship between the numbers. The ratio of any number to the 
next highest number approaches 0.618 via a damped oscillatory path and 
similarly, the ratio of any number to its next lowest number is 1.618. Thisis 
the so-called 'golden ratio 9, which has known applications in many areas of 
human activity eg architecture (several examples are given in Plummer, 1989). 
The series itself was first presented by a thirteenth century mathematician, 
Leonardo Fibonacci. (4) 
The basic Elliott wave form can be broken down into Fibonacci numbers. As 
the analysis of these wave forms is the central tenet of the Elliott approach, 
the subject considered next. 
2.2.2.2: The Ellioft wave pdnciple 
The basic Elliott pattern is shown in Chart 2.2 
-a complete wave consisting of 
a five wave advance followed by a three wave decline. The first, second and 
third waves in the advancing phase are called the impulse waves, while the 
second and fourth are the correction waves. These are followed by a three 
wave correction (decline). Within each eight wave cycle there can be 
subcycles, with each wave subdividing into waves of one lesser degree, and 
so on. 
Subdividing the eight waves in Chart 2.2 into lesser waves gives 34 smaller 
waves, then subdividing the 34 smallest waves further gives 144 waves, all 
numbers of the basic Fibonacci sequence. Whether a particular wave divides 
into 5 waves or 3 waves would be in theory determined by the direction of the 
(4) In the book Liber Abaci (Book of Numbers) in 1202. 
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trend. In Chart 2.2 waves 1,3 and 5 are following the trend of the advancing 
wave 1 and so divide into 5, whereas waves 2 and 4 go against the prevailing 
advancing wave and divide into 3. The converse would apply to the 
downwave. 
While the eight wave cycle is the basic Elliott form, wave theorists claim to 
identify several variants. For example, while the basic up trend has five 
waves, one of the impulse waves may be elongated (an 'extension') and 
consist of five additional waves. There are, in fact, numerous variations which 
have been described on the theme (Frost and Prechter, 1978) 
- 
including the 
integration of some standard chartist patterns (eg ascending and descending 
triangles) into the waves. Though such occurrences make pattern 
identification less clear and often ambiguous, Elliott theorists are not deterred, 
and claim that these do not negate the underlying principle. 
Chart analysts who subscribe to Elliott wave theory thus claim that use of the 
patterns gives a wider perspective than traditional charting techniques by 
helping to determine where the market is in its overall cycle. In terms of 
forecasting, by distinguishing the direction of fives and threes, the analyst 
attempts to determine what to expect next (according to the Elliott wave 
principle) 
- 
whether the general market is advancing or correcting. For 
example, a three wave decline would imply correction (not reversal) of an 
overall bull market, whereas a five wave decline appearing in a bull market 
would be taken as an indication of the beginning of a downtrend. (Frost and 
Prechter, 1978). 
By trying to impose an overall perspective on the market, Elliott wave theorists 
aim to give advanced warning of market peaks and troughs. In this respect, 
they try to meet one of the major criticisms of the Dow approach, which only 
registers signals after a trend has been established. 
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Elliott wave theory is built implicitly on one of the same tenets that underlies 
Dow Theory 
- 
that 'the average discounts everything'. Only the movement of 
the market price is considered; all other information is held to be extraneous. 
Clearly the criticisms regarding the role of information, along with the links with 
the rational expectations hypothesis, apply as equally to the Elliott principle as 
they do to Dow theory. 
Elliott wave theorists argue that the principle that financial markets, such as 
equity markets, follow a five wave pattern with a three wave correction can be 
applied to shed light on historical market movements. Elliott himself identified 
different degrees of the patterns, the longest being the Grand Supercycle, 
spanning some two hundred years 
- 
see, for example, Pring 1985. (This does 
of course beg the question as to what extent it is possible to identify two 
hundred year cycles when the 'industrial society' has only existed since the 
latter half of the eighteenth century. ) The Grand Supercycle was further 
divided by Elliott into eight supercycle waves, which again were subdivided 
into eight cycle waves. The process could continue through the primary, 
intermediate, minute, minuette, and subminuette waves 
- 
the latter which 
would cover only a few hours. According to Elliott's theory, the current Grand 
Supercycle began around 1800, with the latest (and third) up wave having 
begun in 1932. 
Probably one of the major objections which an economist is likely to raise in 
connection with Elliott wave theory is that there appears to be no theoretical 
(or indeed logical) a priori basis for market movements to occur in patterns of 
three and five. This, in a sense, brings into the open the distinction between 
chartism and fundamentalism. Pure chartists offer few arguments as to why 
certain patterns should recur in financial markets other than that observation 
convinces them that they do. In that sense, chartism is largely extrapolative. 
Clearly, there will always be a problem in trying to identify market turning 
points using extrapolative methods (this is a classic criticism of Dow theory), 
and Elliott theory can be seen as an attempt to provide Dow theory with a 
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predictive basis. On the other hand, the predictive nature of Elliott theory is 
weak in the sense that, although it might predict the eventual occurrence of 
market corrections, the exact timing remains unstated. For example, in the 
description of the Grand Supercycle, there is no indication of when the 
assumed three correcting waves might occur. Advocates of the approach do, 
however, claim that the timespan between stock market peaks and troughs are 
often Fibonacci numbers, where simple Fibonacci time targets(5) are found by 
counting forward from significant turning points (Pring 1985). Elliott 
practitioners will cite examples where the next turning points occurred on the 
5th, 8th, 13th day/week etc after a significant change in trend (see, eg. Pring 
1985, Table A. 1, p 383), although the predictive power ascribed to this method 
even by ardent advocates is very slight. 
Another method practitioners might use to try to quantify the wave forns is that 
of proportional relationships between waves and Fibonacci ratios. Two such 
examples (Murphy 1986) are: 
multiplying the length of wave 1 by 1.618 and adding the result to the 
bottom of wave 2 gives minimum target for the top of wave 3. 
if one of the impulse waves extends (see earlier), the other two should be 
about equal in time and magnitude. 
In assessment, these time and quantitative aspects of Elliott waves must be 
the weakest link in the theory, a prevalent problem with all types of technical 
analysis. Practitioners of the Elliott principle claim that by far the most weight 
should be placed on pattern assessment rather than the time or ratio 
relationships and in general, Elliott wave theorists use the techniques in 
(5) Plummer (1989, Chapter 10) describes the calculation of more complex 
Fibonacci time targets. 
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conjunction with other technical tools. Furthermore, few chartists appear to 
subscribe to the explicit use of Dow and Elliott theory, instead tending to 
combine the insights from these with evidence from various other approaches. 
Having considered what is regarded as the origins of modern chartism, which 
was essentially developed in relation to the stock market, the next sections go 
on to look at the main methods of chart analysis currently in use in virtually all 
asset markets, beginning by looking at the basic tools of the subject 
- 
the 
charts and technical indicators themselves. 
2.3: Technical indicators and chart construction 
There are several types of charts and indicators used by chart analysts 
- 
this 
section explains their use and the methods by which they are constructed, 
looking at the bar chart, close-only charts and point and figure charting and 
introduces the area of moving averages, momentum and oscillator analysis. 
The widespread use of computers has enabled technical analysts to conduct a 
far more detailed, immediate and wide-ranging study of charts. Until relatively 
recently, chartism was a paper-based form of analysis, with graphs drawn on 
long rolls of paper. (Edwards and Magee, 1966, in fact offer chartists specif ic 
practical advice on how to continue charts on new piece of paper, and caution 
that a chartist should have, " 
... 
plenty of pencils, a dozen at least, well 





at once with another... " p295). As the Financial Times pointed out, "in the old 
days a chartist would be hard-pressed to keep a dozen charts up to date; now 
he or she can monitor the state of hundreds of shares, as well as currencies 
and commodities. "(Financial Times, 9.12.89, p 111) 
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2-3-1: Bar Charts 
The daily bar chart is a standard tool of the technical analyst. It contains 




volume of trade 
and, in the case of futures contracts, the amount of open interest. A typical 
example of a daily bar chart, for gold futures, is shown in Chart 2.3a, and a bar 
chart of spot foreign exchange (DW$) is shown in Chart 2.307) 
Each day's price range is plotted as a vertical bar, the end points therefore 
marking the high and low of the day with a tick to the right of the bar indicating 
the closing price. The closing price which is held by chartists to have most 
technical significance, as it is interpreted as the market's final evaluation of the 
day's trading. (See quotation from Edwards and Magee in section 2.5.1.1). 
Some charts also incorporate the opening price as a tick to the left of the bar. 
The volume of trade (where available) in the market is shown as vertical bars 
plotted on the bottom of the chart. The volume is the total number of contracts 
traded during the day, and is often referred to in the financial press in terms of 
it being 'light' (orthin), orheavy'during particular periods. These figures will 
not be available for some markets, such as spot foreign exchange, and in any 
case volume information is thought by many practising chartists to give 
unreliable signals. 
Open interest, applicable to futures markets, is the total number of outstanding 
contracts held by traders at the end of the day. It is the total of outstanding 
long or short contracts 
- 
only one side need be known as the two figures are, 
by definition, identical. Open interest is plotted as a solid line along the bottom 
of the chart, between the volume and the price bars. A dotted line which 
(6) Other indicators of price movements are sometimes also included on bar 
charts. In the example shown, moving averages of the price are shown 
on both charts, while a rate of change indicator (see section 2.5.2.1) is 
included on Chart 2.3b. 
(7) Charts 2.3a, b were kindly supplied by Investment Research of 
Cambridge. 
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shows a longer-term average of open interest is also sometimes included, in 
order to give a guide to seasonal movements. 
While daily (or shorter term) bar charts are probably the most widely used tool 
for immediate trading purposes, analogous charts can be constructed for any 
time period, to give a longer perspective of price movements. A weekly chart 
may cover some five years or so, and a monthly chart may go back twenty 
years, as opposed to the nine months or so of information which is usually 
contained in the daily chart. Used in combination, monthly, weekly and daily 
charts may be used by the trader to attempt to put short-term price movements 
into alonger-term perspective. The longer term charts would be studied first, 
to convey an impression of the potential longer term trends, and then the daily 
charts would help determine the exact timing of trading activity. 
At this point some necessary mechanics included in the construction of bar 
charts can be mentioned. A daily bar chart is usually plotted so as to exclude 
weekends, and a blank space is left for weekdays on which the exchanges are 
closed. The vertical axis can be constructed on either an arithmetic or 
logarithmic scale. On an arithmetic scale, the vertical distance is equal for 
each unit of price change, whereas on a logarithmic scale, equal distance 
implies an equal percentage change. While it may be clearer to use a 
logarithmic scale for longer term charts if prices have risen particularly steeply 
(probably due to inflation), commercial traders and chart services generally 
use a standard arithmetic scale. The diagrams in this chapter follow this 
convention. 
2.3.2: Close-Onl or Line Charts 
A second type of chart is the close-only or line chart, where the closing price is 
the only price of information plotted. Most of the illustrative charts in this 
thesis are drawn in the form of 'close-only' charts. 
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The usual reason for a trader plotting a line chart as opposed to a bar chart is 
that intra-day data is not available for some price series. Bar charts, however, 
are generally more readily available from commercial services than line charts, 
and are usually preferred by traders as they embody more information. 
2.3.3: Point and Finure Charts 
A third type of chart used by traders is the point and figure chart. The 
distinguishing feature of these charts is that they disregard the time dimension 
of price changes, with entries being made only when the price has moved by 
some predetermined amount. Chart 2.4 shows a point and figure chart(8) of 
the $/E rate from late 1986 to early 1990, from which it can be seen that the 
entries are made in the form of columns of X's for rising prices and O's for 
falling prices. Each entry represents a price movement of a specified amount, 
called the box size. On Chart 2.4, the box size is 0.5 cents ($ 0.005) hence a 
rise in the $/F- rate of ten cents would require a column of twenty X's to be 
plotted. Alternatively, choosing a box size of 0.2 would require a column of 
five O's to denote a price fall of one cent. If the price moves by an amount 
less than the box size, no entry is made. By convention, the first 0 in a 
column is always plotted one box below the last X in the previous column, and 
the first X is plotted one box above the lowest 0 in the preceding column. 
The convention for the initiation of a new column depends on the variety of 
point and figure chart used. The regular point and figure chart would begin a 
new column whenever the day's price reversed by an amount greater than the 
box size. Alternatively, areversal chart' formulation may be adopted, whereby 
a new column of X's or O's can only be initiated when the price has moved by 
some specified amount in the opposite direction to the previous trend. This 
amount is called the 'reversal size', and would usually be specified in the form 
of a multiple of the box size. 
(8) Chart 2.4 was kindly supplied by Chart Analysis. 
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While the choice of box (and reversal size if used) is arbitrary, the figures 
chosen significantly affect the number of entries made on the chart. Some 
experimentation is generally used in order to find the most informative size for 
a particular market and time period. Obviously, if a reversal size of N boxes 
were used, the number of O's or X's in each column must, by definition, be at 
least equal to N. 
2.3.4: Other Technical Indicators 
Although charts, particularly the daily bar chart, are a standard tool of technical 
analysis, other indicators are drawn upon to provide supplementary 
information. Moving averages are widely used to try to clarify the direction of 
trend in a market (see Section 2.5.1.1), while 'oscillator' and 'momentum' 
indicators emphasise the rate of change of the prevailing price action. Unlike 
charts, these latter categories of indicators can be used to generate precise 
trading signals. Their use will be discussed in further detail in Section 2.5. 
Market profile: One of the latest chartist tools currently in use is the 'market 
profile'. Chart 2.5 is an example of such a chart, constructed over a day's 
trading of spot DM/$. On the left hand side, each letter represents an hour's 
trading (A for the first hour of the day, etc) and a letter is repeated every time 
the price moves into a different 5-point range. (1 'point'= 0.0001 for DM/$ and 
$/F-, 0.01 for Y/$. ) The right hand side is a histogram of tick volume 
- 
increments to which are made when any price change registers on the on-line 
dealing screen. Hence, on the day illustrated, there was most volatility 
(assumed to correspond to more volume of trade) around the upper end of the 
day's price range. The analysis of volatility using tick volumes is the main 
distinguishing feature of this method 
- 
clearly such analysis is only feasible 
with modern on-line systems. The chart is constructed as the day's trading 
progresses, so the technical analyst can watch the shape of the day's trading 
taking place and construe associated intraday support and resistance levels 
from those areas where little (assumed) trading has taken place. 
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Non-price based indicators: There are also other, non-price based indicators 
that may be considered by chart analysts. For example, attitudinal indicators 
may be studied for signs of the market being overbought or oversold 
- 
market 
sentiment measures such as surveys of market participants are widely used by 
chartists. Other indicators which do not fall strictly into the category of 
analysing the individual market price itself might be the study of, say interest 
rate charts alongside exchange rates or using indices of the whole market as 
an additional input to the study of only one price within that market. 
The above attitudinal indicators may further be used to form a scontrary 
opinion 
, 
an approach often cited by chartists which essentially involves 
moving in the opposite direction to the market as a whole. For example, if 
market sentiment appears overwhelmingly bullish, then a chartist may feel that 
there is not sufficient upward potential remaining in the market (because, 
perhaps, most traders could be holding long positions or be at high exposure), 
and therefore would be inclined to advise selling. (See section 2.5.2.2). 
2.4: Pattern recognition 
A major application of bar charts is in the area most closely allied with the 
popular conception of chart analysis 
- 
ie the recognition of regular, known, 
identifiable patterns in market price movements. Chartists generally classify 
price movements by referring to their relationship with the market trend 
- 
reversal patterns are characterised by a reversal of the incumbent trend, while 
continuation patterns occur within a prevailing trend. Before discussing these 
two varieties of pattern further, the concept of trend itself is considered. 
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2.4.1: Trend and related features 
Trends are one of the most widely used chartist descriptions, which are used 
to try to clarify the direction of market movement. A trend may be described 
as the overriding direction of the market: an uptrend is a series of 
successively higher peaks and troughs, a downtrend is characterised by 
successively lower peaks and troughs, while a sideways trend (also called a 
'trading range' or a 'trendless market') consists of a series of approximately 
level peaks and troughs. Chart 2.6 illustrates the principle. 
Trendlines and Channels: Trendlines are one of the simplest but most widely 
used chartist tools, which are used to try to judge the overriding direction of 
market movement. An up trendline connects a series of successively higher 
lows while a down trendline is drawn between successively lower highs. 
Three consecutive higher lows (lower highs) are formally required to confirm 
the validity of an up trendline (down trendline), as illustrated in Chart 2.7a, b. 
A trend channel is a pair of parallel lines enclosing a trend, and price 
movements may be spotted which trend between the basic trendline and a 
channel line drawn parallel to it (Chart 2.7c). 
Penetration of trendlines and channels can sometimes be taken as an 
indication of a significant change in price direction. The chartist tenet that 
trends tend to remain in motion until definite reversal signals are perceived 
CDow's first law of motion') is held to be a pertinent concept here as, once a 
trendline has been identified, a chartist might expect a similar angle of slope to 
be maintained. Breaking of the trendline is held by chartists to be one of the 
best early warnings of a change in the trend (Murphy 1986), and the 
penetration is judged to be all the more important the more significant is the 
trendline (ie the longer lasting and the greater the number of peaks and 
troughs it has). Also, violation by a closing price is regarded as more 
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important than an intra-day penetration. One rule usually applied to trendlines 
and channels is that penetration of the up trendline is a sell signal (eg. in Chart 
2.8a), while violation of the downward trendline is a buy signal, indicating an 
upside trend reversal (Chart 2.8b). Some confirmation criterion may be 
applied 
- 
such as a requirement of a minimum number of closes (often two 
days) beyond the trendline, or a minimum percentage change in price. For 
example, a price filter of the form of a 3% penetration criterion might be 
applied, which would require that the trendline be broken, on a closing basis, 
by at least 3%. A penetration is not, however, always believed to lead to a 
trend reversal, it may instead merely indicate, say, the formation of a new 
trendline at a different angle. However, a chartist would probably claim that if 
this price fails to reach the channel line it is usually a sign of a weakening of 
the trend. Chartists would use such a signal as an early warning of a possible 
price reversal, and may well anticipate that such a move may be followed by 
penetration of the trendline. 
Tradinq Ranqes: Trading ranges are essentially a series of peaks and troughs 
which follow a horizontal path rather than an up or down trend. 'Breakouts' 
from these patterns, such as that shown in Chart 2.8c are held by chartists to 
be among the most reliable of technical indicators, often taken as a signal of 
the initiation of a new trend in the direction of the breakout. The longer has 
been the duration of the trading range, the more technical significance tends to 
be attached to a breakout (Edwards and Magee, 1966). Breakouts from 
narrow ranges are held by chartists to provide particularly reliable market 
signals. 
Trading ranges contain an element of self 
-perpetuation in that trading orders 
may be activated if the price moves a little outside the range. Some believe 
(eg Schwager 1984) this to account for the way in which pdces will often break 
out of the trading range by only a small amount, only to then return within the 
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range. The argument is that, as stop orders may be clustered in the areas 
just outside the trading range, a minor drift beyond the range might trigger a 
series of stops. Once these have been executed the breakout would peter 
out, unless there is sufficient alternative pressure for the price to move further. 
Partly due to this, the breakout signal is taken to be more reliable if the price 
holds beyond the trading range for a number of days (perhaps five or so). (9) 
Support and Resistance: The concept of support and resistance is related to 
the foregoing discussion of trends, but can also be considered as an 
application by chartists of fundamental pressures of supply and demand. The 
terms support and resistance have entered common financial parlance (see 
quotations below) 
-a support price is one which appears to 'halti, or reverse, a 
downtrend, while a resistance level seems to 'stop' an uptrend. Chart 2.9 
shows the support and resistance levels in an uptrend, where the peaks are 
resistance levels and the troughs (or reaction lows) form support levels. A 
possible fundamental justification given for these phenomena is that a support 
range represents an area of concentrated buying, sufficient to overcome the 
selling pressure and maintain at least a certain price level. Conversely, a 
resistance area would be analogous to a region at which there is concerted 
selling. 
If it appeared from a chart that resistance to further price increases was being 
encountered at the point of previous major highs, a penetration of the 
resistance level would be regarded by chart analysts as a significant buy 
signal. Ina similar fashion, a price movement below previous 'resistance' lows 
(9) A stop order is executed when the price attains a given level. A buy stop 
must be above the market price, while a sell stop must be below it. For 
example, if a speculator believed that a price movement to an area 
above the current trading range would be indicative of a potentially 
bullish market, he would place a stop order to buy if the price reached a 
specified level a little above the trading range. 
38 
would be a sell signal. Chartists point out that once previous support or 
resistance levels have been penetrated their roles may reverse 
- 
previous 
resistance levels then acting to support prices. Murphy (1986, p62) draws out 
what he believes to be an important rule from this: 'Whenever a support or 
resistance level is penetrated by a significant amount, they reverse their roles 
and become the opposite'. Chart 2.9 illustrates how the resistance at point A 
is transformed into support at point B. The testing of a previous resistance 
level in an uptrend is regarded as a particularly critical phase for the market 
and failure to break through previous resistance levels may be interpreted as 
the first indicatio n of an impending reversal of a trend. 
Considerable 'psychological' importance may be attached in the market to 
support and resistance levels. Looking at the daily financial press will confirm 
this 
- 
currencies are often seen to hover around what the market regards as 
significant bilateral rates. To quote from the Financial Times: 
"Earlier in the day, the dollar had already stalled, having failed to break 
resistance at DM 1.8300. p# 28.6-88. 






the US currency today broke through what traders regard as the 
psychologically important levels of DM 1.80 and Y 130 
... 
" 25.6.88. 
As illustrated by the last quotation, certain numbers may become focal points 
for market psychology 
- 
with round numbers being particularly renowned for 
offering support and resistance. Traders cautious of this possibility may tend 
to avoid placing trading orders right on these round numbers, lest their role as 
support and resistance levels means that the market price will never quite get 
there. 
On a related point to these 'levels-based' points of market focus, there is some 
evidence regarding the existence of calendar-based anomolies in price 
movements. For example, the 'January effect' 
- 
Rozeff and Kinney (1976) 
found higher average stock returns in January than in any other month; the 
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'weekend effect' (see, inter alia, Cross 1973, French 1980, Jaffe and 
Westerfield 1985) shows that stock and bond returns are on average negative 
from market close on Fridays to opening on Mondays. Recently Cadsby 
(1989) observed that the stock market crash on Monday 19 October, 1987 was 
perhaps in hindsight no surprise since his 1962-85 stock market data showed 
that the worst day of the week, day of the month and month of the year to hold 
stock were Monday, the 19th and October respectively. Such findings perhaps 
offer some statistical evidence to support what otherwise may seem to be 
'irrational' beliefs in psychological levels for market movements. 
To consider a specific pattern based application of trendlines and levels of 
support and resistance, the so-called 'fan-principle' can be cited. 
The Fan Principle: This chart formation derives its name from the three 
trendlines which are used in its identification. Chart 2.10 illustrates the path 
which price might follow after an initial breach of an up or down trend. 
Considering this chart, following the violation of the original trendline 1, prices 
subsequently rallied but failed to break back up through the line which now is 
seen as acting as resistance. A second trendline (line 2), is similarly broken by 
a price drop and tested by a rally, and if a third trendline (line 3) is broken it is 
taken as a signal that prices have further to fall. 
Whether the fan principle is applied to an up trend (as in Chart 2.9) or a down 
trend, the trend reversal signal is still deemed to be given by the breaking of 
the third fanline. Failure of the fan pattern is claimed to be soon recognisable 
(Edwards and Magee 1966), thus in principle enabling a trader to limit losses 
should it fail. 
Trend Measurement: Observation of price lines shows that financial market 
prices often tend to trend in a zig-zag manner, retracing some of their previous 
moves before advancing further. Technical analysts attempt to quantify these 
minor countertrend moves into percenta_qe retracements. Chart 2.11 a 
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illustrates a 50% retracement, whereby an up trend, having moved from a 
price of 100 to 200, then retraces 50% of its advance by falling to 150 before 
continuing it upward path. Widely cited maximum and minimum retracements 
are 33% and 66% ie 
- 
during a pronouced trend, a chartists would be looking 
for the market to retrace at least a third of each move. A chartist may well 
construct his trading opportunities around the identification and anticipation of 
likely retracement zones. Were the price, however, to move beyond a 66% 
retracement, the likelihood would be that the chartist would then suspect that 
the trend was actually reversing rather than only pausing before further 
advance. On Chart 2.11 a, 33% and 66% retracements would have involved 
the price dropping from 200 to 166 2/3 and 133 1/3 respectively. 
Speed resistance lines (or speedlines) are another method of quantifying 
trends. These are designed to measure the rate of ascent or descent of a 
line, by the method demonstrated in Chart 2.11 b. Using the example of an up 
trend, a vertical line is drawn from the level at which the trend began (A) to its 
current peak (B) and this line (E to B) is then divided into thirds, enabling 1/3 
and 2/3 speedlines to be drawn from the origin of the trend to these points. 
(Speedlines for a down trend are constructed in an equivalent way. ) It is 
necessary to redraw the speedline each time the price advances further in the 
direction of the trend. 
A chartist may use speedlines as a yardstick to try to judge whether price 
movements are likely to be simply retracements or full trend reversals. 
According to the speedline method, if the price during an up trend was simply 
making a retracement before continuing its path, it should usually stop failing 
around the higher (2/3) speedline, and were it to fall below the 1/3 speedline, it 
would be a signal that prices would probably fall back to the levels seen at the 
beginning of the trend, and that a new down trend was underway. 
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The previously discussed 'role reversal' concept of support and resistance 
levels can also be applied to speedlines. During an up trend (as in Chart 
2.11 b), if prices fall through the upper 2/3 speedline to the 1/3 line and rally 
thereafter, the upper line now would be interpreted as acting as a resistance 
level and it would require the price to break through the 1/3 speedline to signal 
to chartists that the old highs were probably about to be tested. 
These measurement techniques may be used by technical analysts in the 
appraisal of chart patterns. Once a pattern formation is identified (or even just 
suspected in its formative stages), the likely degree of future price movements 
would be anticipated, possible support and resistance levels drawn in, likely 
retracement moves forecast, and so on. By such methods the chartist would 
aim to anticipate price movements and attempt to position himself on the right 
side of any trend. 
In the following section that area most closely allied with the popular 
conception of chart analysis is considered 
- 
the recognition of known, 
identifable patterns in market price movements. It was noted above that price 
patterns may be categorised according to their relationship with the market 
trend, with reversal patterns being characterised by a reversal of the 
incumbent trend and continuation patterns occurring within a prevailing trend. 
With experience, chartists tend to acquire an individual approach to pattern 
identification and preferences for the use of various other indicators, which in 
practice may well differ somewhat from 'textbook' approaches. However, in 
order to convey the broad methodology of chartism, some standard, or 
'classical' chart pattern formations are analysed, beginning with reversal 
patterns. 
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2.4.2: Reversal Pafterns 
The reversal of a trend may be spread over a considerable time period. 
There are several major reversal patterns which have been classified by 
chartists 
- 
this section considers the well-known head and shoulders pattern, 
double/triple tops and bottoms, V (or spike) formations, and saucer patterns, 
a prerequisite for all of which is the existence of a previous trend. Probably 
the best known chartist formation is the reversal pattern called the head and 
shoulders. 
Head and Shoulders: The head and shoulders is a three part formation 
consisting of a large middle peak with two smaller peaks on either side. 
Chart 2.12a shows an idealised example with the 'neckline'drawn beneath the 
left and right shoulders, A and C. The head and shoulders formation is not 
generally considered by classical chartists to be complete until the final 
penetration of the neckline and last peak (point D) has occurred. Once the 
pattern reaches point D, a full trend reversal is deemed to have been 
signalled. 
It can be seen from Chart 2.12b the way in which the path of the Deutsche 
mark against the dollar over the period 1984-86 was interpreted by certain 
chartists to have traced out head and shoulders formation. 
There are many variations on the basic head and shoulders theme. For 
example, a inverse head and shoulders is essentially an inverted image of the 
same pattern, formed at a market bottom, while complex head and shoulders 
patterns may display perhaps double shoulders, or two heads. Failed head 
and shoulders display the initial three peaks formation, but violate the standard 
pattern because the price line crosses back above the neckline after the right 
shoulder, invalidating the standard formation, in which the price line should not 
recross the neckline after this point. 
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Chartists assert that identifiable patterns can have some underlying 
justification in terms of the fundamental supply and demand behaviour of the 
market. Combining chart information on price activity and trading volume 
enables stories to be told about the market activity behind the chart formation. 
Consider this for the standard head and shoulders pattern. From Chart 2.12a, 
the course of events of a 'typical' realisation was explained by the classic 
textbook, Edwards and Magee (1966) along the following lines. 
A strong rally to a peak (Point A) accompanied by rising volume is 
followed by a minor recession on lower volume. This is the left shoulder. 
The price rallies to new highs on slightly lighter volume and peaks (Point 
B) above the previous high. The price then drops back to a level near the 
bottom of the previous recession. This completes the head of the 
formation. 
A third a rally (to C) on significantly lower volume fails to reach the heights 
of the previous peak. The right shoulder has now been formed. 
The price moves below the 'necklinep 
-a line drawn across the bottom of 
the two preceding lows. 
The pattern is completed with a slight return move back to the neckline. 
This is followed by new lows. 
This classic pattern seems to have developed something of a 'folklore' about 
the course of underlying events 
- 
although all such justifications might be 
regarded simply as ex post rational isations. The accompanying classic'tale' 
of this movement in the stock market is as follows. (Edwards and Magee 
1966, pp 48-51) 
A group of investors may believe that a certain asset is presently undervalued, 
and as a consequence buy what comes available, although hoping not to 
attract the attentions of other investors too eady. After a while, other investors 
begin to show interest in the asset, perhaps having perceived the 
accumulation or having upgraded their rating of the asset for reasons similar to 
those which attracted the original investors' interest. As the asset is scarce, 
the extra demand begins to push up the prices. 
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The up move gathers momentum as demand is buoyant, and the market 
realises that perhaps this asset was undervalued in fundamental terms. By 
now the price is reaching the level at which the original investors had planned 
to take profits. To sell a large number of units now, however, would weaken 
the price 
- 
clearly a gradual approach is required. Hence they begin to sell 
their holdings little by little. 
However, a lull in demand may occur before they have distributed their entire 
holdings, possibly caused by the market sensing an increase in supply. 
Consequently, the group of original investors stops selling, and may even buy, 
in an attempt to support the price. As the flow of supply has now ceased, the 
price is free to rise again and move into new highs. This gives the investors 
the opportunity to unload the rest of their holdings. Provided they judged the 
market correctly, their sales will have satiated demand for some time to come, 
and prices will drift back to the previous support level. A minor rally will follow 
on the strength of new buying from traders who were waiting for just such a 
minor reaction, then the full down trend is underway. 
A similar story is told for formations at market bottoms, except the focus is 
then on accumulation rather than distribution. Technical analysts will argue 
that all chart patterns can be justified as mirroring the market's supply and 
demand reactions. It is, however, enlightening to realise that the entire 
motivation for the above story lies in differential information - to some extent 
negating the premise of the price discounting mechanism. 
It is clear from these 'folklore' tales justifying the major patterns that chartists 
see themselves as being able to spot patterns which the behaviour of the rest 
of the market has caused. In this sense, their beliefs can perhaps be 
characterised as a view that they themselves are 'smart'traders, while the rest 
of the market acts naively, trading on 'mistaken' beliefs about fundamental 
influences. This is an interesting contrast to the academic literature surveyed 
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in Chapter 3, in which economic models incorporating participants with 
different views invariably characterise the so-called non- 
fundamental/noise/chartist-type traders as 'naive', while it is the 
fundamentalists who are'smart 
Furthermore, looking at Chart 2.12b of a head and shoulders top in the foreign 
exchange market, one can easily point to fundamental economic reasons for 
the pattern 
- 
for example the September 1985 Plaza Accord causing the right 
shoulder. 
Justification for the major price patterns, including the head and shoulders, is 
offered by Plummer (1989), who views the behaviour of the market in terms of 
crowd psychology. 0 0) He suggests that a crowd's response to shocks (in the 
case of contra-trend shocks, a three wave response he terms the 'price-pulse') 
combined with the 'natural rhythms' of the crowd are reflected in those 
patterns identified by traditional technical analysis. 
Tops and Bottoms: There are several groups of so-called 'top and bottom' 
patterns, but the triple top and bottom can be regarded as only a minor 
variation on the above head and shoulders formation. Triple tops and 
bottoms essentially the same pattern, but have all their peaks at the same 
level. A double top ýr bottom, as its name implies, may be identified if a trend 
(10) The behaviour of market participants analysed from a pshychological 
viewpoint is also apparent in some recent literature on cognitive 
psychology. Systematic biases have been documented in the decision 
making processes of individuals 
- 
see, for example, Arrow (1982), 
Hogarth and Reder (1987). This literature is also discussed in Chapter 
3, section 3.4.5.3. 
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reversal takes the form of two peaks of roughly equal magnitude. The 
likelihood of a significant trend reversal following such a movement is 
supposedly greatly increased the more pronounced was the previous trend. 
Rounded tops and bottoms (or saucers) are claimed (eg Schwagar 1984) to be 
one of the most reliable formations, but less common than reversal patterns. 
A rounded top is a shape which chartists perceive as being indicative of a very 
gradual change in trend, and the classical form of the pattern would be 
accompanied by a mirror-image movement trading volume. 
Spikes, or'V'Tops and Bottoms: The V top or bottom differs from most the 
other standard reversal patterns in that it is recognised at a sudden, rather 
than a gradual, change in trend. Because of this it is held by chartists to be 
more difficult to anticipate for trading purposes, but certain features are 
claimed to suggest its imminent occurrence. For example, if the chartist 
suspects the trendline is unsustainable 
- 
eg especially steep with few 
retracements and possibly several gaps in the price line 
-a sudden reversal 
may well be believed to be imminent. Traders would usually tend to be wary 
of such price paths, but there is naturally a temptation to remain in the market 
for as long as possible during a pronounced trend in order to let the profits run. 
Trianqles: If reversals assume a pattern, whereby (say) an up trend reverses 
by the price tracing out a succession of diminishing peaks and troughs, it 
would be termed a triangle. Triangular chart formations will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section as they are more usually identified by chartists 
in mid-trend as continuation patterns. 
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Price Gaps and Reversals: If there are price 'gaps' in the price path, chartists 
assert that the path is probably unsustainable. A gap on a price chart is a 
range over which no trading has taken place: the low of the day is above the 
previous day's high, or the day's high is below the previous day's low. 
Chartists distinguish four types of gap: 
(i) The Comm This is held to be the least significant type of gap, 
appearing within a trading range, and is interpreted as being indicative 
of lack of interest in thinly traded markets. Such gaps are generally 
ignored by chartists. 
(ii) The Breakaway Gap: If the price suddenly surges out of a trading 
range, leaving an area where no trading activity has taken place, it is 
termed a breakaway gap. If they are accompanied by heavy volume, 
they are asserted to be among the most reliable chart signals. 
(iii) The Runaway (or Measuring) Gap: Usually cited in strong up or down 
trends, runaway gaps occur when the price movement accelerates and 
leaps forward. In an uptrend such a gap would be taken as a sign of 
strength, in a downtrend a sign of weakness. 
(iv) The Exhaustion Gap: The so-called exhaustion gap precedes a trend 
reversal, occurring near the end of a market move. Its use is largely 
descriptive 
- 
even chartists say that the best way of distinguishing a 
runaway gap from a exhaustion gap is hindsight. 
If the charted price movement of a trend reversal is flanked by gaps on either 
side, the resulting the pattern is the island reversal 
-a pattern which is 
believed often to signal major trend transitions, and as such, will tend to carry 
much weight in chartist analysis. 
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Having seen the major classifications of chart reversal patterns, the next 
section considers those formations which instead suggest trend continuation. 
2.4.3: Continuation Pafterns 
Continuation patterns are generally identified by chartists within long-term 
trends, and the patterns themselves are said to tend to materialise over a 
much shorter time horizon than the foregoing reversal patterns (Murphy 1986). 
One of the most common type of continuation patterns is that of the triangle. 
T There are three basic classifications of triangle: symmetric, 
ascending and descending, their text-book formation is shown in Chart 2.13. 
Symmetric triangles (Chart 2.13a) can be outlined by two converging trend 
lines. The point at which these lines would cross if extended is termed the 
apex, and the full vertical height of the pattern is called the base. Ascending 
triangles consist of a rising trendline and a horizontal upper line (Chart 2.13b) 
descending triangles similarly consist of price movement enclosed by a down 
trendline and a horizontal lower line. 
The crucial aspect of triangles is held to be the direction of breakout of the 
price line from the pattern. As triangles are usually identified as continuation 
patterns, the breakout would therefore tend to be in the direction of the 
prevailing trend. (Chartists do, however, point to occasions where reversals 
assumed a triangular formation. ) The general "rule" though is that an 
ascending triangle is a bullish indicator, a descending triangle a bearish sign, 
and that a symmetric triangle will probably 'breakout' in the direction of the 
prevailing trend. 
Looking at Chart 2.13a, the'minimum requirement'for any valid triangle is four 
reversal points, although six points as illustrated are more usual. Note that six 
reversal points give the five wave advances of an Elliott wave - see Section 
2.2.2.2. 
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Another chartist pattern, the diamond is a combination of two triangles back-to- 
back, although this is more commonly cited as a reversal pattern at market 
tops. 
Most triangle and triangle-based formations tend to last for perhaps a few 
months. The class of much shorter term patterns assuming a similar 
appearance are referred to as fla_qs and Dennants. 
Fla_qs and Pennants: These are held to be particularly common patterns, but 
of only short duration, lasting for periods of up to 2-3 weeks within trend 
phases. The price movements for both are similar, the distinction drawn 
being that a flag can be enclosed by parallel lines while a pennant is price 
movement within converging lines. See Chart 2.14. 
A feature of both patterns is that they are supposed to point in opposite 
directions to the prevailing trend, and develop noticeably quicker during a 
down trend. Flags and pennants are attached to a so-called 'flag-pole', in the 
form of a sharp decline or advance before the pattern develops. In a classical 
'textbook' formation, the sharp preceding move would take place on very 
heavy volume, which would subsequently decline as the pattern develops. 
Then, once the flag or pennant is complete, the trend would be expected to 
resume in a new flurry of trading activity. It is at the point of the breakout from 
the formation at which chart-based dealers would often take positions in the 
direction of the prevailing trend. 
Continuation Head and Shoulders: While the head and shoulders is probably 
regarded by chartists as the most reliable reversal pattern, occurrences of it 
have been pointed to in mid-trend. However, while the pattern may be 
recognised under such circumstances, its forecasting value would naturally be 
markedly inferior to its reversal counterpart. 
50 
TheWed-qe: The so-called 'wedge' continuation is very similar to the triangle 
in both appearance and duration. However, the distinguishing feature of this 
formation is that the two covering lines which enclose the price movement lie 
on a marked slant, as illustrated in Chart 2.15a. Wedges, like pennants, slant 
against the prevailing trend 
- 
hence a falling wedge is considered to be bullish, 
and a rising wedge bearish. This bull/bear guidance is their main application 
to trading, and positions would probably be taken accordingly once an analyst 
believes the onset of a wedge has been identified. Generally, chartists would 
expect that the price line would move about two-thirds of the way towards the 
apex before breaking out to continue the trend. Like other continuation 
patterns, volume is ideally supposed to diminish as the pattern develops and 
the formation ought to take shape quicker in a down trend. 
The Rectangle: As its name suggests, a rectangle is interpreted as a pause 
in the trend during which the price moves between two parallel horizontal lines. 
Chart 2.15b shows an example of a bullish rectangle in an up trend. The 
price movements are akin to a trading range, but of shorter duration. A close 
markedly outside the rectangle is usually interpreted as indicating the direction 
of the ensuing trend 
- 
so although the rectangle is generally cited as a typical 
manifestation of a continuation pattern, the chartist would not rule out a 
reversal. 
Trading approaches to rectangles will differ between analysts. Some may try 
to avoid what they consider to be a trendless market altogether, while others 
may assume the rectangle will be a continuation pattern and take say, long 
positions near the lower end of the price band in an up trend. 
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2.4.4: Concludina comments on Dattern recovition 
This completes a description and categorisation of the main chart patterns 
which chartist analysts claim to be able to identify in financial price series. 
Economists firmly wedded to fundamentalist explanations of market behaviour 
will no doubt remain sceptical of these. However, a possible rationalisation 
would be that the 'long and variable lags' inherent in the economic system, 
together with ignorance of the 'true model', means that perhaps the best that 
can be done, at least over the short to medium term, is to identify regular 
patterns which are seen to occur in the data, without concern over their 
justification. This'black box' rationalisation is again reminiscent of the 
justification often given for using 'black box' statistical techniques, such as the 
Box-Jenkins methodology. An empirical comparison of a set of chartist 
forecasts and the Box-Jenkins approach is included in Chapter 5, Section 
5.6.3. 
At least one problem with pattern recognitions however, is that it is in practice 
very subjective. Patterns will usually not conform exactly to the textbook 
example, and considerable experience will generally have to be brought to 
bear in their recognition. In addition, one might also argue that they are easy 
to see ex post, but not ex ante, and it is the latter which is of prime importance 
to market traders. For these reasons, most technical analysts will generally 
went to supplement pattern recognition with other, less ambiguous indicators. 
It is here that mechanical indicators play a role. 
2.5: Mechanical trading rules 
Whereas chartist pattern identification is largely subjective and open to 
individual interpretation, the various chartist mechanical trading rules or 
systems can be used to generate precise signals. 
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This might suggest that the use of mechanical systems would to some extent 
counterbalance the subjective element of pattern-based trading and thereby 
produce a more consistent approach 
- 
while chartists may disagree over 
pattern formations, mechanical signals should be unequivocal. This would, 
however, be to oversimplify the case partly because of the varieties of systems 
and hybrid indicators which could be used, but especially because the signals 
generated are normally considered in conjunction with other, more subjective 
chartist approaches. Hence even if, a mechanical system alone is used, the 
results are prone to be user-dependent. 
The following discussion of mechanical trading rules is divided broadly into 
trend following and non-trend following systems. Moving averages and 
breakout systems are the two most widely used methods in the former 
category, to which can be applied various additional confirmation ('filter') rules. 
The major non-trend following systems are brought together under the heading 
of 'overbought and oversold indicators', which includes an analysis of the 
classes of momentum, oscillator and rate of change indicators. To each 
mechanical system numerous alterations could be made and hybrid indicators 
constructed: but the aim of this section is to explain the core methods used by 
technical traders. 0 1) 
Trend Followinq S stems 
2.5.1.1: Moving Averages 
Most mechanical trading schemes rely on some form of moving average 
system. The basic form of moving average is constructed by taking the 
average of the previous N period's prices. Several variations in this 
construction are possible, though a standard interpretation of them appears to 
be adopted. 
(11) Recent academic work in economics (Schulmeister, 1988) has assessed the 
performance of various combinations of mechanical trading rules. This 
work is discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.4.4. 
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The closina price is most commonly used in the calculation of a moving 
average, as it is generally held by chartist to be the most important price of the 
day. Edwards and Magee (1966, p8) describe it as, "... the final 
evaluation 
... 
made by the market during the day-the figure upon which the 
majority of prospective traders base their plans for the following day. Hence 
its technical significance... ". Some technicians, however, may instead use the 
midpoint of the day's range, while others use the average of the high, low and 
closing price. 
Another issue is the placement of the moving average. The statistically correct 
way to indicate a trend with a moving average is to centre it, by plotting it in the 
middle of the time period to which it refers, thus a thirteen day moving average 
would be plotted seven days back. Moving averages used for day-to-day 
trading purposes by chartists, however, are almost invariably plotted on the 
final day of the period, so in effect the latest price is being compared with the 
value some period earlier. 
Because of various perceived shortcomings of a simple moving average, 
namely the time lag before turning points are indicated, the fact it is 
unweighted and that only the period covered by the average is taken into 
account, various weighting systems are sometimes used by chartists. 
By using a linear weighting, greater importance can be given to more recent 
observations. While the linearly weighted moving average can be seen to lead 
a simple moving average, thus alleviating the time lag problem, it does not 
overcome the difficulty of accounting for only a limited length of price 
movements. Alternatively, by using an exponentially weighted moving 
average, it is possible to include all available price data in the calculation, but 
still to assign greater weight to more recent observations. Despite these more 
complex systems, a simple moving average appears to be the most widely 
used form. 
54 
The decision of what length of moving average system to use is held to be 
particulady important as short or long term averages can give very different 
signals. Long term moving averages are held by chartists to be most effective 
in a trending market, as being less sensitive to minor movements, they will 
follow the direction of the trend and probably give less false signals 
(whipsaws) than a shorter average. Looking at the moving averages on Chart 
2.3a and 2.3b shows how the longer (40 or 50 day) moving averages follow 
the trend better compared with the shorter (10 or 20) day averages, keeping 
the trader on the right side of the market with few whipsaws throughout the 
trending phases. 
It has been suggested in the chartist literature (see eg Pring 1985) that 
Fibonacci numbers can be useful in moving average analysis. Many of the 
timespans commonly used by chartists are in fact numbers in the Fibonacci 
series. For example, the 21 day moving average is a standard calculation for 
daily charts, while the 13 week average is widely used in stocks and 
commodity charts. 
When prices are in a sideways (trendless) trading range, a short term moving 
average is widely believed to be more effective. By indicating minor price 
movements, it will give more frequent and earlier signals than its longer term 
counterpart. As illustrated in Chart 2.3b, because the length of the longer 50 
day average exceeds any minor 'cycles' during the sideways price movement 
(around June-September 1989), it provides virtually no information, following a 
straight line through the period. Yet while the higher sensitivity of the short 
term 20 day moving average can capture minor turning points in the trendless 
market of Chart 2.3, it is prone to give less clear movements and whipsaws in 
the later trending market. 
Clearly, choice of time span affects the type of information conveyed. The 
'optimal' length varies between individual chartists and individual markets, but 
the argument that longer term moving averages are most useful in trending 
markets while shorter term averages provide early information on trend 
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reversals and minor cycles appears to be a generally accepted principle 
among technical analysts. Most technical analysts will in fact use more than 
one length of average, drawing on the perceived advantages of each. 
2.5.1.2: Trading signal generation from moving averages 
Single moving average: By plotting a single moving average on a bar chart, 
buy and sell signals are generated when the average crosses the price line. 
A buy signal would be generated when the closing price moves above the 
moving average, while the price moving below the average would give a sell 
signal. Both situations can be seen from Charts 2.3a and 2.3b. While the 
signal is usually taken to be given when the closing price crosses the moving 
average line, some technicians advocate that the moving average line itself 
should turn in the direction of the price line for extra confirmation. 
Multiple movinq averages: Two moving averages of different time spans can 
be used to generate signals, via the double crossover method. (12) Abuy 
signal would occur when the shorter average cuts the longer from below, and 
a sell signal would be generated when the shorter average moves below the 
longer, situations occurring in Charts 2.3a and 2.3b. Widely used 
combinations are 5 and 20 day averages, 10 and 40 day averages and, for 
major movements, 10 and 30 week averages. 
There are several variations and additions to this standard cross-over method, 
all of which attempt to look for further confirmation of the buy/sell signals. 
One commonly cited confirmation caveat is that major trends are assumed not 
to have reversed until both lines are moving in the same direction. The use of 
additional rules, such as the filter rules discussed below, are intended to 
improve the performance of moving average systems, largely by reducing the 
number of whipsaws which inevitably occur. 
(12) The double cross-over method is a generalisation of single moving average 
signal generation, as the price line in the latter can be regarded as a 
'one-period moving average' 
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It is also possible to use three moving averages to generate signals, in a 
similar fashion to the double crossover method. As shorter moving averages 
follow the price line more closely than longer moving averages, it follows that 
there should be, at least during trending phases, a predictable alignment of the 
multiple averages. For example, during a bull market the shortest average 
would be above the medium average, which would be above the longest. The 
most common choice of timespan for a triple moving average, and that 
generally used by the commercial chart services, is 4-9-18 days. Hence a 
buy signal would be anticipated during a down trend when the 4 day line 
crosses above both the 9 and 18 line. The signal would be confirmed when 
the 9 day line crosses above the 18, thus giving the 4-9-18 ordering expected 
in an uptrend. Conversely, a definite buy signal would not be given until first, 
the 4 day line crosses below the 9 and 18, followed by the 9 crossing below 
the 18. 
However, in terms of the various types of moving averages discussed above, 
some chartist studies have shown that, despite the theoretical advantages of 
more complex calculations, a combination of two simple moving averages 
often proves to be the most effective tool (see eg Hochheimer 1980), and 
indeed appears the most widely used among practising chartists. 
The perceived advantages and disadvantages of moving average systems are 
largely common to all trend following systems. The other major type of trend 
following system is the 'breakout', described in the next section 
- 
which is 
followed by an appraisal and possible modifications applicable to such 
systems. 
2.5.1.3: Breakout systems 
Breakout systems are also known by various other names 
- 
such as price 
channels and weekly rules. Like moving averages, there are many variations 
on their central theme but they all operate on the principle that market 
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movement to a significant new high or low is indicative of there being sufficient 
potential to continue the trend in the direction of the breakout. 
The Four-Week Rule: The four week rule was found by Dunn and Hargitt 
(1970) to be the most successful of an array of mechanical systems available 
at that time. It is based on the following rules (applied to the spot market): 
1 Buy (go long) whenever the price exceeds the highs of the previous four 
full calendar weeks. 
2 Sell (go short) whenever the price falls below the lows of the previous four 
full calendar weeks. 
A whole array of modifications has been applied to such systems. For 
example, the general rule above has the disadvantage that it is 'continuous', ie 
the trader always has a position, so is exposed to whipsawing during trendless 
phases. Attempts can be made to reduce this hazard by modifying the 
system so as to make it non-continuous. This can be done by using a shorter 
breakout rule (perhaps a two-week rule) for liquidation purposes. So while the 
initiation of a new position would require a four-week breakout, the position 
would be liquidated if there were to be a two-week signal in the opposite 
direction. According to the rule, the trader would then only enter the market 
again at the signal of a new four-week breakout. 
The length of such breakout rules is usually adapted for individual markets (so- 
called 'optimisation'). The length used will generally dictate the sensitivity of 
the system, in the same way that the choice of length of a moving average will 
involve a trade-off between rapid recognition of valid turning points and 
unwanted whipsaw effects. 
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2.5.1.4: Trend following systems and filter rules 
Both moving average and breakout systems are trend following in 
construction, and as such are perceived to display similar advantages and 
disadvantages. They tend to let profits run while cuffing losses short 
- 
thus 
following one of the oldest maxims of trading. However, they are reactive by 
construction, inevitably signalling with a lag. The user of trend following 
systems faces the trade-off between excessive false signals and speed of 
response to turning points 
- 
hence the popularity of the double crossover 
moving average which utilises the features of both long and short term 
measurement. Finally, all trend following systems work best in trending 
markets 
- 
during periods of sideways movement they are especially prone to 
generate false signals. Most modifications to trend following systems impose 
additional confirmation requirements upon signals, in order to reduce this 
endemic whipsaw problem. 
Filter rules impose screening conditions which aim to eliminate trades which 
have a low probability of success. Some possible filtering mechanisms which 
can be imposed on mechanical signalling systems are described below: 
(i) Using a fundamental model to confirm technical signals could act as a 
filter by clarifying the market direction. The buy and sell signals would only be 
acted upon if the economic model confirmed the direction of the trend. 
(ii) As well as requiring the single moving average (say) to cross the price line 
in order to generate a buy/sell signal, a filter may require that the entire day's 
price action clear the average. 
(iii) A crossover signal may also be required to achieve some kind of breakout 
on the chart 
- 
this is clearly a more stringent requirement than normal, so will 
generate stronger (albeit less frequent) signals. 
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(iv) A time delay could be imposed before acting on signals. While this would 
mean that false signals could be largley avoided as they tend to reverse 
themselves very quickly, the imposition of a time filter entails the penalty of 
late market entry in response to genuine signals. 
Clearly all such modifications will give more and more scope for variety in 
chartist analysis. While the imposition of filter rules such as (i) seem to negate 
the pure chartist principle, the suggestion of such a combined approach does 
seem to accord with the complementary approach to charts and fundamentals 
which is apparent in practice (see results of survey in Chapter 4). 
2.5.2: Non-trend following rules 
2.5.2.1: Overbought and oversold indicators 
There exists a large class of indicators which differ from trend following 
systems in that they are designed to attempt to anticipate rather than simply to 
lag changes in price movements. By using them chartists hope to warn of 
strengths or weaknesses in price movements before the ultimate peaks or 
troughs, and provide more useful information in sideways markets than do 
simple trend following systems. 
A plethora of overlapping terminology surrounds these indicators. They are 
here drawn together under the general heading of 'overbought and oversold 
indicators', which encompasses the class of indicators which might broadly be 
termed 'oscillator', 'rate of change' or'difference' analysis. As an introduction 
to the type of indicators, the basic rate of change oscillator is described. 
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Rate of Change (ROC): One of the basic oscillator formulations is a simple 
rate of change formula, using the ratio of the most recent closing price to that 
of k days ago: 
ROC (K) Pt 100 
p 
t-k 
(For presentational purposes, this series is sometimes plotted as ROC(k)-100 
to give a centre-line of zero). The ROC line is interpreted by chartists as a 
momentum indicator: a rising ROC index would imply growth in momentum 
-a 
bullish factor, while a falling index would point to a loss of momentum and a 
bear market. An ROC indicator is plotted on Chart 2.3b. 
The concept of momentum underlies overbought and oversold analysis, as the 
subject is concerned with the change in prices rather than the price levels 
themselves. This analysis, however, is regarded by most chart analysts as 
secondary to trend analysis in that trades should never be made against an 
overriding market trend (Murphy 1986). There are many different ways in 
which momentum oscillators are constructed, but their interpretation is broadly 
similar. The oscillator is usually plotted along the bottom of price charts and 




Overbought and oversold indicators of all kinds move within a fairly flat band, 
and extreme values, either upper or lower, are usually taken to be a warning 
that the price is too high or too low to be sustained and that the market is due 
for a correction. While oscillators are essentially used as a tool to supplement 
other technical indicators, they can be used to generate specific buy and sell 
signals. 
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The general overbought/oversold trading rule would be based on the crossing 
of the zero line: 
1 Buy when the oscillator moves above the zero line. 
2 Sell when the oscillator moves below the zero line. 
- 
with the caveat that trades should only be made in the direction of the 
prevailing market trend. 
As well as the ROC indicator described above, several other types of 
overbought and oversold indicators will illustrate the principle. 
Momentum Line: A standard momentum line is constructed by subtracting the 






The resulting positive or negative figure is then plotted around a zero line, in 
much the same way as the ROC indicator. Some divisor is often used as 
scaling factor, commonly Pt-k (which does not affect the signals generated). 




Moving Average Oscillator: The use of multiple moving averages to generate 
buy and sell signals was discussed earlier under the category of trend 
following systems. The same double moving average principle is used by 
chartists to construct oscillator charts. The usual way this is done is to plot 
the difference between the two averages as a histogram, the bars of which 
appear as a positive or negative value around a zero line. Alternatively, the 
percentage difference between the two averages (shorter as a percentage of 
longer) can be plotted. 
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When the lines move far apart, it is taken as an indication of a market extreme 
which may result in a pause or change in the trend. Thus, as well as their 
standard use as a trend following system, the relationship between two moving 
averages can be used to try to identify overbought and oversold conditions. 
Relative Strength Indicator A perceived problem of most overbought 
and oversold indicators is that they offer no guide to what constitutes 'extreme' 
values 
- 
identification of highs and lows is somewhat arbitrary. Another 
disadvantage is that momentum lines are prone to erratic movements, often 
caused when extreme values are dropped off the calculation of a difference, 
so that sharp movements k days ago, even when recent price movement has 
been relatively smooth, can cause marked shifts in the momentum line. 
Distortions such as these could be minimised by some smoothing process. 
The Relative Strength Indicator (RSI) (Welles Wilder, 1978) is a measure 
designed in an attempt to overcome these problems. It incorporates a moving 
average to smooth the series and it assumes a constant scale of 0 to 100, thus 
solving the problem of measurement of upper and lower values. 







where IRS = Average of previous k days' price increases 
Average of previous k days' price falls 
For example, were a 14 day period to be used, the numerator of the relative 
strength calculation would be the total points gained on the up days, divided 
by 14. In a period of near unbroken up movements, the RSI would approach 
100, while in the opposite situation it would approach zero. Thesmallerthe 
period (k) over which the indicator is calculated, the more sensitive it is, and 
the wider its amplitude. 
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The RSI can be employed by chartists in both a subjective and a mechanical 
fashion. When graphed, its pattern formations might be interpreted in a 
similar manner to price charts 
- 
head and shoulders, triangles, pennants and 
so forth may in some cases be identified on the RS1 line. Interactions 
between the pdce and RSI lines are also considered by chartists. For 
example, a serious warning of likely market reversal is taken to be the 
divergence of the RSI and the price line. 
Moving onto a more mechanistic interpretatation, dextremey values of the RSI 
are considered to be 30 and 70 
- 
indicating oversold and overbought 
conditions respectively. (These margins are often widened to 20 and 80 for 
RSls calculated over shorter periods). The 30 and 70 lines of an RSI can be 
used to generate specific buy and sell signals. To illustrate, a value of 70 plus 
is thought to be a warning of overbought conditions, and the chart-based 
trader who saw the RSI reach the 70 level would probably anticipate selling as 
he would believe the market may soon peak and turn down. A crossing back 
below the 70 line is taken to signal the appropriate sell point. Similar 
principles apply to the crossing of the 30 line. 
2.5.2.2: Overbought/oversold analysis and contrary opinion 
Another chartist technique often linked to overbought/oversold analysis, which 
is used to anticipate market extremes, is the principle of contrary opinion. 
Contrary opinion holds that the view of the majority is generally wrong. It 
follows, therefore, that a subscriber to this principle should ascertain the view 
of 'the majority' and then take the opposite course of action, moving in the 
opposite direction to the market as a whole. 
Measures of contrary opinion are usually based on the recommendations 
published by market advisory services, thus implicitly assuming that these give 
a fair reflection of overall market sentiment. The results are usually presented 
in the form of the percentage of bullish opinion, with around 75% and 25% 
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being taken as indication of overbought and oversold conditions respectively. 
The justification for the apparent perversity of the contrary opinion doctrine lies 
in terms of fundamental supply and demand relationships. 
For example, if market sentiment appears overwhelmingly bullish, then a 
chartist may feel that there is not sufficient upward potential remaining in the 
market (because, perhaps, most traders could be holding long positions, or be 
at high exposure), and therefore would be inclined to advise selling. 
Contrary opinion, although generally classified as a device of technical 
analysis, has its feet in several camps. On the one hand it has been likened 
to oscillator analysis in that it attempts to anticipate market extremes, but it is 
also a sentiment indicator, trying to reflect the psychology of the market, in 
assessing whether attitudes are bullish or bearish. In this respect, contrary 
opinion tends towards fundamentalism, as it is looking behind the pure market 
price movements to the reasons underlying it. Contrary opinion measures 
also can be looked upon as a type of mechanistic filter rule 
- 
sell at over 80%, 
buy at under 20% etc. 
Perhaps another interesting point concerning the principle of contrary opinion 
is that it is almost diametrically opposed to Keynes' (1936) description of 
financial markets as akin to a newspaper 'beauty contest' competition in which 
the winner is the one who guesses what everybody else thinks everybody else 
is thinking (and so on). 
2.6: Conclusion 
This completes a summary of the major techniques used by chartist analysts. 
Rather than attempt to summarise what is essentially a summary of chartist 
methods, it is perhaps appropriate at this point to consider which of the 
techniques outlined above are used most intensively in the financial markets. 
Having spoken, however, to a large number of active technical analysts, it 
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seems clear that a single chartist could not give a representative answer to 
this question. Apart from the fact that almost every technical analyst will have 
a unique approach, nearly all of the methods discussed above can be used to 
some extent in any particular piece of chart analysis, although individual 
chartists may concentrate on a particular type of analysis. Thus, an analyst 
might recognise a pattern in the time series, a head and shoulders formation, 
say, but also supplement this analysis by looking at rate of change indicators 
and moving averages. He might also add that, for example, the partially 
complete right shoulder is composed of five secondary upwaves so that, 
according to the Elliott principle, it should be completed by three downwaves. 
Hence any particular application of chart analysis will generally involve a 
mixture of both subjective and objective techniques to produce an overall 
prognosis. 
Empirical evidence on the use and role of chartism in practice will be 
presented in Chapter 4. In the next chapter, however, the treatment of non- 
fundamental, chartist analysis in the academic literature is considered. While 
this once neglected area now seems to be gaining attention, it does also 
appear that little work has yet been done to examine the actual role of 
chartism and its genuine predictions, areas which are the concern of the rest 





Chart 2.1: Dow theory 
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a) Dow theory: major bull trend time 
b) Dow theory: clear break in major bull trend time 
c) Dow theory: less clear break in major bull trend time 
Chart 2.2: The Basic Elliott Wave pattern 
price 
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The basic Elliott wave pattem time 
Chart 2.3: Daily Bar Charts 
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(a) Charts 2.3 a and b were kindly supplied by Investment Research of 
Cambridge. 
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Chart 2.4: A Point and Figure Chart(a) 
(a) Chart 2.4 was kindly supplied by Chart Analysis. 
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Chart 2.6: Trends 
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a) An uptrend 
- 
ascending peaks and troughs time 
b) A downtrend 
- 
descending peaks and troughs time 
c) A sideways trend 
- 
horizontal peaks and troughs time 




b) A down trendline 




a) An up trendline time 





c) A breakout from a trading range 
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a) Penetration of an up trendline time 
b) Penetration of a down trendline time 
price 
Chart 2.9: Support and resistance 
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Support and resistance in an uptrend time 
price 
Chart 2.10: The fan principle 
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Chart 2.11: Trend measurement 
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tracement 
a) Percentage retracernent time 
b) Speed resistance lines in an uptrend time 






b) A supposed head and shoulders in the DM/$ rate (daily data) 
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a) A classic head and shoulders pattern Time 
iau 
1984 85 86 
price 
price 
Chart 2.13: Triangles 
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a) A bullish symmetric triangle time 
b) An ascending triangle time 
price 
Chart 2.14: Flags and pennants 
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Flags and pennants in an uptrend time 
price 
price 
Chart 2.15: Wedges and rectangles 
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a) A bearish wedge time 
b) A bullish rectangle in an uptrend time 
3 ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND CHARTIST ANALYSIS 
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3-1: Introduction: The movement towards non-fundamentals 
One of the most well-known descriptions of how non-fundamental factors may 
play a significant role in determining prices in financial markets is probably 
Keynes' (1936, Chapter 12) likening of investment speculation to a'beauty 
contest'. (13) There have, however, been remarkably few serious academic 
studies of non-fundamental technical analysis. There are numerous 
fundamental-based academic studies of determination and forecasting of 
exchange rates and other asset prices (see eg MacDonald and Taylor 1989a 
for a survey) and a large number of textbooks essentially detailing the 
technical approach (eg Edwards and Magee 1966, Kaufman 1978, Pring 1985, 
Murphy 1986, Plummer 1989), but very little bridging between the two camps. 
In the case of the foreign exchange market, this may be partly explained by 
the relatively short recent period (only since the early 1970s) over which the 
major currencies have been traded in broadly 'flex-price' markets. 
Nevertheless, although efficient market type theories (see Fama 1970 for a 
review) have been pursued extensively in the last twenty years or so, the 
evidence against them has mounted. 
Empirical research on asset markets has highlighted numerous empirical 
anomalies at variance with the efficient markets hypothesis. These include, 
inter alia, the excess volatility of stock markets (Shiller, 1981, Campbell and 
Shiller, 1987) and the failure of forward rates optimally to predict future spot 
(13) As Keynes wrote in his analogy, "It is not a case of choosing those which 
are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion generally 
thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we 
devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects 
the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise 
the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. " Keynes 1936, Chapter 12. 
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ratesO 4) (see eg the survey by MacDonald and Taylor, 1989a). The extreme 
volatility of exchange rates during the recent float (Dornbusch and Frankel, 
1987) along with evidence revealing the poor performance of asset market 
models of the exchange rate (Meese and Rogoff 1983a, b, Hacche and 
Townend, 1981) further point to the disillusioning results of fundamental, 
particularly 'efficient marketbased, approaches. 
It is probably true to say that such approaches in any case run somewhat 
counter to the beliefs of financial practitioners. To quote the Financial Times, 
5 April 1988 p16, "In the hurly-burly of City dealing rooms, where anomalous 
price movements are exploited daily, the [efficient markets] theory has always 
been dismissed as the product of remote academic theodsing. ti(l 5) 
Probably in response to this continuing undiluted scepticism and mounting 
empirical evidence of the inadequacy of purely fundamental models, academic 
researchers have recently been displaying a heightened interest in the impact 
of non-fundamentals, and particularly chartism, on markets. The literature of 
the 1980s examining the possibility of speculative bubbles and rational 
expectations solutions other than the market fundamentals solution (see eg 
(14) The possibility that risk premia, rather than inefficiencies, drive a wedge 
between forward rates and expected spot rates, has met with little 
empirical success. See eg Domowitz and Hakkio, 1985, Fraser and 
Taylor 1990, MacDonald and Taylor 1989b. 
(15) A similar sentiment was expressed by Withers nearly a century earlier (Withers 
1897): '... we need only ask whether any reader of this journal would 
dream of consulting an economist if he wanted to know what would be 
the price of Consols, or the figure of the Bank rate, 
... 
this day week, or 
this day four weeks, or this day twelve months, and whether any 
bucket-shop tipster would increase his clientele by advertising that he 
kept a professor of political economy on the premises for the express 
purpose of furnishing forecasts to customers who called to consult 
him. ' 
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Flood and Garber, 1980, Blanchard and Watson, 1982a, b, Diba and 
Grossman, 1983) has mainly, however, concentrated on rational bubbles. As 
Blanchard and Watson (1 982a, p 1) write, "Some may object to our dealing 
with rational bubbles only. There is little question that most large historical 
bubbles have elements of irrationality 
... 
Our justification is the standard one: 
it is hard to analyse rational bubbles. It would be much harder to deal with 
irrational bubbles. " 
West (1988), however, argues that the theory of rational bubbles implies 
conditions probably too stringent for their existence. He suggests that findings 
such as those of Singleton (1980) of excess volatility in finitely lived assets 
cannot be caused by bubbles, since in the market of these assets, such as 
bonds, transversality conditions mean that there cannot be a bubble in the 
period a bond matures, hence by backwards recursion there cannot be a 
bubble in any earlier period. Assessing the sum of his evidence, West closes 
his discussion of rational bubbles by concluding that the theory of rational 
bubbles (albeit at a preliminary stage) suggests, "conditions for bubbles that 
are too stringent to make bubbles particularly attractive. " (op. cit, p650). 
It is interesting to observe that, to a large extent, the debate between 
fundamentalists and chartists mirrors the debate in the economics profession 
between econometric modellers and users of pure time series (ARIMA) 
analysis (Box and Jenkins 1971,1976) 
- 
see eg Hendry 1985. Indeed it has 
been argued that chartist analysis in itself is a form of 'eyeball Box-Jenkins' 
analysis, or may at least be proxied by it. Frankel and Froot (1 986b), for 
example, suggest that an ARIMA type system may be an appropriate way to 
model chartists' expectations. (In Chapter 5 evidence is presented to suggest 
that chartism is in fact richer than standard Box-Jenkins analysis). 
The following sections, 3.2 and 3.3 highlight two strands of the academic 
literature (random walk models and the efficient market approach) which have 
pertained to the issues surrounding chart analysis. It then goes on (section 
3.4) to consider several branches of the more recent work which look directly 
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at non-fundamental chart analysis itself as a joint exchange rate determinant 
with fundamental factors. Surveyed in this section are analyses of markets in 
which there are both chartists and fundamentalists; the effect of noise traders 
on financial markets; models which take explicit account of the transmission of 
views between participants; and work which examines the return available 
from following technical trading rules. In section 3.4, there is mention of 
related work which seems pertinent to chartism but has not yet been fully 
integrated with the subject, and in section 3.5 the evidence available from 
analysing surveys of foreign exchange market expectations is considered. 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2: Random walks and asset prices 
The claim that asset price behaviour approximates to a random walk 
- 
ie that 
the expected change in any financial asset price is zero 
- 
has a long history. 
The first proposition that (stock) price changes are independent of all prior 
fluctuations was presented by Bachelier (1900), an interest renewed by 
Working (1934), who argued that random walk patterns look like patterns of 
stock prices. This random walk proposition predates the development of the 
efficient markets models and was empirically tested on stock prices by Kendall 
(1953) and Granger and Morgenstern (1963), was demonstrated by 
theoretically Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) and has been 
popularised by Malkiel (1985)(16) among others. 
(16) Malkiel (1985, pp 129-132) claims that a randomly generated series produces 
a line which is indistinguishable from charts of genuine price 
movements, and describes how he misled chartists using an artificial 
chart. 
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Such an assertion regarding the stock market might be justified as starting 
from the proposition that a share price, pt say, should be equal to the 
discounted present value (dpv) of its expected value next period, pe t+j plus 
the dpv of the dividend expected to be announced next period, de t+1: 
-1 e-1e pt (1+r) Pt+l + (1+r) d t+l (3.1) 
where r is the rate of return. For short enough sampling periods (say weekly 
or daily data), both de t +1 (the expected dividend) and r may be very close to 
zero, so that (3.1) approximates closely to 
e Pt = Pt+l 
which is the random walk hypothesis. 
For the foreign exchange market, it is hard to derive a theoretical justification 
for the random walk model, although since the late 1970s the idea that the 
exchange rate could be well approximated by a random walk has been a 
'stylised fact', with several authors noting that exchange rates are largely 
unpredictable, eg. Cornell (1977) and Frenkel (1981). Mussa (1979 p 10) 
writes, "The natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate follows approximately 
a random walk. " In addition, Goodhart (1988 p 438) points out that the 
nominal exchange rate generally approximates closely to a random walk, and 
goes on to demonstrate that the forward rate contains no additional 
information on the path of future spot rates which is not discounted in the 
current spot rate. 
With regard to modelling the exchange rate, there is a large (and growing) 
amount of empirical evidence which examines how existing exchange rate 
models compare with a random walk. This began with the startling evidence 
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of Meese and Rogoff (1 983a) in which they demonstrate that a naive random 
walk consistently outperforms a number of standard fundamental exchange 
rate models in post-sample forecasting tests, for a variety of exchange rates. 
The technique employed by Meese and Rogoff is to compute'rolling 
regressions'. Their full data set is monthly from March 1973 to June 1981, on 
which the equations are estimated using data up to November 1976, and 
forecasts are made for 1,3,6 and 12 months ahead. The data for the next 
month (December 1986) is then included in the original dataset, the equations 
re-estimated and another set of forecasts made for the four time horizons. 
The rolling regression procedure is continually repeated and various statistical 
measures of the forecast errors of the models computed. The clear result is 
that none of the models tested can outperform a comparable random walk 
forecast in terms of out-of-sample forecasting on the criterion of the root mean 
square error. 
Largely resulting from attempts to pinpoint the precise cause of the damning 
Meese-Rogoff result, various subsequent studies have emerged along similar 
lines. See, inter alia, Woo 1985, Somanath 1986, who find that by various 
modifications to the models (these authors both added partial adjustment 
mechanisms), revised formulations could outperform a random walk over 
certain periods in Meese-Rogoff type exercises. It has also been argued that 
the Meese-Rogoff result may be due to the failure to account for parameter 
instability; the work of Wolff (1987) and Schinasi and Swamy (1989) has 
produced some evidence to support this case. 
This question of whether asset prices do in fact follow a random walk, or at 
least whether they are best predicted by one, is an issue very close to the 
debate of the efficacy of chartism or fundamentalism. If asset prices are 
indeed best modelled by a random walk 
- 
and the evidence on this has been 
seen to be unable conclusively to refute this proposition - then chartism may 
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well be a pragmatic approach to the circumstances. Some academic work 
conducted to evaluate such forecasts is presented in the next section, results 
which cannot dismiss the chartist approach. 
3.3: Market efficiency and evaluation of forecasts 
Were markets fully efficient in the sense of Fama (1970), chartist trading rules 
of the type discussed in Chapter 2 should be unable to produce abnormal 
profits. Using the criteria of Fama, a market may be said to be efficient if it 
'fully reflects' all the information in the relevant information set instantly: hence 
a trader should be unable to construct a strategy which yields abnormal profits. 
(The macroeconomic importance of efficient asset markets derives from the 




There is a marked similarity between the above definition of efficiency and one 
of the central tenets of chart analysis, discussed in Chapter 2, that 'the price 
discounts everything. This also highlights a logical flaw in much of the 
chartist literature in that if markets were fully efficient, then it should be 
impossible to construct profitable trading rules a priori (at least, after allowing 
for risk considerations). Thus, insofar as chartist analysis is successful, then it 
provides evidence against the market efficiency hypothesis and hence a_qainst 
one of its own central tenets. (See also the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox, 
discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.2.1.2 in relation to Dow theory). 
Much of the earliest academic work on aspects of technical analysis involved 
testing the profitability of various mechanistic trading rules as a test of foreign 
exchange market efficiency. Several such studies, some of which are 
discussed below, provided some of the earliest evidence against the efficient 
markets hypothesis by demonstrating the existence, albeit over limited 
periods, of profitable trading strategies which, according to theory, should 
have been arbitraged away in an efficient market 
- 
although the results 
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summarised here have not been entirely destructive to the efficient market 
hypothesis. More recent work by Schulmeister 1988 (discussed in section 
3.4.4) has explored these avenues further with respect to chartist rules, and 
has provided further such evidence (somewhat stronger than presented here) 
against foreign exchange market efficiency. 
Goodman (1979,1980) carded out ex post evaluations of the implied 
profitability of exchange rate forecasts provided both by technical and 
econometric/judgement based services. A major finding of his study was that 
the advisory services based on technical analysis outperform the forward rate 
in qualitative tests while the forward rate itself outperformed 
econometric/judgement based forecasts over the period considered 
- 
(between 
eighteen and thirty-six months in the period January 1976 to June 1978). The 
Goodman (1980) analysis was published in Euromoney, which has for several 
years conducted annual surveys of various aspects of the foreign exchange 
market. Its review of the accuracy of currency forecasting services has 
produced some mixed results overtime, however, 
- 
for example in the 
summary of the 1983 results (Goodman and Jaycobs, 1983) the advice was 
given, (p 132), 'Don't rely on a service just because it's been accurate in the 
past; there are wide fluctuations in the performance of services over time'. 
This emphasises that results for isolated sample periods should not be 
overstated. 
Bilson (1981) conducted test of the hypothesis of non-zero speculative profits, 
and rejected the hypothesis that there are no predictable profits to be made 
from foreign exchange speculation (using a simple forecasting rule and public 
information). Bilson could not, however, use his results to make inferences 
about the efficiency of the foreign exchange market since the profits could 
have been nullified by transactions costs or risk considerations. 
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Cornell and Dietrich (1978) assessed the profitability of chartist trading rules 
over the period March 1973 
- 
September 1975, and for three of the six 
currencies considered found some evidence of inefficiency in that statistically 
significant profits could have been earned by following trading rules over the 
period. They concluded that, on balance, however, their results did 'not 
support the hypothesis of large departures from market efficiency. (p120). 
The forecast accuracy of nine individual foreign exchange advisory services 
was analysed by Levich (1980), with forecasts over various periods and 
frequencies ranging from 1974 to 1979. Analysis of the mean-squared errors 
showed that most forecasters were less accurate than the forecast rate, 
although there was evidence of the services having outperformed the forward 
rate in earlier periods, but the resultant profits implied may not have been 
abnormal after adjusting for risk considerations. 
To conclude this section, there clearly is some evidence of departure from 
market efficiency which has emerged from the study of forecasting services 
and certain trading rules, although the results cannot be interpreted as an 
unambiguous rejection of market efficiency. Clearly results can differ between 
periods and currencies and are affected by whether allowance is made for risk 
premia and transactions costs. Probably largely because of these 
considerations, results can be prone to reverse, as the quotation from the 
Euromoney survey showed. Despite these caveats, however, there have 
clearly been sufficient instances of abnormal profits being made to suggest 
that there may be significant violation of market efficiency. 
3.4: Charts and fundamentals as joint exchange rate determinants 
Recent academic work has begun to consider explicitly the role of non- 
fundamentals, particularly chartism, in exchange rate rate determination. The 
amount of interest generated over the very recent past contrasts with 
prevailing previous attitudes. As Marris (1989 p 1) writes, 'Until quite recently 
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with undisguised scorn; 
indeed again until quite recently, they had not even bothered to look at what 
chartists were doing. ' Yet interest in technical analysis is well documented: 
for example a questionnaire was conducted by the Group of 30 (1985) which 
showed (pl 5) that 97% of banks and 87% of securities houses believed that 
the use of technical models has had a significant impact on the market. (17) 
The previous sections, however, point to influences leading away from pure 
fundamentals and towards an examination of non-fundamental influences. 
Numerous empirical exchange rate anomalies have also been documented, 
features of the market which are empirically well established but do not appear 
in standard models (see, inter alia, Goodhart 1988, Frankel and Froot 1986b, 
Dornbursch and Frankel 1987). For example, continued appreciation of 
currencies have occurred despite all the fundamental evidence and survey 
evidence pointing to depreciation; in the medium term there remain major 
misalignments from some 'fundamental PPP'; markets seem to be more 
volatile than is justified by the role of news, yet apparently under-react to the 
news itself. 
The academic work generated largely by differences between observed 
exchange rate behaviour and what theory would predict is discussed in the 
following sections. 
3.4.1: Balance of chartist and fundamentalist views 
More recent work on exchange rate determination has considered the effects 
of the interaction of agents in the market with different methods of expectation 
formation. There are, however, precursors to this line of thinking. For 
example, de Grauwe (1983) developed a model of exchange rate oscillations 
(17) Further references to this study are made in Chapter 4. 
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and catastrophe theory which employed both regressive and destabilising 
expecatations. More recently, there has been a tendency to describe aspects 
of the foreign exchange market in terms of both chartist and fundamental 
market participants. Goodhart (1988) presents a descriptive explanation of the 
observed behaviour and how misalignments in the exchange rate might occur, 
by assuming that the value of the exchange rate in the market is determined 
by some balance of fundamental and random walk (chartist) views. 
This model of Goodhart's concurs with the more detailed earlier work of 
Frankel and Froot (1 986b, 1986d, 1987b) 
- 
the thrust of their work being to 
develop an explanation of exchange rate determination which explicitly awards 
a role to chartist players, and demonstrates the existence of a speculative 
bubble that is not constrained by the assumption of rational expectations. 
Their model has three types of players: portfolio managers, fundamentalists 
and chartists, each being to a degree rational in that they behave in a specific 
way. The fundamentalists form their views on the exchange rate according to 
an economic model, the chartists use some extrapolation of the price history 
while the portfolio managers, who actually buy and sell the assets, form their 
expectations by a weighted average of the predictions of chartists and 
fundamentalists. The portfolio managers' weights are updated according to 
whether the chartists or fundamentalists have recently been the more 
successful. The basis of Frankel and Froot's work can be summarised by 
starting with a general model of exchange rate determination: 
St =C AS m t +1 + Zt 
(3.2) 
m 
where st is the logarithm of the spot rate, As t +1 is the one-period ahead rate 
of depreciation expected by the 'market' and zt represents other 
contemporaneous determinants. This is a very general model with the first 
term representing speculative factors and the zt term as fundamentals. For 
example in the early flex-price monetary model, such as Mussa 1976, Frenkel 
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1976, zt would be a function of relative monetary velocity. Clearly, according 
to equation (3.2), an increase in the expected rate of future depreciation 
reduces current demand for the currency, and hence causes it to depreciate at 
the current time. 
Frankel and Froot develop the above general model by replacing the standard 
assumption of rational expectations with the idea that the portfolio managers' 
market expectations are determined by a weighted average of the 
expectations of two groups of advisers 
- 
chartists and fundamentalists 
- 
according to: 
As m As f+ (1-W ) As c 
t+1 : -- lot t+l t t+l 
(3.3) 
where superscripts f and c denote 'fundamentalist expectation' and 'chartist 
expectation' respectively and " is the weight given to the fundamentalists' 
views, O<w<l. The model therefore embeds a form of market expectations 
following (3.3) into the standard asset pricing model given by (3.2). A variety 
of assumptions can then be made concerning the determination of chartist and 
fundamentalist expectations. One straightforward approach for modelling 
fundamentalist expectations is to assume that they are determined by the 
deviation of the current spot rate from the long-run equilibrium rate (according 
to fundamentals), § say: 
f 
st+l= V (S-S 
t 
and v is the speed of regression from s to 9 
(3.4) 
In the sticky-price monetary ('overshooting') model of Dornbusch (1976) for 
example, in which goods prices adjust slowly, equation (3-4) would be the 
rational form for expectations to take if there were no chartists in the market (ie 
"= 
1). In general, however, this formulation implies irrationality, given the 
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complete model. Frankel and Froot demonstrate standard ways in which 
fundamentalistst expectations can be a function of the deviation from 
equilibrium exchange rates: as a function of the interest differential and as a 
function of net external assets. 
As for the chartists' expectations, sct+l 
, 
Frankel and Froot assume that 
chartists use time series methods, and examine the very simple case where 





(although they do suggest in their conclusion (1 986b) that a richer class of 
predictor may be useful, eg. ARIMA models). Thus, equation (3.3) can be 
wdtten as: 
Sm (i Sf t+l t t+l 
and hence, using (3.4), 
m 
s t+l ý 10tv st 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
Frankel and Froot assume that the weight the portfolio managers give to 
fundamentalists' views evolves according to 
A 
Awt (w 
t-1 -w t-1 
(3.7) 
(18) Both this, and other work considered later (eg. Kirman 1989) use what are 
clearly naive time-series methods for proxying the behaviour of 
chartists. To this extent, the precise label 'chartist' may be too specific 
- 
any type of market operator using simple time series methods would 




wt-1 is the (ex post) weight that would have accurately predicted, ie 
A 
st (i t-1 v (s -s (3.8) 
Frankel and Froot then go on to model the dynamics of the portfolio managers' 
expectations, which is dependent on the changing weight they put on the 
fundamentalists9 views, according to equation (3.7). The dynamic 
development of two differential equationsO 9) following on from equations (3.6) 
and (3.7) depends on the choice of the basic parameter values, but with a 
choice of plausible parameter values, Frankel and Froot are then able to 
simulate the path of the dollar and are able to illustrate a path which captures 
the features of the overvaluation and subsequent collapse of the dollar during 
the 1984-85 period. 
They offer these results as an explanation (1 986b, p 33) for why sustained 
dollar appreciation may occur (a'bubble' path) even though all agents expect 
depreciation: 
'The equilibrium spot rate appreciates along its bubble path even though 
none of the actors expect appreciation. This result is due to the implicit 
stock adjustment taking place. As portfolio managers reject their 
fundamentalist roots, they reshuffle their portfolios to hold a greater share 
in dollar assets. For fixed relative asset supplies, a greater dollar share 
can be obtained in equilibrium only by additional appreciation. This 
unexpected appreciation, in turn, further convinces portfolio managers to 
embrace chartism. The rising dollar becomes self-sustaining. In the end, 
when the spiral finally levels off at w(t) = 0, the level at which the currency 
becomes stuck represents a fully rational equilibrium: portfolio managers 
expect zero depreciation and the rate of change of the exchange rate is 
indeed zero. ' 
Using a model based on the path of the US's stock of net external assets and 
their erosion by continued current account imbalances leading to US securities 
and therefore the dollar being perceived as increasingly risky, Frankel and 
(19) These are equations 16,17 and 19,20 in Frankel and Froot (1 986b) 
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Froot were also able to suggest a method by which the unsustainability of the 
dollar's position could be included in the model. 
'During the initial phases of the dollar appreciation, the current account, 
which responds to the appreciation with a lag, does not noticeably affect 
the rise of the dollar. But as w becomes small, the spot rate becomes 
more sensitive to changes in the level of the current account, and the 
external deficits of 1983-85 quickly turn the trend. When W is small and 
portfolio managers observe an incipient depreciation of the dollar, they 
begin to place more weight on the fundamentalists, thus accelerating the 
depreciation initiated by the current account deficits. There is a 
'fundamentalist revival'. ' 
Indeed, calculations by Frankel and Froot using survey data produce results 
consistent with w (the weight given to fundamentalists' views) falling from near 
1 in 1976-79 to 0 in 1985 
-a path borne out by the actual course of the dollar. 
Frankel and Froot's work represents a significant step forward in the analysis 
of exchange rates and their work surely accords more closely with market 
practitioners' views of the world than do some more traditional economic 
models which suggest that all agents follow a single 'true' model. 
They explicitly acknowledge that chartists' views, (albeit simply defined in their 
model) should be accounted for, and that time-varying interaction between 
fundamental and non-fundamental pressures on the exchange rate can 
produce paths which explain apparent paradoxes observed between the actual 
path of the exchange rate and market views. 
3.4.2: Noise tradinq 
It is only relatively recently than work in financial economics has explicitly 
assigned a role to the irrational or so-called 'noise'traders: work by Shiller 
(1984), Black (1986), Kyle (1985) Campbell and Kyle (1987) and De Long et al 
(1987,1988,1989) has been in the vanguard. The work of De Long et al 
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(1987,1988,1989), considered here, has continued to consider the role of 
noise traders, examining the implications of them co-existing in markets with 
rational speculators, and has shown that noise traders will not necessarily be 
driven out of the market by the rational agents. 
De Long et al, (1987,1988) use a two-period overlapping generations model 
with two classes of player: irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic 
beliefs and rational speculators. They show that the noise traders will not be 
driven out of the market by the rational speculators, contrary to what 
fu ndame Mal 
-based theory would predict. This is because some noise traders 
may invest heavily in risky assets and so may, potentially, earn higher 
expected returns than sophisticated traders. Additionally, noise traders' 
unpredictable changes in whims serve to make assets in which they invest 
even more risky, thus discouraging rational speculators from investing in them 
unless compensated by a risk premium for both fundamental and noise trader 
created risk. If this reduces the price and increases the return on the assets 
they buy, it means that 'economic selection' may operate even more strongly 
in their favour 
- 
counter to the view that such speculators would be driven out 
of the market. 
The authors are able to show that noise traders can achieve a profitable 
position in the market and that their presence together with that of 
sophisticated investors can account for a variety of otherwise puzzling market 
phenomena, such as excess price volatility and deviations from fundamental 
values. They emphasise in their conclusion that models with noise traders are 
not ones in which 'anything can happen' - the model has clear, identifiable 
consequences. 
De Long et al (1989) continue the research to assess the welfare implications 
of noise trading. Highlighting the significant degree of stock market volatility 
which cannot be explained by movements in fundamentals (eg. Shiller, 1981 
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French and Roll, 1986, Campbell and Shiller 1987) they suggest the effect 
may be due to market response to Anoise trading' and focus on the possible 
size and incidence of losses thereby induced. 
Concern has long been expressed that such trading may act to reduce welfare 
- 
Wojniloweer (1980) wrote of a 'gambling mentality' and 'casino' instincts in 
financial markets and suggested that links with the real side mean that, 'the 
real economy pays the price'. De Long et al develop a formal model to 
evaluate the size and incidence of losses from noise trading, with particular 
regard to capital formation. 
Their method is to use a two-period overlapping generations model. Investors 
live for two periods, in the first they earn exogenous labour income and invest 
it all, allocating the wealth between the two assets of safe, fixed bonds or risky 
stocks, ownership of a stock unit carrying with it ownership of a unit of 
productive physical capital. In the second period individuals sell all their 
investments and consume the proceeds. There are two types of traders in the 
model 
- 
rational investors and noise traders. Rational investors have rational 
expectations, and so accurately perceive the returns on all investments. Noise 
traders accurately perceive the return on bonds but to some extent 
misperceive the stock prices. Noise trader risk 
- 
the risk of changes in noise 
trader opinion 
- 
is the driving force of the model. 
One of the implications of the model is that the additional risk caused by the 
noise trading can reduce the capital stock and the consumption of the 
economy, and that part of this cost may fall on rational investors. De Long et 
al (1989) argue that while noise traders may provide both a profitable 
opportunity for the rest of the economy (in that skillful rational investors can 
exploit their behaviour) and a cost by the increased element of risk (both in 
making consumption excessively volatile around its expected value and by 
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actually reducing consumption via reducing levels of investment and the 
capital stock), the loss due to noise traders can significantly outweigh the 
gain. (20) They conclude that the full welfare cost of noise trading may be 
large if the magnitude of noise in aggregate stock prices is as large as is 
suggested by, for example, the work of Campbell and Kyle (1988) on excess 
stock market volatility. 
Work on noise trading appears to be a rapidly expanding area of economic 
literature: its explanations for several empirical phenomena such as the 
presence of non-fundamental traders in the market and excess volatility 
findings is reason in itself to expect that the area will be, and should be, 
expanded further. 
3.4.2.1: Fads 
While there is little conclusive evidence for fads 
-a term used to indicate short 
term, mean reverting excursions from fundamentals (see eg Shiller 1984, 
Summers 1986) 
- 
several commentators argue that they appear to explain 
certain features of asset markets more plausibly than do more traditional 
models. The empirical evidence is, however, limited. 
In their 1987 paper, Poterba and Summers examine the statistical evidence on 
whether a significant proportion of the variance in stock market returns can be 
accounted for by transitory components. Conducting tests of returns over a 
(maximum) period of 1871-1986, they find evidence that transitory 
(20) De Long et al do stress, however, that noise trading does not always damage 
the economy 
- 
for example if noise traders were very bullish and over- 
invested in stocks leading to the cost of capital being low and its 
quantity high, it would be beneficial to the economy as a whole 
although harmful to the noise traders themselves. 
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components appear to account for more than half the variance in (monthly) 
returns. While they admit that a full examination and explanation of this 
phenomenon would be complex, they suggest that noise trading provides a 
more plausible account of this transistory component than does the possibility 
that such effects are the result of fundamental influences. Their preferred 
explanation of their statistical findings that of slowly decaying 'price fads' which 
could cause stock prices to deviate from fundamentals for perhaps periods of 
up to several years. 
West (1988) also argues that the consideration of fads better explains features 
of asset markets than do more traditional models. If noise trading does indeed 
play a role in stock price determination, it would potentially lead to wider 
variations in expected returns; if one interprets the effects of these noise 
traders as 'fads, then fads would simply add a 'noise-trading' factor to what 
the fundamental price would be. To the extent that noise traders trade every 
asset, the eisk would be 'non-diversifiable': sophisticated investors would have 
to take it into account. Fads can further be interpreted as meaning that even 
after allowing for risk consideration, profitable opportunities could exist (West 
1988): ie. implying that markets are inefficient. 
So, while there is both anecdotal (eg Keynes' beauty contest) and more formal 
evidence of fads (eg De Bondt and Thaler 1985 and 1987, who find that a 
contrarian strategy of selling high performing and buying low performing 
shares can yield high returns), West (p654) argues that the evidence is not yet 
suff icient to 'sway someone unsympathetic to fads models'. As Leroy (1989 
pl 608) writes, ' 
... 
it is not clear that anything is gained by characterising an 
unexplained variation in prices as a fad 
... 
precisely because [the additional 
movement] is unobserved, one is free to accept or reject the interpretation; 
nothing is at stake either way. ' 
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So, while it is possible to characterise hitherto unexplained variation in asset 
prices as fads, there is (as yet) insufficient evidence to make the case stand 
conclusively. Furthermore, the evidence and academic discussion to date 
refers virtually exclusively to the stock, and not the foreign exchange, market, 
although many of the observations are equally applicable to both. 
3.4-3: Transmission of opinions between market participants 
In Frankel and Froot's (1 986b) model, while the numbers of chartists and 
fundamentals is constant, the opinions of portfolio managers change over 
time. In the models of De Long et al (1988, section 111), the proportion of new 
noise traders rises when their returns exceed those of the sophisticated 
traders. Agents with differing views and/or the possibility of conversion 
between camps is now a feature frequently incorporated into economic models 
of financial markets. (See Varian, 1987, for a survey). 
An explicit model of the transmission of and conversion of views, features 
which have generally been absent from exchange rate models, is presented by 
Kirman 1989. The basis of Kirman's work is the idea that people may tend to 
follow the prevailing market view rather than attempt to form their own 
individual view and act accordingly. This idea itself is not new: Keynes (1936 
Chapter 12) writes, 'Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so 
difficult to-day as to be scarcely practicable. He who attempts it must surely 
... 
run greater risks than he who tries to guess better than the crowd how the 
crowd will behave; and, given equal intelligence, he may make more 
disastrous mistakes. ' 
Assuming this type of behaviour to be the case, Kirman cites three conditions 
which are necessary for transmission of opinions to operate - that agents 
watch each others' behaviour, that they hold differing opinions and that there 
is the possibility of them converting their opinions. There are several 
examples of economic literature which discuss or even incorporate these 
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features into economic models. For example, the models of De Long et al 
(1987,1988,1989) suggest a world in which there are different types of 
traders 
- 
the rational sophisticated traders and 'noise'traders and, as 
mentioned above, the proportion of noise traders can rise when they are 
making higher returns than the sophisticated traders. 
Kirman's (1989) model adopts an 'epidemic' approach in that the opinions of 
agents may be changed after meeting people with differing views. (21) He 
defines a specific recruitment/conversion model in which there is a world with 
two prevalent views, and when individuals with different views meet, there is 
some probability of conversion. The players also observe (with noise) the 
majority opinion and act accordingly, hence the market as a whole only 
responds to changes in opinion when the majority switch. Thus, majority 
opinion dominates the path of the market and so the individuals are rational in 
that by following market opinion they forecast correctly. The resulting 
movement of the exchange rate would be characterised by periods of definite 
movement representing the prevailing view, interspersed by brief periods of 
vacillation. 
Modifying Frankel and Froot's (1 986b) model, Kirman's two types of agents 
are fundamentalists whose expectations are formed by the belief that 
movements in the exchange rate tend to bring it to some equilibrium value (as 
in equation 3.4 above) and the chartists who extrapolate naively, according to: 
(21) Kirman states that the model was in fact suggested by the reported behaviour 
of a certain species of ant: when two identical food sources were 
placed near to the ants' nest and replenished so as to maintain them 
at a constant level, the ants did not forage from the two piles equally. 
Rather, they tended to be heavily concentrated on one pile, and from 
time to time would suddenly switch to the other pile. 
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Aq, l = st - st-, (3.9) 
The proportion of fundamentalists and chartists at any one time is determined 
by the model of conversion by encounter, and each agent observes (with 
some error) the proportion of people acting like fundamentalists. Conversion 
is more likely to the prevalent view (the one forming the market price) and with 
agents only acting according to the view they hold when they perceive this to 
have become the majority view. 
So, like the models discussed in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 above, the Kirman 
model also has a strong element of 'real world' behaviour, of a sort generally 
absent from standard exchange rate models. 
3.4.4: Academic analysis of technical tradinq rules 
As mentioned in the survey of chartist methods in Chapter 2, the importance of 
a strong trend for profitability of mechanical trading rules is highlighted by 
chartists as a key consideration in their use: the danger of being 'whipsawed' 
and making a loss during a trading range is apparent. Evidence available so 
far appears to bear this out in practice. Some of the most recent evidence is 
that presented by Schulmeister (1988), who applies four different trading rules 
(double moving average, breakout rules and combinations of the two) to the 
DW$ rate, and finds that the resulting profits over the period are totally 
inconsistent with the the zero profits that pure rational expectations would 
predict. (22) 
(22) Some other analyses of the profitability of technical trading rules were 
considered in section 3.3. The work by Schulmeister, however, is 
some of the most recent available, is conducted on dailv data and 
provides analysis of specific chartist trading rules, evidence of the use 
and consultation of which is found in the results of the questionnaire 
survey, presented in the next chapter. 
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In this work, Schulmeister draws distinction between the pattern recognition 
aspect of chartism, which he terms the 'qualitative' approach, and the 
statistical moving average and momentum type models of technical analysis 
which he describes as the 'quantitative' approach. He calculates and analyses 
the ex post dollar returns from four (moving average/momentum(23) /hybrid 
models) using various parameter values, on daily DM/$ data over the period 
April 1973 
- 
March 1988. Between 1973 and October 1986, the average 
annual return of the models is around 15%. In the later period, to 1988, most 
of the rules prove to be less profitable than in the preceding years, a result he 
attributes to the stabilising effect of the Louvre accord of February 1987. 
The reported returns include neither the effect of transactions costs nor the 
interest differential. Schulmeister justifies this estimating the effect of the 
former to be negligible and that the interest costs of short positions and 
earnings of long positions would be roughly offsetting. 
In his analysis of the results, Schulmeister identifies the precise source of the 
profits. It turns out that, for all the trading rules, while the number of loss 
making positions exceed the number of profitable ones, and although the 
average absolute loss or profit per day of these positions are approximately 
equal, the overall profitability stems from the fact that the average duration of 
the profitable positions is some 3 to 4 times longer than that of the unprofitable 
positions. This is explained by the exploitation of the runs observable in the 
data 
- 
it is pointed out that the general dollar appreciation in the DM/$ rate 
between 1980-85 was due to upward runs of an average duration of 2.6 times 
longer than the counter-runs, and that the depreciation from 1985 saw longer 
lasting downward than upward runs. 
(23) Schulmeister used the term 'momentum' models for the overbought/oversold 
type systems examined in Chapter 2, section 2.5.2.1. 
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As Schulmeister concludes, 'The profits from the correct identification and 
exploitation of the few, but persistent runs, which change the exchange rate 
most, can therefore easily compensate for the more frequent, but smaller 
P losses stemming from the minor exchange rate fluctuations ("whipsaws") 
(Schulmeister 1988 p352). (24) He infers from these empirical results that 
market efficiency (in the sense of Fama, 1970) does not hold for most traded 
currencies. 
Schulmeister's work is an important contribution to the debate about technical 
analysis, particularly in that it demonstrates the efficacy of trading rules, at a 
minimum over a certain substantial period for a major traded currency. It 
does, however, focus entirely on only one aspect of chartism 
- 
namely that of 
mechanical trading systems and as such, a large portion of chartist techniques 
(as surveyed in Chapter 2) and the subjective use in practice of both pattern 
recognition and information from mechanical systems (described in the 
conclusions of Chapter 2 and demonstrated via survey data in Chapter 4) is 
entirely missed. 
Schulmeister does make several additional interesting comments on market 
behaviour following from expectations in the foreign-exchange market. He 
observes that while it is foreign exchange dealers who most directly influence 
the exchange rate, economic theory abstracts from them, assuming them to be 
only intermediary agents (p 344). He goes on to ask how it would be possible 
for the behaviour of dealers to result in persistent medium-term runs of the 
type observed in the 1980s, and suggests two hypotheses: 
(24) This demonstrated the point, made heuristically in some chartist texts (eg. 
Murphy 1986 p [264]) that chartists following mechanistic rules would 
generally make a large number of small losses on false signals but 
would more than offset these by the profits made on the true turning 
points. 
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By the interaction of a 'bandwagon' effect and a'cash-in' effect. If the 
exchange rate appreciates due to some 'news' effect, a certain 
momentum can be achieved as agents buy, which causes appreciation, 
which produces buy signals on trading models, etc. The temptation to 
take profits ('cash-in'the paper profits) increases the longer the upward 
run lasts, hence agents probably become progressively more responsive 
to 'bad news'which could be interpreted as the approaching end of the 
run, and when the run finally bursts, a counter-run is often triggered. 
Medium-term expectational bases could act for or against currencies (eg 
for dollar appreciation 1980-85, or dollar depreciation 1985-87). During a 
prevailing positive bias traders would hold long positions of the currency 
for longer than a short position, a behaviour which hence leads to upward 
runs lasting longer than the counter-runs, and a stepwise appreciation of 
the currency. 
Schulmeister also discusses the so-called 'winners and losers' in currency 
transactions. It is known that banks do make consistent profits from short-term 
speculative foreign exchange dealing and, by definition, global currency trade 




consistently win this game, who then is the loserT He states that the loser will 
be all those who deal in foreign exchange for reasons other than speculation 
- 
ie. those who trade in goods and services, using foreign exchange for 
international payments rather than as a financial asset. He further suggests 
that speculation in asset markets may lead to instability and impede activity in 
the goods market. 
Grubel (1989) takes issue with this view that traders in the goods market lose, 
and, on the assumption that profitable speculation by institutions such as 
banks increases exchange rate stability, suggests that the speculative 
earnings of banks represent a payment by international goods traders for 
increased exchange rate stability. 
This conclusion rests on the assumption that consistently profitable 
speculation does indeed increase exchange rate stability, a long-standing 
controversy which is both theoretically and empirically unproven. Friedman 
(1953) argues that the activities of speculators who consistently earn profits 
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must have the effect of stabilising the exchange rate, writing, 'People who 
argue that speculation is generally destabilising seldom realise that this is 
largely equivalent to saying that speculators lose money, since speculation 
can only be destabilising in general only if speculators on the average sell 
when the currency is low in price and buy when it is high. ' (1953 p 175). 
Friedman's argument has been challenged on several fronts. (25) It was 
questioned at the time and shortly after in several papers (eg. Stein, 1961, and 
a discussion in Sohmen, 1969), and the debate has continued with more 
recent economic concepts. Dombusch and Frankel (1987) suggest that, 'the 
modern theory of rational stochastic speculative bubbles has all but 
demolished Friedman's claim that investors who bet on destabilising 
expectations will lose money. In a rational speculative bubble, investors lose 
money if they don't go along with the trend. ' The models of De Long et al 
(1987,1988,1989), discussed above, presents a model to show that 
speculators could make profits by following 'noise'. The conclusive testing of 
the competing propositions is not, however, possible due to the lack of data 
and complexity of the model structures. As Grubel (1989 p 3) writes, 'Since 
both propositions are theoretically and logically correct, it is not possible to 
consider one to be more realistic than the other. ' 
3.4.5: Related extensions 
Finally in this chapter, some related areas of the literature which do not, as yet, 
appear to have been fully integrated with analysis of chartism, are mentioned: 
the areas of chaos theory, some specialised very high frequency analysis and 
psychological explanations. While some of these areas are perhaps slightly 
(25) Friedman did, however add a footnote on the above quotation warning that it 
was a simplified generalisation of a complex problem. 
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tangential to the main concern of this thesis, it seems likely that further work 
will heighten their importance to non-fundamental exchange rate 
determination. 
3.4-5-1: Chaos Theory 
Chaos theory moves away from the popular exchange rate theories of the 
1970s and 1980s in which linear models of exchange rate changes were 
driven by stochastic disturbances, or random pieces of 'news. (See, inter alia, 
Frenkel and Mussa, 1985) In contrast, the chaos theory approach develops 
models which generate apparently 'unpredictable' exchange rate movements 
via non-linearities in the system. While these models produce results which 
are all but unpredictable, the origins of the movements is entirely from 
fundamentals. Such models were originally developed from the natural 
sciences, for example in physics to analyse the properties of turbulent fluid 
flows (eg Lorentz 1963). 
Chaos theories have recently been gaining attention in the field of economics, 
particularly with regard to the movements of exchange rates and stock prices. 
Interest has become apparent in City-orientated journals, see eg. The Banker, 
'Chaos theory', January 1990, pp 51-54, and Financial Weekly, 'Securities 
face fatal attractors of chaos 9, January 12 1989, p 17, and recent books on the 
subject, eg. Gleick 1988, Chaos 
- 
Making a New Science. 
In the field of academic economics, Scheinkman (1990) reviews the work to 
date on non-linearities in economic dynamics. One of the latest academic 
papers on the subject of chaos itself is that of de Grauwe and Vansanten 
(1990), which highlights the failures of conventional 'news-driven' models to 
account for observed phenomena in exchange rates such as large changes 
when no news is apparent, or provide accurate forecasts, and went on to 
suggest that non-linear deterministic models of exchange rate behaviour 
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containing a mixture of both chartist and fundamentalist expectations can 
generate chaotic movements without the need for'news'. This implies an 
inherent un predictability in exchange rate movements, since large changes in 
rates could occur even in the absence of policy shocks. 
3.4.5.2: Very high frequency analysis 
- 
the Olsen approach 
Research developed by Richard Olsen and his company Olsen and 
Associates (0 & A) has been entirely based on statistical analysis of the raw 
data. They have collected tick-by-tick data on all major exchange rates since 
end-1 985. Their model of exchange rates is based on I ractal theory', 
- 
that 
natural repetitive patterns occur in price series which can be differentiated only 
by their scale; and on 'intrinsic time' 
- 
whereby, for example, tick-by-tick quotes 
are are transformed on to a scale dependent on market activity, such that 
volatile periods of price movements receive higher weighting. Analysis is 
presented (see, for example, Muller et al, 1988) which suggests a scaling law 
relating the absolute value of the price changes to the time interval of the price 
changes. From these ideas, 0&A have built up a forecasting and trading 
model and consultancy service (see 0&A Sales Documents, 1989). 
It is interesting to note that the above analysis, which is essentially based on 
patterns invariant of time, is not dissimilar to traditional point and figure charts 
- 
see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3 and Chart 2.4. 
This work of Olsen can clearly be linked to the high frequency work of 
Goodhart, for example Goodhart and Figliouli (1988) and Goodhart and 
Giugale (1988). Both strands of work point to the importance of the analysis of 
high frequency data. 
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3.4-5.3: Psychological explanations 
Recent work on cognitive psychology (see eg Hoggarth and Reder, 1987: and 
Leroy 1989 section viii discusses the work to date) has documented 
explanations of human behaviour which seems to bear some resemblance to 
various empirical anomalies in asset markets: for example, behaviour such as 
people systematically placing too much weight on current observations has 
been described. Plummer (1989), in his discussion of technical analysis, 
works on the premise that individuals are influenced by crowd behaviour, 
which would lead to decisions which were 'non-rational' according to 
economists. These psychological explanations can also be linked to the more 
economic-based ones: as Leroy (1989, pl 608) writes in relation to fads, 
'Advocacy of a fads model is perhaps best interpreted as a statement of belief 
that the most fruitful avenues of future research will involve social or cognitive 
psychology, rather than as referring to any well-formed model that is now 
available'. 
3.5: Survey evidence on foreign exchange markets 
Having surveyed various studies which include non-fundamental chartist 
influences in either theoretical models or simulations of foreign exchange 
markets, this section considers the results of various analyses of surveys of 
foreign exchange market expectations. Several such data sources are 
discussed in the next section and section 3.5.2 then goes on to consider 
results regarding features such as expectation formation, rationality and risk 
premia. 
3.5-1: Sources of survey data 
There are several sources of survey data on foreign exchange market 
expectations. The main categories which have been analysed include: 
a) Godwins, a firm of financial consultants, survey the expectations of the 
chief investment managers of over fifty leading investment houses at the 
data collected include (among others) the k -r" 
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predictions of the $/E rate, in three category response form: up, down, or 
same. These data are used by Taylor (1989). 
b) The Economist has data back to 1981 collected every six weeks by 
telephone from currency traders and economists. The data from this source in 
combination with the AMEX and MMS data (see below) are used in the 
Frankel and Froot papers which analyse survey expectations 
- 
all these data 
are in quantitative form. See, for example, Frankel and Froot 1986a, c and 
1987a. (26) 
C) The American Express Bank Review (AMEX) survey consists of the 
exchange rate expectations of over 250 bankers, corporate treasures and 
economists questionned annually 
- 
at maximum the data go back to 1976. A 
disadvantage of this data is that it is conducted by mail, so that it is not 
possible to put a precise date on the expectations, nor to identify the exact 
information set available. 
d) Data from Money Market Services (MMS) go back to 1983, and consists 
of weekly or twice weekly expectation of currency traders collected by 
telephone. This data has been widely used by researchers, see for example 
Dominguez (1986), MacDonald and Torrance (1 988a, b), as well as in the 
Frankel and Froot papers mentioned above. 
There are many other sources of data which have been used in analyses of 
market expectations, but the above cover the main sources widely available to 
researchers of exchange rates. There are other surveys available which 
examine expectations of other aspects of the economy - for example the 
'Livingston' data-set has been used in numerous studies. This is a quantitative 
data-set, collected bi-annually since 1946, on the views of a panel of leading 
economists regarding price and wage expectations (these price series have 
(26) The survey data is described in several of Frankel and Froot's papers 
- 
see for 
example Frankel and Froot 1986a, p4 and 1987a, p 151. 
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been very widely examined, see, inter alia, Turnovsky (1970), Gibson (1972), 
Pesando (1975)), GNP, stock prices, investment, unemployment. See Brown 
and Maital (1981) for an examination of these latter series. 
If the survey data is only available in a non-quantitative form, such as that 
collected by Godwins(27) 
, 
it can be used to derive series of aggregate point 
expectations by several methods. The methods of Carlson-Parkin (1975) and 
Knobl (1974) along with those of Pesaran (1984,1987) can be used to 
quantify qualitative responses. 
3-5.2: Findinqs using survey data of foreiqn exchange markets 
There is widespread empirical evidence that the forward rate is not an optimal 
predictor of the future spot rate (see Hodrick (1988) for a survey of the 
literature). Much of the work, though, comes to this conclusion by testing the 
joint null hypothesis of both risk neutrality and rational expectations on the part 
of agents, and there is disagreement in the literature as to which aspect is 
responsible for the bias. The use of survey data, however, enables these two 
aspects to be distinguished, (28) and the majority of studies so doing have 
found that it appears to be the assumption of rationality which is violated. (29) 
(27) Other UK examples of this type of data are the CBI industrial trends survey 
and Gallup surveys. 
(28) See Taylor (1989) for a mathematical demonstration of this. 
(29) This contrasts with some other (non-survey) analysis which has cited risk 
premia as the cause of the bias: see, inter alia, Hansen and Hodrick 
(1983) and Fama (1984). 
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Frankel and Froot (1 986a) use the Economist, MMS and AMEX data to 
examine expectations of the V/$ rate and find evidence to suggest that 
variations in the forward premia reflect changes in expected depreciation 
rather than changes in the risk premium. MacDonald and Torrance (1 988b), 
using MMS data to examine the DW$ rate 1985-86, found that the bias in the 
forward rate were due to the failure of the rationality of expectations over the 
period, and not due to a risk premium. They did suggest, however, that this 
may not necessarily reflect irrationality but rather may be evidence of a 
situation such as a'peso problem' (Krasker, 1980) 
- 
ie. a small probability of a 
large depreciation which did not occur over the sample period. In another 
study Froot and Frankel (1989) also found that it is expectational errors rather 
than the risk premium which causes the systematic prediction error in the 
forward discount. 
An exception to the body of results such as those cited above is the findings of 
Taylor (1989), who used the Godwins data to examine predictions of the $/E 
rate and the sterling effective index, but was unable to reject rational 
expectations, and his analysis suggested that the bias of the forward rate was 
probably due to a risk premium. 
There are several arguments concerning, for example, the problems of the 
conversion of qualitative to quantitative data, and of the various merits or 
shortcomings of data from different surveys, which can be brought to bear on 
the apparent contradictions of such results. Overall, however, balance of 
opinion from analysis of foreign exchange survey data suggests that the cause 
of the forward rate bias is the failure of rational expectations to hold. What is 
very clear, however, is that the analysis of survey expectations has enabled 
the crucial aspects of the question to be distinguished. 
Survey data of foreign exchange expectations has also been used to 
investigate which expectations mechanisms best describe the beliefs of 
market participants, given the general failure to find evidence of rationality. 
The usual approach is to fit alternative expectations models to the data and to 
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ascertain which best describes the data. Most such studies have highlighted 
the issue of whether agents' expectations may be a destabilising influence on 
the foreign exchange market: ie. whether the hypothesis of so-called 
'bandwagon expectations' can be rejected. 
For example, Frankel and Froot (1 987a) fit a variety of models to their data 
and find that both the bandwagon and the static expectations hypotheses 
could be rejected, and showed that variables other than the contemporaneous 
spot rate receive weight in agents'views. This contrasts with MacDonald and 
Torrance (1 988b) who find some evidence of destabilising behaviour, 
although, as discussed above, they did raise the possibility of a'peso'type 
problem affecting the expectations over their sample period. Evidence 
presented in Chapter 7 for an analysis of chartists' expectations gives further 
weight to the rejection of the bandwagon hypothesis. 
There does appear to be a general reluctance to attribute bandwagon 
expectations to foreign exchange market participants, and even those few 
studies which do find some evidence of it tend to suggest explanations of why 
it may not necessarily be a pervasive result. What does seem to emerge 
however, both in theoretical discussions of foreign exchange market dynamics 
(eg. Frankel and Froot (1 986d), Goodhart (1988)) and in recent empirical work 
is that fundamental inputs to expectation formation may well be mixed with 
non 
-f u ndame ntal/extrapol ative/ch artist type approaches, with the latter 
perhaps being more used over shorter horizons. Some survey evidence from 
a questionnaire is presented in the next chapter to support this view. 
3.6: Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the ground has been shifting recently 
away from general academic scepticism of non-fundamentals to active 
investigation of the many observed phenomena not captured by traditional 
economic models. These new lines of research seem, in many cases, to be 
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more capable of capturing 'real-world' behaviour, and the area of investigation 
is clearly a growing one. Very many of these new approaches do award an 
explicit role to chartist players and recognise that they can, and do, (profitably) 
exist in the market. This is a departure from the line of thinking which 
suggests that these traders would be wiped out by 'smart' fundamentalists. 
There is as yet, however, insufficient empirical evidence which enables the 
effects of such players to be distinguished conclusively or analysed fully. 
Hence, while many commentators do find explanation of market movements 
by features such as fads and noise trading appealing, belief in them as yet has 
to remain an informed act of faith. To some extent, fads/noise trading 
explanations are treated as a 'residual' hypothesis, given the failure of market 
efficiency and the lack of an adequate explanation of market movements in 
terms of rational behaviour. (30) 
There does, however, still appear to be a dearth of hard empirical evidence 
about the actual activities of these non-fundamental players such as chartists 
in the market, and the next chapter helps to fill this gap. 
Following the survey of chartist techniques in Chapter 2, it is not unreasonable 
to suppose that there are certain recurring, common threads running through 
chartists' approaches. In order to try to guage which of the many chartist 
techniques explained in Chapter 2 are particularly widely used, and to gain 
insights into the role and perception of chartism, a questionnaire was sent to 
dealing institutions throughout the City of London. The design and results of 
this questionnaire are the subject of the next chapter. 
(30) Indeed recalling the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, West (1988) 
argues that the theory of rational bubbles implied conditions too strong 
for their existence. 
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4 QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY OF DEALERS 
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4.1: Introduction 
As seen in the previous chapter, there has recently been increasing interest in 
chartism by a number of authors who have begun to examine the role of non- 
fundamentalist analysis on capital markets. Frankel and Froot (1986b), for 
example, suggested that technical analysis may have been largely responsible 
for overvaluation of the US dollar during the 1980s. In a similar fashion, some 
economists have suggested that chartist analysis may have been an important 
contributory factor in the international stock market crash of 1987 (see eg Artis 
and Taylor 1989). At a more general level, there does now seem to be a 
growing interest in the role of non-fundamentalist (or'noise') traders in 
financial markets (such as the work of De Long et al 1987,1988,1989 
discussed in Chapter 3). 
Despite this growing professional interest in technical analysis and the 
existence of a widespread literature on chartist methodologies, some of which, 
as seen in previous chapters, dates back to the beginning of the century, there 
appears to be little or no empirical evidence on the prevalence and use of 
these techniques in the financial markets, although indications of the 
importance of these issues are not new. For example, an international 
questionnaire of forty large banks and other foreign exchange market 
participants was conducted by the Group of Thirty (1985) included returns by 
participants which were summarised as (p 14), 'Technical trading systems, 
involving computer models and charts have become the vogue', and the vast 
majority of those questioned believed that the use of technical models did 
have some effect on the foreign exchange market. 
There is, however, virtually no work which specifically examines the extent to, 
and manner by which, chartism is used in the foreign exchange market and 
how it is perceived by the market participants themselves. In an attempt to 
provide empirical answers to these issues, it was undertaken to conduct a 
questionnaire survey on the use of technical analysis, with particular reference 
to the London foreign exchange market. 
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The survey was conducted among chief foreign exchange dealers in the 
London market. It was designed to provide answers to three basic questions. 
First, to determine which, chartist techniques are most used in practice. 
Second, to ascertain the role of the chartist practitioners themselves 
- 
is their 
presence in dealing organisations widespread, what is their input into the 
trading decision, to what extent is their advice likely to be combined with 
fundamentals before a trade takes place? Third, how do market participants 
view the role of chartism? The answer to the latter question is largely manifest 
in the time horizon over which charts are used and the extent to which they are 
viewed as complementary as opposed to competing tools of analysis, while 
the former issues could be largely ascertained from factual enquiries. There 
was also space for respondents to add any general comments concerning the 
role of chartism in the foreign exchange market. 
The next section considers factors influencing the design of the questionnaire, 
after which the coverage and results of the survey are examined. A final 
section concludes by summarising the salient points revealed in the survey. A 
copy of the original questionnaire forms an Appendix to this chapter. 
4.2: The design of the questionnaire 
Several considerations influenced, and to some extent constrained, the design 
of the questionnaire. On a practical level, it was felt that is should not exceed 
two pages of A4 paper, so as not to deter responses from busy chief dealers. 
Another important factor was that many (probably most) of those questioned 
would be non-economists, so formal economic terminology was inappropriate. 
Furthermore, the subject of technical analysis itself has a plethora of 
overlapping and sometimes confusing terminology, (eg. the terms 
oscillators/momenturn/rate of change indicators are not always used in the 
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same context) so some questions had to refer to concepts by several names. 
Before the questionnaires were sent out, comments and suggestions were 
incorporated from both Bank of England and market traders and analysts. 
Methodological considerations behind the design of the various types of 
questions are set out below. The question numbers reference the 
questionnaire in the Appendix. 
a) Questions concerning chartist methodolo_qy. The first question (no. 1) 
concerned which chartist methods and services were used by dealing rooms. 
The question posed was, "Which of the following chartist methods and 
services does your organisation use? " followed by three categories of chart 
analysis 
- 
analytical techniques, computer analysis and chartist publications. 
b) Questions concerninq the role of chart analysts. The next three 
questions asked whether the organisation used a particular chart company or 
analyst (no. 2), and whether any in-house economists or technical analysts 
were employed (nos. 3 and 4). The latter questions had subsidiary sections 
which asked whether the economists/technical analysts actually took positions 
or acted only as advisers, and to what extent their advice influenced foreign 
exchange forecasts. 
C) How do market participants view the role of chartism? The emphasis 
market participants placed on chartism and fundamental analysis over various 
time horizons (no. 5) and whether the two are viewed as complementary or 
competing tools of analysis (no-6) was the aim of the rest of the questions on 
the survey. The form of the questions was that of a linear 1 0-point scale, on 
which respondents could mark where they judged their approach to lie 
between using pure chartism or pure fundamental analysis. 
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The question concerning the time horizon over which chartism is used was 
phrased, "Please indicate the relative importance you attach to 
chartist/technical analysis versus fundamental (ie economic) analysis of 
currencies over the following forecasting horizons. (Mark scale at appropriate 
point. )" This question was asked for seven time horizons 
- 
intraday, 1 week, 1 
month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and for longer horizons. Respondents 
could indicate the balance which they thought appropriate between charts and 
fundamentals by indicating a point on the linear scale (Appendix 1). There 
was, however the option of stating that views were not taken over particular 
time periods. The marking of a scale was felt to be the most objective way in 
which to assess a balance of market opinion. Verbal options 
(high/medium/low, etc. ) were too open to subjective interpretation and also 
may have left some respondents feeling that their nuance of opinion was not 
adequately described. 
This question format also had the advantage of enabling a distribution to be 
built up for the use of charts and fundamentals at each time horizon. 
Similarly, each respondent was asked to indicate on a scale the extent to 
which they felt charts and fundamentals to be complementary or competing 
tools of analysis. The same considerations applied to the design of this 
question 
- 
plus the fact that the same style of question would minimise 
possible confusion among respondents. 
4.3: Coverage and results of the survey 
The survey was sent to every chief foreign exchange dealer in the London 
market, a mailing list being obtained from the Banking Supervision Department 
of the Bank of England. While the original mailing list had 402 named 
institutions, 16 were returned to sender by the Post Office (presumably the 
institutions had closed or moved) while 33 were returned, marked by the 
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institutions as being inapplicable as they had no dealing arm. Hence the 
sample size on which the percentages in the following chapter is based 
assumes a sample size of 353 (402-16-33). A total of 213 replies were 
received, giving a response rate of over 60%. (The 'true' response rate is 
believed to be somewhat greater, as several institutions to which the 
questionnaire was sent but not returned may also have closed, moved or may 
not have had an applicable section to which to send the questionnaire. ) 
Tables 4.1 to 4.4 detail the results of the survey. 
The questions to determine which chartist techniques and sources of 
information are most used in practice (Table 4.1 ) showed that by far the most 
widespread source of chartist analysis among the survey respondents 
appeared to be in the form of on-line commercial services. Over 65 % of 
respondents reported using some form of on-line data and graphics computer 
services, ranging from basic data retrieval and graphics packages to 
sophisticated, dedicated chartists services providing foreign exchange data 
updated almost continuously and capable of producing highly complex, full- 
colour charts. These graphics packages were widely used to produce various 
calculated indicators 
- 
the most widely used of which were the trend following 
indicators. Additionally, some 21 % of respondents relied on advice from 
outside commercial chartist companies for their chartist input (Q2), whilst 43% 
subscribed to particular chartist publications (Ole). 
Approximately 65% of respondents reported using trend-following systems 
such as moving averages in their chart analysis (01 a) and 40% reported using 
some form of overbought/oversold indicators (01 b), such as oscillators, 
momentum lines or rate of change indicators (Murphy 1986). Several 
respondents commented on which particular methods they used. The 'relative 
strength indicator' or RSI (Welles Wilder 1978) was cited repeatedly while 
several chartists stated their preferred moving average combinations for the 
foreign exchange market. 
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The enquiries into the source of chartist advice are summarised in Table 4.2. 
They reveal that almost exactly a quarter of respondents reported that their 
organisation employs in-house technical analysts (04), as opposed to 38% 
who reported having in-house economists (W). It did appear that more 
chartists took positions than did economists, though the number of 
respondents at this stage of the question was felt to be too low to draw more 
than tentative conclusions. 
Turning to the questions on time horizons (05) and complementarity (06), one 
of the clearest results of the survey was that chartism appears to be most used 
for forecasting over short time horizons, given the lack of immediate economic 
data at such frequencies. The results obtained at each time horizon are 
shown in Table 4.3 while Chart 4.1 gives four summary distributions. At the 
shortest horizons (intraday to one week), approximately 90% of respondents 
use some chartist input in forming their exchange rate expectations, with 60% 
judging charts to be at least as important as fundamentals (Chart 4.1 a). 
At longer forecast horizons, of one to three months or six months to one year, 
the weight given to fundamentals increases (Charts 4.1 b, c). At the longest 
forecast horizons, one year or longer (Chart 4.1 d), the skew towards 
fundamentals is most pronounced, with nearly 30% of respondents relying on 
pure fundamentals and 85% judging fundamentals to be more important than 
charts. It can, however, be seen from Chart 4.1 that there is a persistent 2% 
of presumably 'pure' chartists who never use fundamentals at any horizon. At 
the same time, there is a larger persistent group (almost 10 %) of 'pure 
fundamentalists', who appear to use fundamentals alone, regardless of time 
horizon. 
With regard to the question of whether survey participants regarded chartist 
and fundamental approaches to exchange rate analysis to be complementary 
or competing (06), only 8% replied that they thought the approaches to be 
competing to the point of being mutually exclusive; the rest held the 
approaches to be complementary to a greater or lesser degree (Chart 4.2). 
Detailed figures for this question are shown in Table 4.4. A related point 
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(arising from interviews with chartists) was that while some may personally 
prefer to use exclusively charts, they still believed that in a global market 
sense the two methods are complementary. 
This view that chartist and fundamental analysis may be largely 
complementary also figured strongly in respondents' general comments as 
well as the view that charts should be used to confirm but not contradict the 
message from the fundamentals. (31) One respondent went into some detail 
on this issue: 
'A classic attitude on the interbank side is "if I agree with the technical 
view I'll double my position 
- 
if I disagree I'll throw it in the bin". On the 
customer dealing side [dealers] typically use it to complement their own 
fundamental view. Good fundamental arguments, for instance, would be 
put forward for why sterling should fall. The customer will then invariably 
ask "by how much? " Often technical analysis is used to provide this sort 
of quantitative level of a fundamental view. 9 
Other comments explicitly highlighted the complementarity issue, linking it 
explicitly to the time horizon over which charts are used. 
'Although fundamentals are the major factor when determining long dated 
views and positions, charts do have an advantage when determining 
shorter periods and spot currencies. Although effective in indicating trend 
(31) These results on the complementarity of the two approaches concur with the 
summary of the Group of Thirty (1985) questionnaire which indicated 
different degrees of reliance on tech nical/f undamental approaches 
(p 45), 'Some state they consider both but do not rely on either: if the 
indications conflict, more weight is attached to fundamental factors. ' 
This result is taken from the section questionning international 
industrial corporations with interest in the foreign exchange market: 
based on 50 replies of the 142 approached. 
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changes and highlighting trading opportunities, charts remain an indicator 
only and are used as confirmation of views/positions rather than a trading 
vehicle on its own. 0 
'Over the medium term, ie 6 months+, technical analysis is of dubious 
importance. Intraday, the relative strength or features of a move is more 
visible if one uses charts. P 
'in the long term fundamentals will rule. But in the short term chartists will 
lead because dealers need a lead of some sort to base opinions/views 
on. ' 
Several comments made by survey participants indicated a belief that charts 
essentially measure swings in market psychology, which may be of most 
importance in the shorter term but may be harder to forecast over the longer 
horizons, over which fundamental economic factors tend to become more 
dominant. A slightly different view expressed was that chartism may actually 
obscure the underlying fundamentals over the shorter horizons; for example: 
'.. charts merely prevent fundamentals coming through over the short term. 
The skill therefore is to spot when the charts will break down, and catch 
up with the fundamentals. As a trading tool they are useful because they 
are widely used and therefore can be self-fulfilling. ' 
Such a view seems to be tantamount to asserting that chartists generate short 
excursions from fundamentals 
- 
ie 'fads', discussed in Chapter 3, section 
3.4.2.1. 
Another recurring theme among respondents' general comments was the idea 
that chart analysis may be largely self-fulfilling, with some 40% stating so 
explicitly. One respondent wrote: 
'Knowledge of chart signals is essential to all operators as they have a 
bearing on the action of many market participants 
... 
This holds true both 
for operators who place high priority on technical analysis and for others - 
like ourselves 
- 
who prefer a more fundamental approach. ' 
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This quotation, and many others like it in the sample, tends to bear out the 
suggestion of de Long et al that sophisticated speculators will not trade purely 
on consideration of economic fundamentals, but will also aim to exploit market 
movements generated by non-fundamentalists (see eg de Long et al, 
1987, p2). 
4-4: Conclusion 
This chapter has described the design of a questionnaire sent widely to chief 
foreign exchange dealers in the London market, factors influencing its design 
and the questions to which it tried to find answers. How can the results be 
viewed? 
The introduction to this chapter lists the three basic questions to which the 
questionnaire was designed to elicit answers. Probably the first and last of 
these were answered the most successfully 
- 
the results have shown which 
chartist techniques are most used in practice and given clear insights into 
market practitioners' views of chartism, in terms of time horizons, relation to 
fundamentals and (more impressionistionally) various general comments 
made. 
The questions on the role of chartist practitioners (and economists) in the 
trading process yielded less clear results, partly because of the smaller 
response, and because it was not possible, at least in terms of the 
questionnaire used, to gain a precise picture of their amount and type of input 
into the trading decision. While it is clear that consideration of chartist opinion 
is widespread, any more specific conclusions as regards this have had to be 
drawn from the other, related, questions and from more impressionistic 
sources, such as interviews and the telephone survey. The main aim of the 
latter, however, was to build a database of actual chartist forecasts. This is 
described in the next chapter. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of responses to Questions 1 and 2. 
01: "Which of the following chartist methods and services does your 
organisation use? " 
a) Moving average/trend following systems. 
b) Oscillators/momentum lines/ rate of 
change indicators 
C) Graphics packages 
d) Services 
e) Publications 
Y=137 N=74 NR=2 
Y=85 N=126 NR=2 
Y=76 N=132 NR=5 
Y=l 38 N=74 NR=l 
Y=89 N=l 17 NR=7 
Answer coding: Y= yes; N= no; NR = no response. 
02: "Does your organisation use a particular chart company or analyst? " 
Y= 45; N= 167; NR 
=1 
Listings of the particular services and publications specified cannot be given 
due to the commercial confidentiality commitments made. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of responses to Questions 3 and 4 
Q3: "Does your organisation have any in-house economists? " 
82; N= 131 
(o/w 2 took positions; 74 acted only as advisers) 
Q4: "Does your organisation have any in-house technical analysts? " 
Y= 53; N= 160 
(o/w 24 took positions, 18 acted only as advisers) 
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Table 4.3: Breakdown of responses to Question 5 
Q5: "Please indicate the relative importance you attach to chartist/technical 
analysis versus fundamental (ie economic) analysis of currencies over 
the following forecasting horizons". 
i) Percentage response for each point on scale 
Scale: 0= pure chartism to 10 = pure fundamentals 
Forecast horizon 10 
a) Intraday 5.6 3.4 15.6 13.4 6.7 15.6 8.4 10.6 7.3 2.8 10.6 
b) 1 week ahead 1.8 2.5 4.9 13.5 18.4 20.2 11.0 11.0 4.3 3.1 9.2 
C) 1 month ahead 2.0 0.0 1.3 6.7 15.4 16.8 17.4 12.8 7.4 8.1 12.1 
d) 3 months ahead 1.6 0.8 1.6 2.4 8.8 21.6 9.6 18.4 15.2 6.4 13.6 
e) 6 months ahead 1.8 1.8 0.9 1.8 5.5 12.8 14.7 18.3 16.5 7.3 18.3 
f) 1 year ahead 2.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 9.6 4.8 18.1 18.1 21.7 20.5 
g) Longer horizons 3.5 1.8 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 7.0 14.0 17.5 15.8 33.3 
(ii) Listing of the total number of respondents who marked the scale at each 
horizon, and the number whom stated they did not take views over the 
particular horizon. 
Forecast horizon [A] Number 
marking scale 
[B] Number [C] Number 
no view no response (=213-A-B) 
a) Intraday 179 19 15 
b) 1 week ahead 163 40 10 
C) 1 month ahead 149 53 11 
d) 3 months ahead 125 76 12 
e) 6 months ahead 109 94 10 
f) 1 year ahead 83 118 12 
g) Longer horizons 57 142 14 
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Table 4.4: Breakdown of responses to Question 6 
06: "Do you regard chartist/technical analysis and fundamental (ie 
economic) analysis of currencies to be complementary or competing 
tools of analysis? " 
Scale :0= complementary to 10 = competing 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Percentages: 13.6 10.7 14.6 13.1 13.6 12.6 2.9 7.8 3.9 0 7.3 
Of the 213 respondents, 206 marked the scale while 7 gave no view. 
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Chart 4.1 
Perceived importance of chartism and fundamentals in foreign 
exchange forecasts (a) 
On the horizontal scale, 0= pure chartism and 10 = pure fundamentals. 
(a) Percentage of chartists advocating particular chart/fundamental weighting in forecasting the path of exchange rates at each time horizon 
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Chart 4.2 
Is chartist and fundamental analysis regarded as 







On the horizontal scale, 0--complementary to 10--competing 
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APPENDIX: Foreign Exchange Survey 
I 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE SURVEY 
- 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Which of the following chartist methods and services does 
Vour oroanisation use? (Please feel free to add anv 
comments which vou feel to be relevant to each category. ) 
(a) Moving average/trend following systems Yes/No 
00000000a000aaa*00000000006*0000a000&. 00a00a0.0 
Oscillators/momentuin lines/rate of change 
indicators YeS/No 
a0000a*0a00000a0000e000000000000aaa00000a00aa00 
(c) Graphics packages Yes/No 
- 










Other, please specify 
aa0000&000a0*aa*&0aa0000a00000000000a00000000*0 




2 Does your organisation use a particular chartist 
company or analyst? yes/No 
- 
If sof who? 
3 Does your organisation have any in-house economists? Yes/No 
- 
Do they take positions or act only as advisers? 
- 
To what extent do they influence forex forecasts? 
Does vou oroanisation have any in-house technical 
analysts? Yes/No 
Do thev take positions or act only as advisers? 
To what extent do they influence forex forecasts? 
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2 
5 Please indicate the relative importance you attach to 
chartist/technical analysis versus fundamental (ie economic) 
analysis of currencies over the following forecasting horizons. 




(b) 1 week ahead t 
-L-. J 
(C) 1 month ahead IAIAa. a.. -. A--j 
(d) 3 months ahead I,, '- --- 
__. 
a. 1 
(e) 6 months ahead 1AI-AAII 
(f) 1 vear ahead 
(9) Longer horizons 
OR: 
Do not take 
views over 
this period 
6 Do you regard chartist/technical analysis and fundamental (ie 




-8 1a.... -. I 
7 Do vou have anv other comments concerning the relevance and 









please be assured that the name of you and your organisation will 
be treated in complete confidence. Please return by July 4th 1988 
to: Helen Garnette Bank of England, Economics Division 6/2 HO-4, 
Threadneedle Streett London, EC2R 8AH. 
Many thanks for your co-operation. 
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5 AN ANALYSIS OF CHARTISTS' PREDICTIONS 
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5.1: Introduction 
In the last chapter the actual practice of many chartists was analysed, from 
which it could be seen that practitioners draw upon a wide variety of 
techniques and hold differing views as to the nature and importance of 
chartism. While something of a broad consensus emerged regarding the 
weights given to charts at differing time horizons, there was sufficient 
heterogeneity in general to suggest that differences in views would be 
transmitted, and possibly magnified, in actual chartist advice. In the light of 
this variety of approaches to, and opinions regarding, the use of chartism, 
technical analysis appears to emerge as something of an art form which 
involves subjectively evaluating the gestalt of chartist advice and forming a 
view. Chartist advice surely is largely subjective and dependent in 
construction on the individual chartist's approach. 
Nevertheless, given the perceived importance and widespread use of chartist 
advice in the London foreign exchange market it seemed important to analyse 
the characteristics of the advice itself. In order to do this it was therefore 
necessary to assemble a database of actual chartist advice in a form which 
could be analysed quantitatively, both to see the descriptive characteristics of 
the data and to analyse the nature of the expectations implied therein. The 
construction of the database and analysis of the data itself is the subject of this 
chapter. 
The next section of this chapter describes the construction of the database 
and the reasons why the particular approach (a telephone survey) was 
adopted. The following section analyses the characteristics of the data itself 
using descriptive statistics with both graphical and tabular presentation, tests 
for unconditional bias and measures of qualitative accuracy. This is followed 
by analysis of the relative accuracy of the chartists in the sample using non- 
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parametric tests and an examination of the joint significance of forecasters' 
predictions. The penultimate section compares the chartist forecasts with 
other forecasting methods while the final section summarises and concludes. 
5-2: Data construction 
The above comments, and the foregoing chapters, reinforce the idea that 
there is no one absolute form of chartist advice/predictions. The subjective 
nature of the area make it unlikely that a tractable mathematical or statistical 
model would adequately reproduce chartist behaviour. Moreover, many (but 
by no means all) technical analysts would argue that they are not in the 
business of making precise predictions at a particular time horizon, but rather 
are aiming to 'set the parameters' within which market traders operate. To 
quote a typical piece of chartist advice: "important support is likely to be 
found around the year's low at just over )0 20. A break below V120 will give 
an immediate objective of Y1 10, and such a decline cannot be ruled out-01 
(Robert Fleming & Co, Foreign Exchanqe, 1988 pl 5). Other analysts, 
however, claim that they can hardly justify their positions unless they can give 
some specific prediction. 
Clearly, it is not possible to 'simulate' chartist forecasts for the purpose of 
analysis. Neither would it be representative of the many varieties of chartist 
advice to pick one practitioner and proceed on the basis of the forecasts of 
that individual alone, nor indeed to make one's own chart-based predictions. 
In the light of these considerations, it was decided that the most representative 
way of collecting chartist advice was to construct a survey database of 
chartists' exchange rate expectations. This would enable each contributor to 
employ whichever methods were felt to be the most appropriate to the 
particular market situation. 
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A panel of chartists was selected to include chartists who were highly regarded 
in the City both by fellow chartists and by foreign exchange dealers, this 
having been ascertained through preliminary interviews with a number of 
chartists and dealers as well as from the questionnaire survey described in the 
previous chapter. 
The data collection was done by means of a weekly telephone survey, in 
which participants were asked to predict the level of the $/E, Y/$ and DM/$ 
exchange rates one week and four weeks ahead. A telephone survey enabled 
the predictions to be gathered relatively quickly (mostly within an hour or so on 
Thursday morning), thus attempting to ensure near identical market conditions 
for each respondent's current information set. The time horizons over which 
predictors were requested (one and four weeks) were those over which 
chartism appeared to be most widely used as judged by (Q5 on) the 
questionnaire survey. (See Chart 4-1). Predictions one and four weeks ahead 
could also be evaluated for accuracy with relatively little time lag. The survey 
was conducted for nearly ten months (9 June 1988 
-2 March 1989), enabling 
results to be evaluated within a reasonable time horizon. 
The three major bilateral rates were chosen as those to forecast since all 
chartists would hopefully have easy access to information about them and 
because they are probably the deepest markets in London. This latter point 
was recently evidenced by a comprehensive Bank of England survey of the 
London foreign exchange market. Of the business conducted throughout April 
1989 (the survey period), bilateral sterling, D-Mark and yen transactions 
accounted for 27 %, 22 % and 15 % of principals' turnover respectively. 
(BEQB 1989, 'The market in foreign exchange in London', 29,4, pp 531-535). 
These arrangements, therefore, required the chartists to provide a total of six 
forecasts each week. While more detail may have been desirable, it was 
believed that too great a burden would have led to less initial cooperation and 
a high probability of drop-out. (In the event, only one chartist approached 
dropped out, after the first week). 
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The precise number of chartists participating in the survey, including the 
number involved, have to remain confidential to preserve anonymity. The 
number of chartists participating was between ten and twenty. 
5-3: Description of the chartist forecasts. (32) 
5.3-1: Graphical presentation 
The sample median, high and low chartist forecast for each currency and time 
horizon, together with the actual rate that materialised, are shown in Charts 
5.1 a, b. The forecasts are shifted forward so that points vertically in line on the 
graphs compare predictions with actual outcomes. The precise data are listed 
in Tables 5.1 a to 5.1 c. 
Several points can be made from the inspection of these figures. First, as 
would be expected, prediction errors are noticeably greater at the four-week 
horizon. Second, there appears to be a tendency for the forecasts to miss 
turning points and for forecast errors to narrow when the exchange rate is 
(32) Some of the caveats to the analysis presented should be stated. First, any 
results must be regarded as tentative, given the limited sample size 
and relatively short period over which the survey data were collected. 
Second, many chartists prefer to 'set the parameters' for exchange 
rate movements rather than provide point estimates. All forecasters, 
however, whether fundamental or non-fundamental based, would 
probably prefer to provide contingent advice with confidence intervals, 
and in this sense the results have not been biased for or against 
chartists. Third, the analysis has been conducted entirely in terms of 
the accuracy of chartist forecasts and not in terms of their profitability, 
although one would expect a close correlation between the two. 
Finally, the analysis of chartist forecasts was confined to two horizons, 
although they would seem to cover the range over which most charts 
are widely used in the London foreign exchange market, as revealed 
by the questionnaire survey. 
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trending. This may well imply that chartist forecasts are more accurate in a 
trending market 
-and as such, had the survey been conducted, for example, in 
the period 1984-85 when the dollar was trending more markedly, the results 
may have shown a higher degree of accuracy. A third point is that a visual 
inspection of the graphs shows a tendency for the chartist to underpredict in a 
rising market and to overpredict in a falling market. This suggests that the 
average elasticity of expectations is less than unity 
-ie a1% rise (fall) in the 
rate apppears to induce a less than expected 1% rise (fall) next period. This 
last point is made more formally in the next chapter. 
5.3.2: Tests for unconditional bias 
Statistical tests of unconditional bias(33) were performed by regressing the 
forecast errors on to a constant. The results for the four-week ahead 
predictions were computed using a method of moments correction to allow for 
overlapping forecast errors Hansen (1982). (34) Full results are shown in 
Tables 5.2a and 5.2b. All data were transformed into logarithms to produce 
scale-free results. 
(33) According to the so-called 'Siegel Paradox', (Siegel, 1972), forecasters cannot 
have unbiased expectations of both the future spot rate in terms of, 
say dollars per pound and in terms of pounds per dollar. Hence, 
E(St+4lQt)o1/E(1/St+4lOt). McCulloch (1975), however, showed that 
the operational aspects of this may be very slight, leading Siegel 
(1975) to reply, '... these problems should concern only the pure 
theorist, since, as McCulloch has shown, the distortions caused [by 
applying Jenson's inequality to an arbitrary choice of numeraire] are so 
small as to be empirically insignificant. ' 
(34) Since the errors in four (n) step ahead predictors are subject to a third order (n-1) moving average error, thus violating the 1: A assumption. 
See further detail Appendix to Chapter 6. 
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This results shows whether the chartists systematically over or underpredict 
the future exchange rates at one and four week horizons. The hypothesis of 
zero unconditional bias could not be rejected at the 5% significance level for 
four-week ahead forecasts, for all individuals and the median, although 
significant evidence of bias was shown in certain chartists' one-week 
predictions, particularly for the DM/$. 
5-3.3: Qualitative accuracy 
A guide to the qualitative accuracy of the chartist forecasts was given by 
calculating the number of times the direction of currency movement (ie 
appreciation/depreciation) was correctly predicted. The results of this analysis 
are tabulated in Table 5.3. The accuracy of the individual chartists for each 
currency at particular time horizons varied between 21 % and 69 %, with an 
average whole sample accuracy approximating 50 %. 
Charts 5.2a and 5.2b present as a time series the aggregate qualitative 
accuracy of the forecasts at the one-week and four-week horizons, both for 
each currency and averaged across all chartists averaged across each month 
of the survey. These charts again suggest a tendency for chartist 
expectations to be extrapolative. For example, the rise in average qualitative 
accuracy of DM/$ predictions at the one-week horizon between September 
and October exactly matches the downtrend in the rate (Chart 5.1, DM). As 
the dollar shifts into an uptrend against the mark at the end of November, the 
average qualitative accuracy quickly shrinks for December (Chart 5.2a). 
This analysis of course only measures whether the direction of movement 
predicted was correct and gives no indication to what extent different chartists 
were in general closer to or further from the true rate. The non-parametric 
tests reported next analyse the relative performance rankings. 
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5-4: Non-parametric tests of homogeneity of forecast accuracy 
This section describes formal tests of whether there were systematic 
differences in the accuracy of forecasts among the panel. One method of 
testing for systematic differences which immediately suggests itself involves 
conducting an analysis of variance. Since, however, not all currencies and 
time horizons would have been equally easy to forecast at each data point 
(Charts 5.2a, 5.2b), the resulting averaging of errors would not be legitimate 
(ie there are matched samples). In an analysis of the forecasting records of 
professional US economic forecasters, Stekler (1987) suggested using a non- 
parametrictest. Batchelor (1988) subsequently pointed out an error in 
Stekler's analysis, however, and showed that the correct formula is in fact just 
the Friedman (1937) test for two-way analysis of variance by ranks (Siegel, 
1956). 
In the present context, the procedure is as follows. First, the (absolute) 
forecast errors are mapped into ranks at each data point, for each exchange 
rate and for each time horizon. For n forecasters, the chartist with the largest 
error is assigned rank n and the chartist with the smallest error is assigned 
rank 1. These ranks are then summed for each forecaster over each forecast 
week, exchange rate and both time horizons, to produce a rank sum 
r, EE1; r ijkl i=l, 4 j=l k=l 
(5.1) 
where rijkl is the rank of the 1-th forecaster, at the i-week horizon, for the j-th 
exchange rate (1 =$/E, 2=DM/$, 3=i/$), for the kth data point (out of a total of 
T). 
Under the null hypothesis of no significant differences in ranks, the expected 
value of the rank rijkl is simply the average rank (n+l)/2 and the expected 
value of the rank sum is 6T(n+l)/2=3T(n+l). Now, under the null hypothesis 
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of random assignment of rank, the sampling variance of an individual rank 
statistic is n(n+l)/l 2 (Kendall, 1948), and so for the sum of 6T (ie 2 time 
horizons by 3 currencies) independent ranks it is 6Tn(n+l)/l 2= Tn(n+l)/2. 
The test for systematic assignments of rank simply compares the variance of 
the actual ranks across chartists to the theoretical variance under the null 
hypothesis: 
n2 
r 3T (n+l) 
Tn(n+l)/2 
(5.2) 
Under the null hypothesis of no systematic assignment of ranks, 0 will be 
distributed as central chi-square with n-1 degrees of freedom. 
Using the full data set, this statistic was computed and yielded a value which 
was just insignificant at the 5% level, buts'ignificant at the 10% level. (The 
exact value of the statistic and its degrees of freedom cannot be reported, 
since this would reveal the number of participants in the survey. ) Since a well- 
known feature of non-parametric tests is their low power, this was taken as 
reasonable evidence of systematic differences in forecasting performance 
across the panel. 
A slightly different version of this test was also constructed in order to 
ascertain whether one of the forecasters, who from perusal of the weekly 
rankings, appeared to have a high number of low ranks, was indeed 
systematically better than the group average. If this forecaster is labelled the 
n-th, then there are n-1 others 
n-1 
r (n- 1) 
Using (5.1) above, write 
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The expected value of r(n-1) is (n-1) times the expected value of rl, ie 
6T(n-1)(n+l)/2 
= 
3T(n-1)(n+l), while the variance is T(n-l)n(n+l)/2. Similarly, 
for the n-th forecaster, the expected value of rn is 3T(n+l) and the variance is 
Tn(n+l)/2. Thus, the statistic 
#n 
r (n-1) - 3T(n-1)(n+l) 
2+rn- 3T(n+l) 12 
T(n-l)n(n+l)/2 Tn(n+l)/2 
will be distributed as X2, under the null hypothesis of no significant differences 
in accuracy between the n-th chartist and the rest of the panel. This statistic 
was computed and yielded a value which is significant at the 1% level. This 
result, of course, should be treated with caution because of the problem of 
pre-test bias; there will always be a few forecasters who are apparently better 
than the rest purely by chance. A statistically better guide is therefore to use a 
test which avoids this problem of pre-test bias, and this is described in the 
section below. 
5.5: Joint significance test of forecasters' predictions(35) 
A test of the joint explanatory power of chartists was also conducted 
- 
and this 
test is not affected by the pre-test bias mentioned above. This involved 
regressing the actual change in the exchange rate on the change predicted by 
all individual chartists. Thus: 
Asae. be "I + cla t+i + I"bAst+i . 
......... 
where st is the (logarithm of) the spot rate of a particular currency at time t and 
St+i ae is the prediction of Chartist a (say) of the spot rate of that currency at 
time t+i. 
(35) This section was added at the suggestion of Robert Shiller. 
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An F-test was then performed of the significance of the whole regression. The 
results are reported in Tables 5.4a and b. 
The results in general show siginificant rejection(36) of the null hypothesis of 
no explanatory power (Ho: a=O). This is clearest for the four week ahead 
estimates 
- 
while it holds for the one week predictions of Y/$ and (nearly) for 
the DM/$, the test cannot reject the hypothesis that chartists' one week 
predictions of $/E have no explanatory power. 
Hence overall this test shows that the set of chartist forecasts do have 
explanatory power for the exchange rate, the statistical evidence suggesting 
that this is particularly so at the longer (four-week) horizon. 
5.6: Comparison with other forecasting methods 
The accuracy of chartist predictions can also be compared with various 
economic and statistical approaches, using the root mean square error 
(RMSE) of the forecasts of each. Comparisons have been made between the 
chartist forecasts themselves, and with forecasts generated from a random 
walk, the forward rate, ARIMA models and vector autoregression models. 
Results for the RMSEs of one and four-week ahead predictions are reported in 
Tables 5.5a and 5.5b respectively. This analysis was conducted with data 
transformed to logarithms, leaving the RMSEs in percentage terms. 
5.6.1: COMDarisons between chartists 
The first obvious feature of Tables 5.5a and 5.5b is that there are substantial 
differences between individual chartists. Chartist M appeared to be 
particularly accurate across all currencies and time horizons and was the only 
(36) Note that Table 5.4 reports marginal significant levels: indicating rejection of 
the null if less than the desired significance level (say 0.05). 
146 
chartist consistently to outperform the median. The median itself had a lower 
RMSE than the majority of individual chartists, suggesting that the consensus 
chartist view will outperform most individuals' views on aggregate. 
5.6-2: Comparisons with random walk and forward rate 
It is clear, however, that even the median view is generally unable to 
outperform a random walk. Chartist M, however, was consistently more 
accurate than the random walk 
-a significant finding, as Meese and Rogoff 
1983(a, b) found that no economic model was able to outperform a random 
walk in out of sample forecasting tests, as measured by the RMSE97) Using 
the forward rate to forecast exchange rates would have produced errors of a 
similar magnitude to that of a random walk (four week ahead forecasts only). 
This accords with findings elsewhere which point to the lack of information 
regarding the future spot rate which is contained in the forward rate (see 
Goodhart 1988). 
5-6.3: Comparison with ARIMA models 
The ARIMA forecasts reported were generated as follows. Six months of 
weekly data were used immediately prior to the forecast sample to identify and 
estimate initial ARIMA models (Box and Jenkins, 1971,1976). The models 
fitted were: $/E ARIMA(1,1,1); DM/$ ARIMA(1,1,1); Y/$ ARIMA(1,1,0). These 
were then re-estimated at each data point, with the new observation included, 
and one and four-week ahead predictions were recorded. At the mid-point of 
(37) Although, as mentioned in Chapter 3, section 3.2, various studies (inter alia 
Wolff, 1987, and Schinasi and Swarmy, 1989) have found that by 
making various modifications to the models considered by Meese and 
Rogoff that revised formulations were able to outperform a random 
walk over certain periods 
the survey sample, new ARIMA models were identified, and the process of 
successive re-estimation and forecasting was continued up to the end of the 
sample. The most appropriate ARIMA models for the rates up to the mid-point 
of the survey were ARIMA(1,1 2) for all currencies. 
Re-identification and re-estimation of the ARIMA models as described above 
is, of course an approximation to re-identifying and re-estimating the models 
each time a new data point is added. In practice, however, it is unlikely that 
the models would change frequently under the latter method, since it would 
probably take a considerable weight of additional data to reject to original 
models. Another alternative would have been to re-estimate the models at 
intervals using a'moving window'of data. 
Looking at the results of the estimation according to the models described 
above, however, it is notable from Tables 5.5a and 5.5b that the ARIMA 
models estimated produced a higher RMSE than most chartists 
- 
demonstrating that chartism is more than simply an 'eye-ball Box-Jenkins' 
approach. Another feature of the ARIMA models was that their RMSEs 
exceeded that of the random walk, despite the fact that the former nests the 
latter. This is indicative of a time-varying process: while the ARIMA models 
would have performed better in-sample, its performance out of sample 
worsened as the data process shifted, leading to the comparative results 
reported. 
5-6.4: Comparisons with vector autoregressions 
Finally, the chartist results were compared with the one- and four-step ahead 
forecasts generated by vector autoregressions (VARs). Two types of VAR 
were estimated 
- 
first an 'economic'VAR based upon the exchange rate, the 
interest rate differential (against the dollar) and relative stock market 
performance (against the US), and second a currency VAR involving only $/F-, 
DW$ and Y/$ exchange rates. A fourth-order lag was used in all cases. An 
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initial VAR was estimated using six months of data prior to the survey sample, 
and a Kalman filter algorithm was used to update the coefficient estimates and 
forecast dynamically at each data point. Both completely unrestricted VARs 
and VARs employing Bayesian priors on the coefficients (Litterman, 1981) 
were estimated. On an unrestricted basis, the resulting forecast displayed a 
large error, but this was significantly reduced using the Bayesian technique. 
The Bayesian VARs were computed using the procedures available in the 
RATS econometric package (Doan and Litterman 1987). The priors employed 
were basically that each variable followed a random walk. Thus, the mean 
vector of the prior distribution has unity for each first own-lag and zeros 
elsewhere. A spherical prior precision matrix was employed with, in the Doan- 
Litterman terminology, a tightness parameter of 0.3 and a symmetric 
parameter of 0.1 (Doan and Litterman 1987). 
The results in Tables 5.5a and 5.5b it can be seen that the restricted VARs 
usually have a lower RMSE than the random walk but that the unrestricted 
VARs never outperform a random walk. This result is explained by the 
inefficiency caused by the additional variables in the unrestricted VARs 
- 
inefficiency which is reflected in the RMSEs. 
5.7: Conclusion 
This chapter has described the motivation for, and the construction of, a 
database of chartist forecasts. The resulting unique set of data has been 
subjected to a range of tests to analyse its nature and has been compared 
with other forecasting approaches. 
The usual caveats inevitable to such a study(38) must of course be borne in 
mind 
- 
particularly the fact that the sample length is relatively short: as has 
(38) See section 5.3, footnote 32. 
been seen (eg. in Chapter 3, section 3.3), such analytical results can differ 
over different periods. it is particularly felt that it would also have been 
interesting to observe strongly trending markets. 
Bearing in mind these considerations, however, a recurring result throughout 
the analysis was the apparent difference in accuracy between the individual 
chartists. This was evidenced in both their qualitative (direction of movement) 
accuracy and in the size of their absolute errors. When compared with a 
range of other forecasting techniques, there is a range of results: with some 
chartists underperforming an array of standard economic and statistical 
approaches, while the best chartists even outperformed a random walk over 
the sample period. Overall, however, statistical tests show that there does 
appear to be information in the chartists' forecasts. 
These results, suggesting a mixture of performance, can be related to the 
findings of the studies of the performance of forecasting services and technical 
trading rules discussed earlier in Chapter 3, section 3.3. These provided 
somewhat mixed results for the performance of services both in terms of 
'market efficiency' and in comparison with other forecasting services. 
Given this information, it seems logical to proceed by analysing the nature of 
their expectations, both individually and in aggregate. The next chapter 
therefore is devoted to testing the degree of rationality present in the 
forecasts, while the following chapter looks further into the nature of the 
implied expectations mechanisms. 
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Table 5.1 a: Median and range of forecastst 
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Table 5.1b: Median and range of forecasts, DM/$ 
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Table 5.1c: Median and range of forecasts, V/$ 
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Table 5.2a: Testing for unconditional bias: 
1 week ahead predictions (dependent variable (St+, 
_tSe+, )) t 
Rate Mean SD of mean t-ratio 
Chartist A $/E 
-0.65 0.31 -2.13 
Chartist B $/E 
-0.37 0.23 -1.56 
Chartist H $/E 
-0.25 0.26 -0.97 
Chartist L $/E 
-0.56 0.29 -1.90 
Chartist M $/F- 
-0.38 0.20 -1.86 
Chartist P $/E 
-0.37 0.62 -0.59 
Median $/F- 
-0.33 0.20 -1.61 
Chartist A DW$ 0.66 0.28 2.35 
Chartist B DM/$ 0.37 0.26 1.43 
Chartist H DW$ 0.23 0.28 0.81 
Chartist L DM/$ 0.51 0.25 2.08 
Chartist M DW$ 0.54 0.23 2.36 
Chartist P DM/$ 0.24 0.62 0.39 
Median DW$ 0.49 0.20 2.40 
Chartist A Y/$ 0.74 0.32 2.33 
Chartist B V/$ 0.30 0.27 1.12 
Chartist H Y/$ 0.33 0.30 1.13 
Chartist L V/$ 0.45 0.23 1.91 
Chartist M W$ 0.23 0.23 0.98 
Chartist P Y/$ 0.04 0.63 0.06 
Median V1$ 0.44 0.22 2.04 
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Table 5.2b: Testing for unconditional bias: (a) 
4 week ahead predictions (dependent variable (St+4-t Se +4)) t 
Rate Mean SD of mean t-ratio 
Chartist A $/E 0.14 0.19 E-1 0.72 E-1 
Chartist B $/E 0.13 E-3 0.95 0.14 E-1 
Chartist H $/F- 0.83 0.12 E-1 0.67 
Chartist M $/rL 
-0.65 0.83 -0.78 
Chartist P $/F- 0.37 0.12 E-1 0.30 
Median $/F- 0.89 E-3 0.10 E-1 0.89 E-1 
Chartist A DM/$ 0.51 0.20 E-1 0.25 E-1 
Chartist B DM/$ 
-0.23 0.13 E-1 -0.18 
Chartist H DM/$ 
-0.60 0.13 E-1 -0.45 
Chartist M DM/$ 0.55 0.93 0.60 
Chartist P DM/$ 0.24 0.11 E-1 0.21 
Median DM/$ 0.57 0.12 E-1 0.49 
Chartist A Y/$ 0.34 0.20 E-1 0.17 
Chartist B V/$ 
-0.74 0.11 E-1 -0.65 
Chartist H Y/$ 
-0.81 0.11 E-1 -0.71 
Chartist M V/$ 0.36 0.10 E-1 0.36 
Chartist P Y1$ 0.13 0.11 E-1 0.11 
Median Y/$ 0.11 0.11 E-1 0.96 E-1 
(a) The results for the 4-week ahead predictions were computed using a 
method of moments correction to the covariance matrix to allow for 
overlapping forecast errors (Hansen 1982). 
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Table 5.3: Qualitative accuracy of chartism(a) 
- 
whole sample period 
1 
week 
$/E D M/$ Y/$ 
4 weeks 
$/E D M/$ Y/$ 
Chartist A 50 60 42 42 31 36 
Chartist B 55 47 52 47 44 42 
Chartist F 47 39 47 50 44 44 
Chartist H 40 52 42 21 43 57 
Chartist J 48 56 48 45 48 41 
Chartist L 57 66 51 57 66 69 
Chartist M 50 68 59 46 40 50 
Median forecast(b) 55 63 55 50 42 47 
Average accuracy(b) 51 57 51 46 47 49 
Standard deviation 
of accuracy(b) 5.44 9.65 6.49 11.10 10.11 9.77 
(a) Percentage of occasions on which the direction of currency movements 
(appreciation/depreciation) was correctly predicted. 
(b) Whole sample. 
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Table 5.4a: Testing for joint significance of forecasters' predictions: One 
week ahead predictions(cl) 
R2 DW F(excl. constant) 
$/£ 0.168 1.559 21.670 0.775 
(0.117) (0.598) 
DM/$ 0.390 2.213 11.551 2.447 
(0.713) (0.561 E-1) 
Y/$ 0.480 2.535 8.717 3.538 
(0-892) (0.125E-1) 
(a) Figures in parentheses indicate the marginal significance levels 
Table 5.4b: Testing for joint sic 9 inificance of forecasters predictions: 
Four week ahead predictions a) 
R2 DW F (excl constant) 
$/E 0.502 1.089 17.103 55-643 
(0.146) (0.00) 
DM/$ 0.537 0.824 56.437 99.099 
(0.999E-1) (0.00) 
Y/$ 0.373 0.765 44.937 12.685 
(0.106 E-4) (0.26E-1) 
(a) Figures in parentheses indicate the marginal significance levels. 
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Table 5.5a: Comparison of % RMSE of 1 week chartist forecasts 
with other forecasting approaches 
Representative selection of individual chartist forecasts and whole sample 
median, compared with ARIMA, random walk and four VAR approaches. 
1 
week ahead 
$/F- DM/$ V/$ 
A 1.98 1.85 2.03 
B 1.47 1.63 1.64 
IF 1.95 1.46 2.01 
H 1.60 1.70 1.82 
M 1.21 1.30 1.33 
P 1.38 1.41 1.91 
Median (whole sample) 1.28 1.33 1.38 
Random walk 1.25 1.38 1.35 
ARIMA 1.77 2.05 2.17 
Economic VAR (unrestricted) 1.64 1.92 1.68 
Economic VAR (restricted) 1.12 1.39 1.23 
Currency VAR (unrestricted) 1.98 1.75 1.91 
Currency VAR (restricted) 1.05 1.37 1.29 
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Table 5.5b: Comparison of % RMSE of 4 week chartist forecasts with 
other forecasting approaches 
Representative selection of individual chartist forecasts and whole sample 
median, compared with ARIMA, random walk, four VAR approaches and the 
forward rate. 
4 weeks ahead 
$/E DM/$ V/$ 
A 5.20 5.56 5.41 
B 3.05 3.65 3.37 
IF 4.48 4.13 4.05 
H 3.62 3.89 3.66 
M 2.37 2.84 2.71 
P 3.44 3.60 3.55 
Median (whole sample) 3.00 3.38 3.33 
Random walk 2.81 3.18 3.12 
Forward rate 2.71 3.07 3.10 
ARIMA 4.14 4.94 4.64 
Economic VAR (unrestricted) 4.63 4.66 4.74 
Economic VAR (restricted) 2.99 3.76 3.04 
Currency VAR (unrestricted) 5.18 4.12 4.22 
Currency VAR (restricted) 2.55 3.76 3.28 
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Chart 5.1 
Chartist forecasts: one week and four weeks ahead 
Actual rate 
Median chartist fomcast 
Fý Range of fomcast (high to low) 
One week ahead (a) Four weeks ahead (b) 
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(a) Actual rate plotted at time t, forecasts plotted at time t+1. (b) Actual rate plotted at time t, forecasts plotted at time t+ 4. 
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Chart 5.2: 
Aggregate qualitative accuracy of chartist forecasts 
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b) Qualitative accuracy of 4 weeks chartist predictions for each month of the survey* 
Percentage of chartists who correctlý forecasted the direction of currency movements (appreciation/depreciation) over eac month of the survey period 
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As was discussed in the concluding comments of the previous chapter, having 
subjected both the individual and aggregate chartist forecasts to an array of 
tests of accuracy and comparisons, it seems logical to test the degree of 
rationality underlying these results. The key issue is: do chartists fully utilise 
the available information set when they make their forecasts? There are 
several levels at which this issue can be investigated 
- 
(see eg. Fama (1970, 
1976) for a discussion of the possible categorisations of efficient uses of 
information) but two questions are particularly pertinent to the current analysis. 
First, do chartists take full account of the past price history of the asset, by 
using information from their own past forecast errors in their current forecasts? 
Second, does this price information incorporate available fundamental 
information so as to support the chartist tenet that the 'price discounts 
everything'? 
These questions of rationality are crucial to the study of chartism. The popular 
perception of chartism among economists is probably of it being somewhat 
irrational and divorced from fundamental factors, a view expressed by The 
Economist, 'Technical analysis is the alchemy of the modern investment world 
... 
like any other cult [chartism] is not overly worded by logic. ' (The Economist, 
30.1.88 
- 
5.2.88, p 65). 
The theory of chartism, however, would suggest otherwise: the crucial reason 
why chartists claim it is valid to look at price movements alone is because it is 
believed that all relevant information is reflected in the price. Recalling 
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Chapter 2, a tenet of Dow theory is that 'the averages discount everything'(39) 
, 
and more generally in chartism that, 'the price discounts everything', hence 
for these to be valid propositions some degree of rational behaviour as 
specified above ought to be evidenced. 
This chapter next (section 6.2) discusses the method used to test whether the 
chartist forecasts did display rationality, then the ensuing empirical results are 
reported and their implications discussed in the third section. Section 6.4 
concludes. 
6-2: Method of testing rationality of forecasts 
The basic method of testing for rationality is thus: if chartists are rational, 
accounting for available information, then their current forecast errors should 
be uncorrelated with their past known forecast errors (Shiller, 1978); 
regressing the former on (lags of) the latter should hence produce insignificant 
coefficients. On a wider level, fundamental information available at the time 
the forecasts were made should also be fully included in current forecasts 
- 
testing this tests whether the price does indeed 'discount everything'. 
Given the database of chartists' expectations described in Chapter 5, it is 
possible to carry out these rationality tests directly both for the individual 
forecasters and for the median forecasts. It is unusual, when analysing survey 
(39) A quotation from Hamilton, colleague of Dow, sums up this concept. Referring 
to stock prices, it is claimed that they, 'take account of dear money and 
pig iron furnace operations, together with crop prospects, grain prices, 
bank clearings, merchants' collections, political prospects, foreign 
trade, savings bank figures, wages, volume of railroad freight and a 
hundred and one other things. The average price of active stocks is 
the result of all of this, impartially reflected in a market which no 
interest is big enough to influence. ' (Wall Street Journal editorial, July 
15 1924. ) Quoted in Rhea, 1932b. 
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data, to be able to analyse the forecasts of individuals. Aggregation at an 
early stage or confidentiality requirements often preclude this. The papers of 
Frankel and Froot discussed in earlier chapters, for example, were restricted to 
using the sample median for their studies of investors' expectations using 
survey data from Money Market Services (MMS), American Express and The 
Economist, data which is discussed in Frankel and Froot, 1987a. Further, 
direct point estimates of specific exchange rates are not always available. For 
example Taylor (1988) in his study of investment managers'views had to use 
the Carlson 
- 
Parkin (1975) method to obtain a quantitative expectations 
series, since the source survey data was expressed in three-category 
response form (ie 'up', 'down' or 'same'). (40) 
Extending the framework of Fama (1970), (41) the following classification was 
devised to judge whether chartists' advice 'fully reflected' information available 
to them. Weak form rationality would not be rejected if the forecaster made 
efficient use of the information in the past movements of the particular rate: ie. 
if the information from his past forecast errors in the currency he was 
(40) Results of studies analysing survey data of foreign exchange expectations 
were discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.5. 
(41) Fama (1970) made the following classification. Weak form tests concerned 
the information subset of the past price history alone. Semi-strong 
form tests included publically available information, while strong form 
tests also included the use of information to which the agent had 
private access. 
Fama's definition of efficiency in his 1970 paper was that a market is 
efficient if all the information in set 4ý is 'fully reflected' in securities 
prices. In a later book (Fama 1976), he modified this definition to state 
that a market is efficient if all relevant information is used to determine 
securities prices, and that the information is used correctly. The 
market would hence act as if it had rational eexpectations. A survey oi 
the development of these arguments is given in Leroy (1989). 
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forecasting were efficiently used. Semi-weak form ratio would be judged 
by whether the chartist used information on the past movements of all rates he 
was forecasting: ie. his forecast errors in all currencies. Semi-strong form 
rationality was to be evidenced by the above plus the use of relevant, 
fundamental, publically available information in the form of stock market and 
interest differentials. These concepts can be expressed mathematically. 
Let the set of the last two forecast errors at the j-week horizon, for the i-th 
individual and the k-th currency at time t be denoted a (i, j, k, t): 
0 (i, j, k, t) 
=I ei j, k, t-j , ej, k, t-j-1 
Then weak rationality would imply that ejl, k, t is orthogonal to a (i, j, k, t): 
ej 
tk, t 
Ia (i, j, k, t) 
Semi-weak rationality would require: 
ei n, Q (i, j, k, t) (6.2) jlk, t I Uk= 
(where n currencies are considered). Let FU, k, t) denote the set containing 
data on relative stock market indices and interest rates for the j-th and 0+1)-th 
lags: 
mk k ik ik Fo, k, t) 
= 
(mt-j 
- t-J, mt-j-i - Mt+l , It-j - t-j, It+l -t 
_j-l 
where m and i denote the stock market index and three month Euro-deposit 
rates for the US, and mk and ik denote the same variables for the country of 
the k-th currency. Then semi-strong form efficiency would require: 
ei 2 (i, j, k, t) j, k, t 1 FU, k, t) u (6-3) 
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It would be expected that chartists would be at least weakly rational if 
they discount past price information. If it were the case that prices do 
'discount everything', then they should furthermore display stronger forms of 
rationality. 
The tests themselves were carried out using the following regressions. In 
order to test (6.1), the chartist's current forecast error in the particular currency 
was regressed upon his last two known errors in that same currency. A test of 
the significance of the whole regression was then conducted. (42) For semi- 
weak rationality (6-2), the chartistos two lagged forecasts errors from the other 
two currencies were included in the regressions above. Semi-strong form 
tests (6.3) also included (two lags of) the stock market and interest differential 
of the particular currency's country with the US. Thus the series of tests was 
fully nested. The full series of regressions is specified below. 
i) For weak rationality 
el el j, k, t ý ao+oil el j, k, t-j + 012 j, k, t-j-1 (6.4) 
calculated for chartists i=l,.., n; for currencies k=l,.., 3 and time horizons j=1,4. 
(Where, as above, ejl, k, t '*'ý st - t-j s? ie the forecast error for the i-th individual at 
the j week horizon and the k-th currency). 
ii) For semi-weak rationality 
i3 




Ea k+3 k=l 
calculated for chartists i=l,..., n and time horizon, j=1,4 
I 
(42) Constants were included in all regressions, but the X2-test of the whole 
regression excluded the constant. 
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ii) For semi-strong rationality 
i 
ot +Eae ei e k t k=l kj, kft-j k=l k+3 j kf t-j-' 
+a mk 7 
+a9 
t-j 10 
For chartists i=l,.., n and time horizons j=l, 4 
(Where rn and i are defined as above in the components of equation 6-3). 
6-3: Results and implications 
(6.6) 
The estimation results for the one-week ahead forecasts are shown in Tables 
6.1 a-g and those for four-week forecasts in Tables 6.2a-f. (43) Each Table 
displays the results for individual chartists, moving from weak to semi-strong 
rationality tests. The one week ahead predictions used the White (1980) 
correction for heteroscedacity, while the four week ahead predictions were 
computed using a method of moments correction to allow for overlapping 
forecast errors, (Hansen 1982). See the Appendix to this chapter. 
The general results apparent from these tables is that the hypothesis that the 
chartists are rational (the regressors have no explanatory power over the 
errors) cannot be rejected most often for the weak tests at the one-week 
horizon, (44) while the same hypothesis is rejected most often on the semi- 
strong tests at the four week horizon. The general pattern to emerge is that of 
(43) Note that these tables report marginal significance levels: indicating rejection 
of the null if less than the desired significance level (say 0.05). 
(44) Of course, these tests do not escape the caveat of Shiller (1978), ie that there 
may be some piece of information, which is not considered, which may 
not be orthogonal and to the forecast error. 
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chartists tending to display evidence of weak rationality, but becoming 
markedly less rational as the information set is expanded. This pattern is 
common to both one and four-week forecasts, the difference between the two 
being that at the one week horizon the information set usually has to be larger 
for the rationality hypothesis to be rejected. 
These results can perhaps be linked to the findings reported in Chapter 4, in 
which market participants' preferences for the use of chartism as opposed to 
fundamentals was particularly skewed towards charts for the one week or less 
timescale. 
The results reported above hold reasonably consistently for the individual and 
median forecasts. It is also interesting to note that Chartist M violates 
rationality in a similar way to the other chartists, yet displayed a relatively high 
degree of accuracy in the tests reported in Chapter 5. It is clearly possible to 
be irrational and accurate, as well as being irrational and inaccurate. All the 
chartists displayed some (albeit slight) evidence of rationality at four-weeks in 
terms of accommodating their past errors in the currency in question, but 
became notably irrational once the information set was widened beyond that. 
For both sets of forecasts, the median appeared representative of the 
illustrated individuals. 
It should be noted that the semi-strong rationality tests are using the same 
type of information as in the 'economic'VARs with which the chartist forecasts 
were compared in Chapter 5, section 5.6.4. The fact that some chartists 
outperformed the VAR (both restricted and unrestricted) yet were 'irrational' at 
the same four-week horizon is indicative of there being some pieces of 
information in the VAR which were not incorporated into their forecasts, 




The results reported offer some support for the 'weak' rationality of chartism, 
particularly over a very short horizon (one week), which ties in with the fact 
that market participants are inclined to give chartism greater weight in their 
decisions at the shorter horizons. At the four week horizon, however, the 
history of the price series and subsequent forecast errors were apparently 
being utilised less. This is evidence of irrationality of chartist views, even at 
the relatively short horizon of four weeks. Furthermore, even basic 
fundamental information was not being included in most forecasts, so could 
not have been incorporated in the price in the manner which chart theory 
suggests. 
Overall, the result that rationality was less often rejected at the one-week 
horizon is further evidence to chartism having most value as a short-term 
forecasting tool. This supports the view of the majority of market participants 
surveyed in the questionnaire survey analysed in Chapter 4. On the evidence 
analysed here, though, the clearest result is that the hypothesis of rationality is 
generally rejected as the information set is expanded, and that rejection occurs 
sooner at the longer horizon. 
In the next chapter, various alternative methods of forming expectations are 
examined and tested for, with particular emphasis on the question of whether 
there is any evidence that the use of chartism may exert a destabilising 
influence upon the market. 
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Table 6.1a: Rationality Tests for Chartist A, 1 week ahead predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 
lags in same currency) 
R2 DW 
0.041 2.020 
DM 0.016 2.000 






















Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
C 0.172 2.026 13.026 0.330 0.212 
(0.600) (0.999) (0-999) 
DM 0.120 2.043 8.985 13.704 6.538 
(0-878) (0.567E-1) (0.366) 
Y 0.212 2.072 6.883 20.902 8.541 
(0.961) (0.392E-2) (0.201) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies + 2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
E 0.293 2.055 8.225 33.254 32.501 
(0.914) (0.478E-3) (0.330E-3) 
DM 0.218 2.081 10.164 18.485 14.830 
(0.809) (0.710E-1) (0-138) 
Y 0.279 1.986 5.762 35.010 14.040 
(0.983) (0.247E-3) (0.171) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marqinal significance levels. 
171 
Table 6.1 b: Rationality Tests for Chartist B, 1 week ahead predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 




























Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
C 0.117 1.995 7.419 0.122E-2 0.878E-3 
(0.945) (0-999) (0.999) 
DM 0.144 1.914 15.616 18.520 10.461 
(0.408) (0.983E-2) (0.107) 
Y 0.076 2.035 8.332 5.504 3.221 
(0.909) (0.599) (0.781) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies + 2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
E 0.345 2.220 11.520 41.324 39.050 
(0.715) (0.212E-4) (0.249E-4) 
DM 0.349 2.248 18.105 44.962 31.035 
(0.257) (0.493E-5) (0.579 E-3) 
Y 0.142 1.964 7.814 13.292 10.264 
(0-931) (0.275) (0.418) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 


























Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
C 0.203 2.091 10.282 0.198E-2 0.186E-2 
(0.802) (0.999) (0-999) 
DM 0.282 1.956 11.389 31.277 31.264 
(0.725) (0.553 E-4) (0.226E-4) 
Y 0.215 2.077 10.807 18.062 15.377 
(0.766) (0.1 17E-1) (0.175E-1) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies + 2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
E 0.389 2.029 17.506 52.766 52.672 
(0.299) (0.198 E-6) (0.857E-7) 
DM 0.379 1.908 10.986 50.743 49.253 
(0.754) (0.460E-6) (0.366E-6) 
Y 0.229 2.172 10.102 23.902 18-989 
(0.813) (0.132E-1) (0.404E-1) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marqinal significance levels. 
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Table 6.1d: Rationality Tests for Chartist L, 1 week ahead predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 
lags on same currency) 
R2 DW 
£ 0.319 1.879 
DM 0.067 1.831 








x2 (including constant) 
16.238 












Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
E 0.453 2.064 9.725 0.588 0.517 
(0.837) (0.999) (0.999) 
DM 0.217 1.864 10.126 19.182 15-382 
(0.812) (0.764E-2) (0.178E-1) 
Y 0.189 1.934 13-180 14.531 12.656 
(0.588) (1 0.425E-1) (0-488E-1) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies + 2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
0.542 2.037 7.093 196.009 195.777 
(0.955) (0.000) (0.000) 
DM 0.288 1.837 10.157 44.612 36.288 
(0-810) (0.568E-5) (0.751 E-4) 
Y 0.270 1.947 14.385 36.921 36-880 
(0.497) (0.119 E-3) (0.594E-4) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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Table 6.1e: Rationality Tests for Chartist M, 1 week ahead predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 





























Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
0.220 2.072 18.675 13.721 12.950 
(0.229) (0.564E-1) (0.438E-1) 
DM 0.355 1.988 10.796 53.812 45-629 
(0.767) 0.000) (0.000) 
Y 0.212 1.967 12.595 23.642 20.903 
(0.634) (0.132 E-2) (0.191 E-2) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regres sing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all currencies +2 lags of stock market a nd interest 
differentials) 
C 0.378 2.326 29.456 37.668 33.268 
(0.140 E- 1) (0.890E-4) (0.246E-3) 
DM 0.452 1.506 9.566 62.691 57.914 
(0.846) (0.000) (0-000) 
Y 0.451 1.907 20.686 53.179 50.330 
(0.147) (0.167E-6) (0.232E-6) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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Table 6.1f: Rationality Tests for Chartist P, 1 week ahead predictions(cl) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 
lags in same currency) 
R2 DW 
£ 0.025 1.877 
DM 0.042 2.011 






















Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in same currency) 
0.073 1.860 8.756 5.953 5.694 
(0.846) (0.545) (0.458) 
DM 0.301 2.108 10-318 22.526 18.628 
(0.739) (0.206E-2) (0.484E-2) 
Y 0.187 1.911 8.095 20.764 18.320 
(0.884) (0.414E-2) (0.548E-2) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies + 2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
C 0.246 0.192 10.615 16.879 16.156 
(0.716) (0.112) (0.953E-1) 
DM 0.367 2.145 10.640 70.482 50.210 
(0.714) (0.000) (0.244E-6) 
Y 0.332 2.036 7.291 56.866 35.137 
(0.923) (0.352E-7) (0.118 E-3) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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Table 6.1g: Rationality Tests for median chartist forecast, 1 week I'm I 
ahead predictionst"', 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast eirror on 2 own forecast error lags in 
same currency) 
R2 DW aX2 (Including constant) x2 (excluding constant) 
C 0.015 2.043 10.772 1.219 0.459 
(0.769) (0.749) (0.795) 
DM 0.047 2.059 14.387 5.879 2.049 
(10.496) (0.118) (0-359) 
Y 0.109 2.059 2.311 10.950 8.612 
(0.949E-1) (0.120E-1) (0-135E-1) 
(ii) Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error lags in 2 aim forecast 
error lags all three currencies) 
0.140 2.167 9.768 0.832 0.692E-3 
(0-834) (0.999) (0-999) 
DM 0.260 1.892 16.782 35-086 20.791 
(0-332) (0.108 E-4) (0.200E-2) 
Y 0.193 2.016 9.030 14.710 11.450 
(0.876) (0.399E-1) (0.754E-1) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 aim forecast 
errors lags in all currencies + 2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
C 0.333 2.299 14.163 22.267 21-880 
(0.513) (0.224E-1) (0.157E-1) 
DM 0.367 1.897 13.348 61.056 35.530 
(0.575) (0-000) (0.10 1 E-3) 
Y 0.247 1.868 10.337 22.772 17.245 
(0.798) (0.190E-1) (0.691 E-1) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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Table 6.2a: Rationality Tests for Chartist A, 4 week ahead predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 
lags in same currency) 
DW 0 
£ 0.299 0.507 
DM 0.188 0.498 
y 0.073 0.866 






(0.164 E-6) (0.299) 







Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
£ 0.498 0.765 50.312 90.480 59.046 
(0.541 E-5) (0.00) (0.00) 
DM 0.372 0.665 42.476 34.944 30.401 
(0.115 E-4) (0.330E-4) 
y 0.330 1.152 24.140 35.780 21.868 
(0.441 E-1) (0.798E-5) (0.128 E-2) 
Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error in 2 own forecast 
error lags in all currencies +2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
£ 0.718 1.409 19.772 1632.662 880.666 
(0.137) (0-00) (0.00) 
DM 0.518 1.190 29.373 209.186 150.681 
(0.930E-2) (0.00) (0-00) 
y 0.432 1.354 21.370 68.357 67.465 
90.925E-1) (0.00) (0.00) 
(a) Figures in parentheses are the marginal significant level. 
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Table 6.2b: Rationality Tests for Chartist B, 4 weeks ahead predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error lags the same currency) 
R2 DW 
£ 0.111 0.856 
DM 0.142 0.608 
y 0.149 0.858 




















Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
£ 0.208 1.086 17.395 21.705 19.826 
(0.236E-1) (0.286E-2) (0.297E-2) 
DM 0.221 0.676 43.107 102.431 65.143 
(0.824E-4) (0.00) (0.00) 
y 0.285 1.127 32.073 23.870 23.805 
(0-391 E-2 (0.120E-2) (0.567E-3) 
Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies +2 lags stock market and interest 
differentials) 
£ 0.388 1.260 16.896 107.531 47.751 
(0.262) (0.00) (0.689E-6) 
DM 0.474 1.018 32.937 69.188 48.395 
(0.294E-2) (0.00) (0.526E-6) 
y 0.554 1.336 33.171 932.312 845.332 
(0.272E-2) (0.00) (0.00) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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Table 6.2c: Rationality Tests for Chartist H, 4 weeks ahead predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error lags in same currency) 
R2 DW a X2 (including constant) X2 (excluding constant) 
C 0.0956 0.696 58.947 18.270 3.919 (0.179 E-6) (0.387E-03) (0.141) 
DIVI 0.088 0.717 43-619 11-161 2.458 
(0-682E-4) (0.109 E- 1) (0-293) 
Y 0.113 0.666 66.574 6.632 6.614 
(O. BOOE-8) (0.846E-1) (0-366E-1) 
Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
£ 0.257 0.928 48.782 62.145 18.492 
(0.975 E-5) (0.00) (0.511 E-2) 
DM 0.242 0.848 59.935 46.768 14.541 
(0-120E-6) (0-00) (0.241 E-1) 
y 0.305 0.784 58.346 38.265 35.922 
(0.228E-6) (0.270 E-5) (0.286E-5) 
Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies +2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
£ 0.483 1.094 41.530 153.293 130.875 
(0.147E-3) (0-00) (0.00) 
DM 0.536 0.836 44.603 399.277 236.232 
(0.473E-4) (0.00) (0-00) 
y 0.716 1.277 31.427 902.985 770.016 
(0.483E-2) (0.00) (0.00) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marqinal significance levels. 
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Table 6.2d: Rationality Tests For Chartist M, 4 weeks ahead 
predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 
lags same currency) 
R2 DW 
£ 0.028 0.676 
DM 0.086 0.608 
y 0.198 0.952 
a 
38.422 



















Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags all three currencies) 
E 0.509 1.503 13.463 44.309 23.256 
(0.336) (0.186E-6) (0.715E-3) 
DM 0.506 1.483 14.672 81 
. 
064 50.617 
(0.260) (0.00) (0-00) 
Y 0.477 1.091 12.338 44.345 41.381 
(0.419) (0.183E-6) (0.00) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies +2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
C 0.633 1.626 21.287 438.471 365.749 
(0.463E-1) (0.00) (0-00) 
DM 0.673 1.642 14.653 399.512 155.867 
(0.261) (0.00) (0.00) 
Y 0.681 1.122 16.725 564.609 543.922 
(0.160) (0.00) (0.00) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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Table 6.2e: Rationality Tests for Chartist P, 4 weeks ahead predictions(a) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 
lags on same currency) 
R2 DW a X2 (including constant) X2 (excluding constant) 
0.054 0.613 34.399 2.612 1.458 
(0.311 E-3) (0.455) (0.482) 
DIA 0.022 0.536 36.425 0.745 0.575 
(0.144 E-3) (0.863) (0.750) 
Y 0.028 0.748 35.280 3.378 1.327 
(0.223E-3) (0-337) (0.515) 
(ii) Semi-weak ratio nality (Regressing forecast error on 2 aim forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
E 0.235 0.773 34.259 50.988 19.745 
(0.328E-3) (0.00) (0-307E-2) 
DM 0.122 0.639 29-305 17.957 11.738 
(0.204E-2) (0.122E-1) (0.681 E-1) 
Y 0.037 0.793 34.061 10.035 4.667 
(0.353E-3) (0.187) (0.587) 
Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
errors lags in all currencies +2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
£ 0.642 0.836 28.894 642.478 498.299 
(0-236E-2) (0.00) (0.00) 
DM 0.492 0.889 10.977 181.283 97.088 
(0.445) (0.00) (0.00) 
y 0.627 1.310 10.664 6553.905 286.499 
(0.472) (0.00) (0.00) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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Table 6.2f: Rationality Tests for median chartist forecast, 4 weeks ahead 
predictions(8) 
Weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast error 




























Semi-weak rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 own forecast 
error lags in all three currencies) 
0.331 0.813 50.102 24.948 23.712 
(0-587E-5) (0.775E-3) (0.590E-3) 
DM 0.247 0.690 66-198 23.698 23.440 
(0-934E-8) (0.129E-2) (0 
. 
662 E-3) 
Y 0.204 0.719 53-888 40.133 40.117 
(0 
- 
134 E-5) (0.119 E-5) (0.432E-6) 
(iii) Semi-strong rationality (Regressing forecast error on 2 aim forecast 
errors lags in all currencies +2 lags of stock market and interest 
differentials) 
C 0.375 0.927 39.734 49.139 43.232 
(0.281 E-3) (0.893E-6) (0.452E-5) 
DM 0.397 0.799 58.261 53.949 48-638 
(0.236E-6) (0.121 E-6) (0.474E-6) 
Y 0.547 0.926 41.509 124.651 113-067 
(0.148 E-3) (0.00) (0.00) 
(a) Figures in parenthesis are the marginal significance levels. 
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APPENDIX: Correction for heteroscedastic and moving average error 
terms. 
The general linear model, 
Y=Xp+u 




leading, by standard derivations (see any econometric text book, eg Johnston 
(1984)) to the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator 
= (X, X)-l X'y 
and 




If, however, the error term covariance matrix is not a scalar matrix as in 
equation 6A. 2 above, but 
N(o, z), Z0 
(6A. 3) 
then the OLS point estimator (6A. 3) remains unbiased and consistent, but its 
covariance matrix is now given by 
COV(AOIS) = (X'X) -1 x'zx (X, X)-l p 
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i) In the case of heterscedastic errors, Z is a diagonal matrix with non- 




White (1980) shows in this case that using 
u 2. Piim E 000 
where Ot denotes the OLS residual, so that 
cov (ß OLS) = (X X) -1 XZX (X X)- 
1 
gives a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix. 
(6A. 4) 
ii) Hansen (1982) extends this to the case where there are both moving 
average errors and time-varying autocovariances, in which case the applicable 






02 UT J 
In the case of an MA(n-1) error, there would be (n-1) non-zero bands. 
(6A. 5) 
These consistent covariance matrix estimators are used in conjunction with 
OLS in estimating the results reported in this chapter. 
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7 CHARTISTS' ADVICE: IS IT DESTABILISING? 
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7-1: Introduction 
The previous chapter offered evidence which did not reject the hypothesis of 
chartist rationality over the one-week horizon, but offered less support, or 
rejection, of this for the longer period. Taking the question wider than whether 
chartists are rational per ýe, however, is the question of what type of 
expectations mechanism they actually employ, and, crucially for the market as 
a whole, whether they act in a stabilising or destabilising fashion. 
This chapter presents the results of several tests to examine the implied 
expectation formation of the chartists, looking at the possibilities of static, 
extrapolative, adaptive, regressive and bandwagon expectations. Only the 
latter type would exert a potentially destabilising influence on the market. The 
next section discusses these five expectations mechanisms, which is followed 
in section 7.3 by an explanation of the estimation methods. Section 7.4 
examines the results, while the final section concludes, with particular 
emphasis on the issue of stabilisation introduced above. 
7.2: Expectation mechanisms 
Equations (7.1) to (7.5) list five alternative expectations hypotheses, where st 
e the expected value of denotes the (logarithm of the) spot rate at time t, tst+ n 
St+n at time t, 9t is the "equilibrium" exchange rate at time t and A is the first- 
difference operator (eg Axt = xt - xt-1): 
e Static expectations: ts t+n- St0 
Bandwagon expectations: se-s t t+n t 
Extrapolative expectations: 
e 
ts t+n = (1-ß) st+ ßs t-i' 
(7.1) 
= vi, 6 (7.2) 




ts t+n t-n st -YIS se -Y 1t t-n t (7.4) 
Regressive expectations: 
se st st - st], > t t+n (7.5) 
Static expectations on the part of chartists essentially means they would be 
assuming that the exchange rate follows a random walk: (45) this is the null 
hypothesis throughout. Although perhaps not immediately appealing to 
fundamentalists, it appears that economists have often made such an 
assumption. For example, in the classic Mundell-Fleming model under perfect 
capital mobility, domestic and foreign interest rates are set equal to each 
another. Assuming uncovered interest rate parity, this can only be true if 
agents have static expectations. Moreover, Frankel and Froot 1986(a, b) 
assumed static expectations on the part of chartists (albeit for simplicity) in 
their analyses. In the case of static expectations, the 'elasticity of 
expectations' is unity 
-a1% change in the current rate will cause expectations 
of the future rate to be revised upwards by 1 %. 
If, however, agents instead conform to the bandwagon expectations 
hypothesis, (7.2), then the elasticity of expectations will be greater than unity: 
(1 +a) > 1. Thus, in this case, if chartists heavily influence foreign exchange 
dealers' behaviour, they will tend to have a destabilising effect on the market 
(45) In the empirical analyses, no distinction is made between simple random walks 
and random walks with drift. This is because the primary concern is 
with slope coefficients (and hence elasticities) rather than intercepts. 
Intercepts are included in all estimated equations. 
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as, for example, dealers are advised to sell a currency, which depreciates 
further, which they are then advised to sell again, and so on. Market 
participants would essentially extrapolate the most recent trend. Describing 
such events, Nurkse (1944, pl 18) wrote, 'Exchange rates under such 
circumstances are bound to become highly unstable, and the influence of 
psychological factors may at times be overwhelming'. The debate over 
whether speculation has a stabilising or destabilising effect on the market was 
discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.4.4 
- 
it is clearly an issue of some 
importance and a debate with a long history. 
The other cases examined 
- 
extrapolative, adaptive and regressive 
expectations 
- 
all have an expectations elasticity less than unity, implying that 
chartist advice would have a stabilising influence on the market. Changes in 
the current spot rate would lead to a less than proportionate expected change 
in the future spot rate. 
Extrapolative expectations (equation 7.3) imply that the expected future spot 
rate is some proportion of the current and lagged exchange rates. Adaptive 
expectations (equation 7.4) suggest that the expected future spot rate is 
formed as a weighted average of the current spot rate and the lagged 
expected rate. The regressive expectations formulation (equation 7.5) is 
perhaps best known for its application in the exchange rate overshooting 
model of Dornbusch (1976): the equation states that expectations of the 
change in the current exchange rate are formed so as to converge to their long 
run equilibrium values. Definitions of 9, the equilibrium, can vary between 
formulations, in this chapter the sample period is sufficiently short to assume it 
does not change over the period considered. 
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7-3: Estimation 
7.3.1: Static versus extrapolative and bandwaqon expectations 
To test for static as against extrapolative or bandwagon expectations, 
reparamaterise equation (7.3) as: 
tse t+n- st PAst 
Then, by estimating the slope coefficient in the corresponding regression: 
e Ast + ut ts t +n - st ý-- clo + Oll 
(7.6) 
(7.7) 
(where ut is an error term assumed to satisfy the usual requirements), a test of 
the null hypothesis 
HO: al =0 
constitutes a test of static expectations (equation 7.1) while the alternative 
hypotheses 
Hl: oil >0 
and 
H2: 
"l ": 0 
correspond to bandwagon and extrapolative expectations respectively. 
7-3.2: Static versus adaptive expectations 
Similarly, to test for static as against adaptive expectations, equation (7.4) can 
be reparameterised as: 
tse e- St) t+n- st -'Y) (t- A 
so that in the regression: 
tse 
e-st) + ut (7.8) t +n - st ---: 00 +01 (t-n-t 
the null hypothesis 
HO: P, =0 
would again correspond to static expectations while the alternative hypothesis 
Hl: 01,0 
would correspond to adaptive expectations. 
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7-3.3: Static versus regressive expectations 
In analysing the regressive expectations hypothesis, it is reasonable to 
assume that the perceived equilibrium exchange rate would remain fairly 
constant over the nine month or so sample period, (gt=§), so that (7.5) may be 
rewdtten as 
e ts t +n - St 2. - Oý - Ost 
Hence, in the regression 
.e tst+n -stý -to + -fist+ ut 




is again static expectations, and regressive expectations is the alternative 
71 0. 
Note that as exchange rates generally follow an I(l) process, equation (7.9) is 
essentially the same formulation as the Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity, ie. 
Axt 
=c+C, xt_l + ut , where the test statistic is the t-statistic on cl. 
This will therefore mean that the coefficient yj is baised towards zero, and 
follows the Dickey-Fuller distribution. Hence the significance levels of the 
coefficient should be taken as those implied by the Dickey-Fuller, and not the 
t-distribution (see eg Fuller, 1976): see footnote to Table 7.3. 
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7.4: Results of estimation 
These regressions were carried out using survey data collected for six 
individual chartists from the data base (labelled alphabetically to preserve 
anonymity) as well as for the whole sample median forecasts. The results are 
reported in Tables 7.1 to 7.3 and summarised in Tables 7.4a, 046) 
For the one-week predictions, the general tendency is an inability to reject the 
hypothesis of static expectations against any of the considered alternatives. 
The exceptions are chartist M, for whom the null hypothesis is often rejected in 
favour of one of the inelastic alternatives, and chartist L, for whom the 
hypothesis of static expectations is rejected in favour of the adaptive 
alternative. At the four week horizon, chartist A also has strongly non-static 
expectations, with the null hypothesis being rejected in favour of either 
adaptive, regressive or extrapolative expectations, but not bandwagon 
expectations. Similar results are obtained for chartist M at the four-week 
horizon. 
Overall, therefore, these results suggest an inelasticity of expectations. Static 
expectations are never rejected in favour of bandwagon expectations for any 
chartist at any horizon, results which bear out the informal impressions gained 
from a visual inspection of Chart 5.1. 
7.5: Conclusion 
The general result to emerge from the analysis of this section is thus that 
chartist advice does not appear to be intrinsically destabilising in the sense 
that chartists' expectations do not appear to overreact systematically to 
changes in the current exchange rate. 
(46) The results for the four week-ahead predictions were calculated using a 
method of moments correction to allow for overlapping forecast errors 
(Hansen 1982). See Appendix to Chapter 6. 
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Logically separate from these issues, however, is the question of whether 
chartist advice may be destabilising in the sense of leading the market away 
from the underlying fundamentals. The most that can be said, is that on the 
analysis of the chart advice presented here, the advice may at most cause 
mean-reverting, or stationary, deviations from the fundamentals (ie 'fads'- see 
eg Poterba and Summers, 1987 and discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.1). 
The results presented here concur with those of Frankel and Froot (1 987a) 
who found that (presumably fundamental based) exchange rate expectations 
did not exhibit bandwagon effects and hence, like the results presented here, 
were evidence of speculation being stabilising. This is all evidence which can 
be added to the debate of this issue discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.4.4. 
In the same study, however, Frankel and Froot reported results which rejected 
the static expectations hypothesis: significant weight being given to variables 
other than the contemporaneous spot rate. Three possibilities could account 
for these differences. First, the time period examined differs. Frankel and 
Froot used several sources of survey data covering periods from 1976 to 
1986, of expectations of up to five currencies against the dollar. Their period 
is obviously much longer than the one examined in this thesis, and includes 
several trending episodes. In contrast, there were no prolonged trends in the 
nine month survey examined here: as seen in Chart 5.1, rates fluctuated, only 
trending for a few months at most. These movements, perhaps more akin to a 
'trading range', would probably incline (chartist) forecasters to follow a strategy 
approaching a random walk. 
Second, this thesis looks explicitly at chartist forecasts; the data of Frankel and 
Froot was drawn from a panel of bankers, corporate treasurers and 
economists, most of whom, it seems safe to assume, would be 
fundamentalists. In a trading range, such as that examined in this thesis, 
chartists are probably more inclined than fundamentalists to hold a'random 
walk'type view. 
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Third, while the median results presented in this chapter unanimously could 
not reject the null hypothesis of static expectations, individuals did on 
occasions favour one of the inelastic alternatives. Similarly, it is probably the 
case that some individuals comprising the median results of Frankel and Froot 
had implied static expectations formations. 
Furthermore, the results presented in this chapter examine the implications of 
one week and four week forecasts separately: any implied inconsistency 
between the two has not been discussed. This is an issue recently examined 
by Froot and Ito (1989)(47) who use survey data to test whether exchange 
rate forecasts are consistent, ie. whether expectations of different forecast 
horizons lead to equivalent predictions of the exchange rate at future horizons. 
Hence they compare forecasts at different horizons rather than comparing 
forecasts with outturn. Their overall result is that expectations generally fail to 
be consistent 
- 
to quote their key result: 'In every one of 20 sets of time-series 
estimates encompassing four surveys, five forecast horizons and five 
currencies, shorter-term expectations overreact relative to longer-term 
expectations when the exchange rate changes'. (p 506). 
(47) Pesaran (1989) provides an alternative and more general derivation of Ito's 
and Froot's cross equation restrictions for the purpose of testing short- 
term and long-term expectations. 
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Table 7.1a: Testing for static expectations against bandwagon or 
extrapolative expectations, 1 week ahead forecasts(a) (Dependent 
variable (tSt+, 
-St)) 
Rate Constant LSt R4 DW 
Chartist A $/E 0.54 
-0.12 0.01 1.61 (2.19) (-0.62) 
Chartist B $/E 0.28 
-0.10 0.15 E-5 1.94 (1.60) (-0.72 
Chartist H $/F- 0.14 0.11 0.14 E-1 1.64 
(0.74) (0-68) 
Chartist L $IF- 0.39 
-0.26 0.36 E-1 0.98 (1-34) (-1.12) 
Chartist M $/F- 0.45 
-0.24 0.14 1.64 (3.72) (-2.15) 
Chartist P $/F- 0.17 
-0.19 E-1 0.47 E-3 1.94 (0-91) (-0.12) 
Median 0.17 0.20 E-1 0.13 2.17 
(1.46) (0.21) 
Rate Constant A-St R2 DW 
Chartist A DM/$ 0.53 
-0.47 0.24 1.68 (-2.25) (-0.28) 
Chartist B DM/$ 
-0.29 0.14 0.40 E-1 1.57 (1.66) (1.58) 
Chartist H DM/$ 
-0.45 E-3 -0.14 0.35 E-1 1.15 (-0.25) (-1.12) 
Chartist L DM/$ 
-0.37 0.47 E-1 0.28 1.16 (-1.73) (0.31) 
Chartist M DW$ 
-0.54 -0.14 0.61 E-1 1.59 (-4.10) (-1.40) 
Chartist P DM/$ 
-0.34 0.86 E-1 0.14 E-1 2.14 (-1.91) (0.65) 
Median DM/$ 
-0.33 0.16 E-1 0.11 1.74 (-2.81) (0.19) 
(a) Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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Table 7.1a: (contd. ) 
Rate Constant ASt R2 DW 
Chartist A V1$ 
-0.72 0.29 0.62 E-1 1.51 (-2.72) (1.49) 
Chartist B Y/$ 
-0-30 0.14 0.30 E-5 1.54 (-1.55) (0.10 E-1) 
Chartist H Y/$ 
-0.32 -0.49 E-1 0.28 1.12 (-1.44) (-0.31) 
Chartist L V/$ 
-0.39 -0-18 0.64 E-1 1.23 (-2.43) (-1.53) 
Chartist M 
-0.41 -0.26 0.24 1.91 (-4.00) (-3.07) 
Chartist P Y1$ 
-0-28 0.22 0.44 E-1 2.36 (-1.16) (1.15) 
Median W$ 
-0.41 -0.55 E-1 0.94 2.08 (-3.12) (-0.57) 
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Table 7.1 b: Testing static expectations against bandwagon or 
extrapolative expectations, 4 week ahead forecasts(a) (Dependent 
variable (tSt+4-St)) 
Rate Constant LSt R2 DW 
Chartist A $/E 
-0.78 -0.76 0.35 0.64 (-1.45) (-4.11) 
Chartist B $/E 
-0.23 0.21 0.99 E-1 1.61 (-0.72) (1.88) 
Chartist H $/E 
-0.12 E-1 0.16 0.68 E-1 0.87 (-3-95) (1.88) 
Chartist M $/E 0.74 0.72 E-1 0.22 E-1 1.32 
(3-00) (0.77) 
Chartist P $/F- 
-0.28 0.44 E-1 0.50 1.37 (-0.86) (0.36) 
Median $/E $/E 
-0.32 0.73 E-1 0.40 E-1 1.43 (-1.79) (1.16) 
Rate Constant 454 R2 DW 
Chartist A DM/$ 0.74 
-0.58 0.25 0.64 (1.26) (-3.28) 
Chartist B DW$ 0.72 0.13 0.53 E-1 1.33 
(2.33) (1.34) 
Chartist H DW$ 0.11 E-1 0.11 0.41 E-1 1.26 
(3.60) (1.17) 
Chartist M DW$ 
-0.53 -0.57 E-1 0.19 E-1 0.86 (-2.16) (-0.73) 
Chartist P DM/$ 
-0.31 0.37 E-1 0.50 1.03 (-0.96) (0.36) 
Median DM/$ 
-0.92 E-3 -0.17 E-1 0.22 0.97 (-0.44) (-0.27) 
(a) Figures in parenthese s are t-statistics. 
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Table 7.1b: (contd. ) 
Rate Constant A-St R2 DW 
Chartist A V/$ 
-0-83 E-2 -0-13 0.67 E-1 1.85 (-3-12) (-1.51) 
Chartist B V/$ 
-0.25 E-2 -0.70 E-2 0.48 E-3 1.51 (-1.38) (-0.12) 
Chartist H V/$ 
-0.24 E-2 0.91 E-1 0.60 E-1 1.39 (-1.20) (1.43) 
Chartist M V/$ 
-0.44 E-2 -0.10 0.20 1.95 (-3-81) (-2.61) 
Chartist P Y/$ 
-0.34 E-2 0.46 E-1 0.12 E-1 2.24 (-1.34) (0.55) 
Median V/$ 
-0.42 E-2 -0.53 E-1 0.54 E-1 2.06 (-3-35) (-1.35) 
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Table 7.2a: Testing for adaptive expectations, 1 week ahead 
forecasts(a) (Dependent variable (tSt+, 
-St)) 
Rate Constant it 
-i 
vt!: 
-ýtl R2 DW 
Chartist A $/E 0.46 E-2 0.15 0.39 E-1 1.85 
(1.76) (1-16) 
Chartist B $/E 0.26 E-2 0.24 E-1 0.11 E-2 1.99 
(1.44) (0-19) 
Chartist H $/F- 0.19 E-2 
-0.22 E-1 0.99 E-3 1.65 (0-93) (-0.18) 
Chartist L $/F- 0.13 E-2 0.52 0.29 1.60 
(0.46) (3.65) 
Chartist M $/E 0.34 E-2 0.25 0.16 2.11 
(2.76) (2.39) 
Chartist P $/F- 0.16 E-2 0.15 E-1 0.43 E-3 1.95 
(0-88) (0.11) 
Median $/F- 0.20 E-2 
-0.56 E-1 0.10 E-1 2.07 (1-64) (-0.59) 
Rate Constant it 
-i%. --Stl 
R2 DW 
Chartist A DM/$ 
-0.43 E-2 0.12 0.21 E-1 1.86 (-1.68) (0-85) 
Chartist B DM/$ 
-0.26 E-2 -0.17 E-1 0.72 E-3 1.53 (-1.40) (-0.15) 
Chartist H DM/$ 
-0.32 E-3 0.23 0.13 1.58 (-0.18) (2.26) 
Chartist L DM/$ 
-0.11 E-2 0.24 0.11 1.39 (-0.68) (2.02) 
Chartist M DM/$ 
-0.43 0.20 0.13 2.06 (-3.13) (2.10) 
Chartist P DM/$ 
-0.34 E-2 0.86 E-1 0.14 E-1 2.14 (-1.91) (0.65) 
Median DW$ 
-0.31 E-2 0.24 E-1 0.19 E-2 1.66 (0.25) 
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Table 7.2a: (contd. ) 
Rate Constant ý-i%. 
--Stl 
Chartist A Y/$ 
-0.72 E-2 -0.35 E-1 (-2.42) (-0.24) 
Chartist B V/$ 
-0.26 E-2 0.12 (-1.28) (0-98) 
Chartist H V/$ 
-0.24 E-2 0.24 (-1.10) (1.92) 
Chartist L V/$ 
-0.22 E-2 0.33 (-1.41) (3.15) 
Chartist M V/$ 
-0.32 0.24 (-3.05) (3.07) 
Chartist P V/$ 
-0.37 E-2 -0.19 (-1.55) (-1.52) 
Median W$ 
-0.41 E-2 0.32 E-1 (-2-82) (0.31) 
(a) Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
R2 DW 
0.18 E-2 1.54 




0.74 E-1 2.10 
0.29 E-2 2.05 
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Table 7.2b: Testing for adaptive expectations, 4 weeks ahead forecasts(a) (Dependent variable (tSe t +4 - SO 
Rate Constant R2 DW 
Chartist A $/F- 
-0-60 E-2 0.48 0.50 1.06 (-1.28) (5-66) 
Chartist B $/E 
-0.30 E-2 
-0.17 0.74 E-1 1.51 (-0.92) (-1.60) 
Chartist H $/E 
-0.13 E-1 
-0-67 E-1 0.20 E-1 0.74 (-3.97) (-0.80) 
Chartist M $/F- 0.79 E-2 
-0.46 E-1 0.70 E-2 1.31 (3.14) (0.44) 
Chartist P $/F- 
-0.28 E-2 -0.25 E-1 0.29 E-2 1.37 (-0.85) (-0.28) 
Median $/E 
-0.35 E-2 -0.64 E-1 0.37 E-1 1.44 (1.91) (-1.11) 
Rate Constant SS ft-4-t-tl R2 DW 
Chartist A DM/$ 0.87 E-2 0.44 0.42 0.88 
(1.68) (4.77) 
Chartist B DM/$ 0.81 E-2 
-0.98 E-1 0.43 E-1 1.28 (2.62) (-1.21) 
Chartist H DM/$ 0.12 E-1 
-0.90 E-1 0.41 E-1 1.16 (3.95) (-1.17) 
Chartist M DM/$ 
-0.48 E-2 0.77 E-1 0.30 E-1 0.86 (-1.89) (0.91) 
Chartist P DM/$ 
-0.34 E-2 -0.57 E-1 0.18 E-1 1.06 (-1.06) (-0.69) 
Median DM, /$ 
-0.63 E-3 0.55 E-1 0.27 E-1 0.95 (-0.30) (0.94) 
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Table 7.2b: (contd. ) 
Rate Constant ft-44LS-tl 
Chartist A V/$ 
-0.74 E-2 0.14 (-2.79) (1-88) 
Chartist B V/$ 
-0.25 E-2 0.40 E-2 (-1.37) (0.71 E-1) 
Chartist H Y/$ 
-0.27 E-2 -0.68 E-1 (-1.32) (-1.11) 
Chartist M V/$ 
-0.41 E-2 0.10 (-3.54) (2.61) 
Chartist P V/$ 
-0.35 E-2 0.60 E-1 (-1.42) (-0.86) 
Median Y/$ 
-0.40 E-2 0.53 E-1 (-3.16) (1.30) 
(a) Figures in parentheses are t-stat istics. 
R2 DW 
0.99 E-1 1.87 
0.16 E-3 1.51 
0.37 E-1 1.36 
0.20 1.93 
0.28 E-1 2.24 
0.50 2.07 
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Table 7.3a: Testing for regressive expectations, 
1 week ahead forecasts(a) (Dependent variable (tSe+1 
.S Rate Constant ýit tR 21 
0) 
Chartist A $/F- 0.10 
-0.17 0.13 (2-34) (-2.22) 
Chartist B $/F- 
-0.13 E-2 0.67 E-2 0.40 E-3 (0.38 E-1) (0.11) 
Chartist H $/F- 
-0.31 E-1 0.58 E-1 0.25 E-1 (-0.84) (0.90) 
Chartist L $/F- 0.76 E-1 
-0-13 0.49 E-1 (1.35) (-1.28) 
Chartist M $/E 0.55 E-1 
-0-90 0.15 (2.47) (-2.28) 
Chartist P $/F- 
-0.19 E-1 0.37 E-1 0.13 E-1 (-0.57) (0.62) 
Median $IF- 0.13 E-1 
-0.20 E-1 0.78 E-2 (0.57) (-0.50) 
Rate 
Chartist A DM/$ 
Chartist B DM/$ 
Chartist H DM/$ 
Chartist L DM/$ 
Chartist M DM/$ 
Chartist P DW$ 
Median DW$ 
Constant at R2 
0.11 
-0-18 0.17 (2.42) (-2-54) 
-0-38 E-1 0.59 E-1 0-30E-1 (-1.06) (0-99) 
-0-58 E-1 0.95 0.75 E-1 (-1.64) (1-61) 
-0-33 E-2 0.21 E-2 0.45 E-4 (-0.99 E-1) (0.38 E-1) 
0.65E-1 
-0.12 0.23 (2.76) (-2.99) 
0.30 E-2 
-0.11 E-1 0.12 E-2 (0-87 E-1) (-0.19) 
0.98 E-2 


















Table 7.3a: (contd. ) 
Rate Constant at R2 DW 
Chartist A V/$ 0.68 
-0.14 0.99 E-1 1.88 (1.86) (-1.88) 
Chartist B V/$ 0.38 E-1 
-0.83 E-2 0.64 E-3 1.51 (0-13) (-0.14) 
Chartist H V/$ 
-0-18 0.36 E-1 0.10 E-1 1.19 (-0.58) (0-57) 
Chartist L V/$ 0.42 
-0-88 E-1 0.10 1.39 (1-89) (-1.90) 
Chartist M Y/$ 0.32 
-0.67 E-1 0.13 2.01 (2.11) (-2.14) 
Chartist P V/$ 
-0.25 0.50 E-1 0.18 E-1 2.37 (-0.74) (0.73) 
Median V/$ 0.20 
-0.42 E-1 0.37 E-1 2.09 (1.08) (-1.10) 
(a) Figures in parentheses are 't-ratios' 
- 
those for the constant term 
will have a t-distribution, those for the exchange rate term will 
have aDickey-Fullerdistribution. Significance values for the 
latter are 1% 
-3.58; 5% -2.93; 10%-2.60 (Fuller, 1976). 
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Table 7.3b: Testing for regressive expectations: 4 week ahead 
forecasts(8) (Dependent Oriable tSet+4 SO 
Rate Constant at R2 DW 
Chartist A $/E 0.42 
-0.77 0.38 0.57 (4.34) (-4.43) 
Chartist B $/E 
-0.14 0.24 0.15 1.67 (-2.41) (2.37) 
Chartist H $/F- 
-0.24 0.41 0.47 1.49 (-5-65) (5.37) 
Chartist M $/E 0.11 
-0-18 0.20 1.45 (2.76) (-2.58) 
Chartist P $/rL 
-0.12 0.21 0.15 1.59 (-2.14) (2.10) 
Median $/E 
-0.40 E-1 0.66 E-1 0.36 E-1 1.43 (-1.19) (1.09) 
Rate Constant at R2 DW 
Chartist A DM/$ 0.31 
-0.51 0.16 0.54 (2.54) (-2-51) 
Chartist B DM/$ 
-0.15 0.26 0.19 1.64 (-2.64) (2.78) 
Chartist H DM/$ 
-0.19 0.33 0.31 1.80 (-3.60) (3-83) 
Chartist M DM/$ 0.14 
-0.24 0.34 1.03 (3-55) (-3.70) 
Chartist P DM/$ 
-0.48 E-1 0.74 E-1 0.20 E-1 1.04 (-0.77) (0.72) 
Median DM/$ 
-0.78 E-2 -0-15 0.14 E-2 0.96 (-0.19) (-0.21) 
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Table 7.3b: (contd. ) 
Rate Constant at 2 R DW 
Chartist A V/$ 0.77 
-0-16 0.13 1.99 (0-35) (-2.20) 
Chartist B V/$ 
-0.11 0.22 E-1 0.59 E-2 1.51 (-0.45) (0.44) 
Chartist H Y1$ 
-0.33 0.68 E-1 0.40 E-1 1.29 (-1.17) (1.16) 
Chartist M V/$ 0.37 
-0.77 E-1 0.17 2.00 (2.32) (-2.34) 
Chartist P V/$ 
-0.22 0.45 E-1 0.15 E-1 2.25 (-0.64) (0.63) 
Median V/$ 0.15 
-0.32 0.23 E-1 2.07 (0.85) (-0.87) 
(a) See footnote to Table 7.3a 
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Table 7.4a: Summary of tests for adaptive and regressive 
expectations(8) 
Forecaster I week predictions 4 week predictions 
Accept AE? Accept RE? Accept AE? Accept RE? 
C DM V C DM V C DM V E DM 
A NN N N N N yy N y N 
B NN N N N N NN N N N 
H NY N N N N NN N N N 
M yy y N y N NN y N y 
P NN N N N N NN N N N 
L yy y N N N 
Median NN N N N N NN N N N 









Forecaster 1 week predictions 4 week predictions 
Accept EE? Accept BWE? Accept EE? Accept BWE? 
C DM V C DM VE DM V C DM V 
A NNN NN Nyy N NN N 
B NNN NN NNN N NN N 
H NNN NN NNN N NN N 
M yNy NN NNN y NN N 
p NNN NN NNN N NN N 
L NNN NN N 
Median NNN NN NNN N NN N 
(a) AE 
= adaptive expectations; RE = regressive expectations. (b) EE 
= 





The aim of this thesis was to enquire into the tools and techniques of chartist 
analysis, its perceived importance in the foreign exchange market and the 
nature of the advice provided. Although the results of the study are manifold, 
some broad themes can be seen to have emerged. 
First, a recurring feature of this thesis has been evidence on the heterogenous 
nature of chartist advice. Chartists are far from being a homogeneous group, 
and the advice given can vary markedly across a sample of analysts. This 
was first indicated from the survey of their methods in Chapter 2, when even 
the calculated indices were seen to have many possible permutations, and 
when combined with the subjective interpretation of patterns, the possibilities 
for difference of interpretation widen further. Added to which, evidence from 
the questionnaire survey of foreign exchange dealers highlighted that chart 
advice is in general seen as complementary to the fundamental approach. 
What eventually enters the dealing decision is likely to be, at most, a diluted 
interpretation of chartism. Having said this, comments by market participants 
indicate that when chart signals and fundamental advice confirm each other, 
the trader is likely to take more decisive action. 
It is apparent that some chartist some practitioners are better than others; and 
given the range of analytical tools open to them, this should not be surprising. 
The comparisons between individual chartists and against other forecasting 
methods showed a range of performance, varying from out-performing all 
other methods to under-performing all alternatives. To what extent this result 
is due to the analysis applied, or to a genuine 'feel'for the market cannot be 
known 
- 
but the results hopefully explode any myths about a 'homogeneous 
mass of chartists' in the market. 
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It is, however, clear from the results of the questionnaire survey that this brand 
of non-fundamental influence is perceived as an important force by foreign 
exchange market practitioners. Clearly, therefore, research on the foreign 
exchange market should not ignore non-fundamental influences, and some 
understanding of the methods used and their role in the market would seem to 
be essential to researchers of these areas. 
A further broad theme to emerge is that of chartists' global effect on the 
market. The finding that chartist advice does not appear to be intrinsically 
destabilising (even in any individual case) is surely reassuring news to those 
concerned about the stability of modern financial markets. It is, however, 
unrealistic to draw wider conclusions from the evidence presented here 
concerning, for example, market regulation. The caveats (see Chapter 5) 
made regarding the sample size and period considered mean that the 
empirical results should be interpreted alongside other evidence on foreign 
exchange markets, and that there is considerable scope for further work on 
theseissues. 
For example, the work of Frankel and Froot (eg 1986b) suggested that here 
had been periods in the 1980s when market fundamentals pointed to a 
weakening of the dollar, yet it still continued to appreciate, implying that non- 
fundamental influences could be dominant by default. It is very likely that 
results emerging from analysing chartists expectations could differ, possibly 
markedly, between trending and non-trending periods of the market. 
Bearing these considerations in mind, it has been clearly demonstrated in this 
thesis, using a variety of data sources and techniques, that consideration of 
chartist non-fundamental influences should not be precluded from work in the 
area of foreign exchange markets in particular, and other financial markets in 
general. 
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